


## Relations Between Politicians and Administrators at the District Level

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Relations Between Politicians and Administrators at the District Level



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**Relations Between  
Politicians and Administrators  
at the District Level**

*A study for the  
Administrative Reforms Commission  
Government of India*

**SHANTI KOTHARI M.P.**

John F. Kennedy Professor of Politics

*and*


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**INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  
AND  
THE CENTRE OF APPLIED POLITICS  
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*TO OUR*  
***RESPONDENTS***



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

THE nature of relationship between the two important institutions of a polity, that is, political leadership and administration, has very significant bearing on systemic goal gratification in emerging nations like India. Yet, no systematic study of this relationship is available to illumine this unexplored area. The present study is expected to fill the gap that currently exists in public administration literature. This study would not have been possible without the positive cooperation of several Members of Parliament, Members of the Legislature and members of Zila Parishad belonging to almost all political parties, several opinion leaders and civil servants. We are extremely grateful to our respondents who want to remain anonymous but without whose sympathetic cooperation during the field survey stage of the study and, more importantly, critical evaluation of the findings of the study in a round table conference, the study would not have been what it is.

We express our sense of gratitude to the Ford Foundation and particularly to Dr. Edward A. Kieloch and Professor Ross Pollock who gave their time ungrudgingly. Their association in this study was, to say the least, very helpful.

Our discussions with Dr. P. B. Gajendragadkar, Vice-President of the Centre of Applied Politics and Vice-Chancellor of Bombay University, formerly the Chief Justice of India, went a long way in helping our endeavour.

The late Professor R. Bhaskaran, Member of the Governing Body of the Centre of Applied Politics and a leading thinker of this country, alas, could not live to see the study in print. We have greatly profited from his insights, experiences, deep knowledge and refreshing ideas.

We are very thankful to Dr. J. N. Khosla, Director, Indian Institute of Public Administration, for his valuable cooperation at every stage of the study.

We take this opportunity to express our deep appreciation for the devotion and dedication to the work shown by every member

of the research team composed of Suresh P. Verma, Ranjit Chaudhari, P. N. Iyer, Gajanand Pandey, C. N. Bhalerao, Indu Shekhar Sharma, Sant Saran, Rama Rao, Neelam Mandal, Rama Gupta, Usha Narang and Renu Sachedeva. The secretariat composed of Mr. R. G. Mulgund, K. Narayanan, K. M. Thomas, R. K. Kaushik, K. K. Joshi and Manik Rao helped administratively and otherwise by equally admirable devotion.

We must also express our thanks to Professor V. Jagannadham and Mr. B. S. Narula for their assistance and help.

Our discussions with Dr. B. N. Ganguli, Vice-Chancellor, Delhi University, Professor M. N. Srinivas, Head of the Department of Sociology, Dr. Douglas Ensminger, Representative in India, Ford Foundation, Professor Edwin A. Bock of Syracuse University, and Dr. Herman Stein of Case Western Reserve University, Ohio, helped us enormously in conducting the study.

Dr. Suresh P. Verma in spite of his heavy engagements helped us in various ways. We are thankful to him for that.

Discussions with Academician Rumyantsev and Professor Sidorov, Dr. S. A. Mikoyan and Mr. J. S. Kostko, Academy of Sciences, USSR and leaders of Moscow and Leningrad Soviets, as well as similar exchange of views with scholars in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and other countries, helped us widen our perspective.

We thank Mr. Om Anand for his untiring zeal in making the study highly presentable.

If anyone has been a source of inspiration—academically, and otherwise throughout the study—it is one man, Shri Asoka Mehta, President of the Centre of Applied Politics, who is also Chairman of the Indian Institute of Public Administration.

We have all learned in the process of this study, which is just an humble beginning in this virgin field.

SHANTI KOTHARI  
RAMASHRAY ROY

NEW DELHI,  
June 16, 1969,

## FOREWORD

I AM happy to bring to the attention of our people the valuable and pioneering study made by the Indian Institute of Public Administration and the Centre of Applied Politics.

The relationship between the administrator and the politician in a country like ours has rarely been explored. The study shows to what extent, in the absence of a meaningful analysis, the relationship assumes the character of blind men describing the elephant. Here is a vital area where neither instinctive impressions nor even intuitive perceptions are enough. We are indebted to Professor Shanti Kothari and his colleagues for the perceptive and illuminating study they have brought out.

I wish that it had been possible for the Centre to carry out simultaneously a parallel study in a district in Maharashtra where the Zilla Parishad and the Panchayat Samitis enjoy a wide extent of powers and where the popular representatives have direct administrative responsibility and also *administrative* relationship with a diversified cadre of officials. Such a study would have shown how far conclusions drawn from Meerut district tend to get modified when effective decentralization of powers is brought about.

If I may hazard a guess based upon my fairly close knowledge of some districts in Maharashtra, the findings emerging in Meerut would get modified to a considerable extent in the desired direction. A certain tension is bound to exist between the politicians and the administrators but it is likely to operate in a winding context of mutual cooperation and reciprocal needs.

In the absence of effective decentralization of power, able politicians tend to gravitate to politics at State or national level. That drains district politics of talent while simultaneously enhancing the possibilities of interference in district affairs from levels above the district.

It is interesting to find that politicians have a poor image of themselves. That means that they are aware of the complexities of

modern administration and of their inadequacies to grapple with them. Here is an area of activity carved out for the Centre of Applied Politics. It should be possible to work out courses, both spot and correspondence, for politicians at the district level to enable them to comprehend and deal with administrative problems that emerge at that level. Likewise, the Indian Institute of Public Administration (and similar bodies) can help the officials to reorient their understanding and approaches in consonance with the claims of development and democratic functioning.

We have to move in both the directions simultaneously: effective decentralization of authority and better education and understanding about the common tasks to be performed among both the politicians and the administrators.

If we can articulate a political system with two or three political parties competing and alternating among themselves for power some of the difficulties and distortions brought out by Professor Kothari could disappear. Such a structure would evoke somewhat sustained responsibility among the politicians and responsiveness among the administrators to the suggestions of informed and experienced politicians.

In districts where political parties have sound party organizations and capable leaders, the relationship between the politicians and the administrators moves towards normalcy. I cannot say how high the district of Meerut rates on this particular scale.

Democracy, even development-oriented democracy, has to accept the Rule of Law, that is government by Laws (Rules) and not by Men. This does not mean either rigidity of rules or subjective variations of them. It means frequent revision of rules in the light of the experience encountered. Rules need not be a bed of Procrustes. Periodically, superior officers need to consult district officials and politicians to find out how rules operate. The rules may have to be varied to suit regional (a group of districts) requirements, and even certain specified variations can become an integral part of the rules themselves. The drawing up of rules has to become a creative exercise and not just abstract formulations.

Professor Kothari's report shows that in a district between the politicians and the administrators, cross purpose proclivities abound. His warning should stir us to purposive action. The relationships

are complex but not beyond the capacity of rational forethought and organized improvement. Professor Kothari provides both the diagnosis of our ills and the prognosis for their cure.

ASOKA MEHTA

PARLIAMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI

29th July, 1968.



## PREFACE

THE present study of "Relations between Politicians and Administrators at the District Level" is a pioneering venture in the field. It has been done under the chairmanship of Professor Shanti Kothari. It is for the first time that an empirical research of this kind has been carried out in our country. This study has been conducted on behalf of our Institute as a part of a series of studies taken up for the Administrative Reforms Commission. Effective formulation and implementation of programmes of development is possible only with the active help and collaboration of the representatives of the people. Smooth and cooperative relationship between political leaders and administrators is, therefore, of supreme importance. Even though this issue relates to interaction between political and administrative processes, it is vital to any scheme of reorienting the administrative machinery to the new tasks and responsibilities of Government in the field of development.

The study has been confined, being a pilot project, to one district, *i.e.*, Meerut. A district was chosen because it is where citizens today come in contact with administration. It is the base both for administration and political hierarchy and a meeting ground between traditional and modern societies.

Using the techniques of role analysis, the authors have examined in detail the normative referents and role perceptions of administrators and political leaders, their image of each other and behavioural styles of their mutual interaction. Notwithstanding its pilot character, the study furnishes some penetrating insights into the existing relationship between politicians and administrators at the district level. The problem has been viewed in the context of the achievement of basic societal goals by these two sets of functionaries. We learn that even though the administrators would like to use their better judgment to meet the demands of local situations, they have a propensity to give precedence to bureaucratic rules, regulations and procedures. They try to preserve their bureaucratic autonomy from the pressures of political leaders and

show special deference to superiors' instructions. They do seek support of political leaders and try to establish good relations with them but their effort in this direction is much less than that of political leaders. Administrators do not perceive it as their role to modify policy decisions on the advice of political leaders. They feel obliged to refuse to carry out the unsound decisions made by elected bodies. Nor do they allow the different socio-economic interests in the district to influence bureaucratic decisions and programme execution. The overall finding is that administrators have a negative orientation to "representative politics".

The study also shows that political leaders do bring to administrators unreasonable and improper demands and apply pressures to get these fulfilled. They are concerned much more with advancement of parochial and narrow interests than those of the district as a whole. Political leaders, though professedly committed to democratic principles and inclined to establish amicable relations with administrators, are in actual behaviour considerably influenced by exigencies of a particular situation. They perceive their role as representatives of the people in terms of their personal conception of what should be the best course of action. Instead of adapting their own conception to the demands of the people they attempt to convert the latter to their personal views. They all the same perform useful watch-dog operations and focus public attention on administrative abuses.

According to this study, both political leaders and administrators have a very low image of each other. Political leaders have also a low self-image. The adverse evaluation of each other by political leaders and administrators appears to arise from insufficient understanding and appreciation of each other's role. Both try to give greater importance to the requirement of their own role over that of the other. Political leaders and administrators do not perceive their roles strictly in terms of policy-making and execution respectively. Distribution of loans, grants and subsidies, selection of sites for programmes, redress of public grievances, and dealing with emergency situations are perceived by both the parties generally as a joint responsibility. There is a manifest tendency on the part of both to encroach upon each other's territory. However, despite their desire to share these responsibilities with political leaders, administrators are largely interested in safeguarding their power position and keeping the politicians at distance. It is only

political leaders who substantially recognize the importance of contacts between administrators and themselves.

The incongruence between the values and attitudes of political leaders and administrators, which the study highlights, is essentially not conducive to attainment of national economic and social goals. There is no denying that administrators need to be more responsive to the felt-needs and legitimate demands of the various citizen groups. They also need to change their procedure-ridden outlook and become result-oriented. The particularistic character of articulation of citizens' interests by political leaders in the district today acts as a constraint on development of free and participative relations between administrators and politicians. We have in recent years devoted not insignificant attention to problems of economic development and administrative reform and reorganization. We have, however, not seriously thought of accelerating the process of political growth in terms of meeting new challenges. It deserves to be fully recognized that the establishment of a democratic form of government does not automatically bring about democratic advance. Democratic growth has to be rationally planned and nursed. There is need to synchronise economic development, administrative change and political growth. None of them can proceed very far without the other. Even bureaucracy cannot be made responsive without reinforcement of outside sanctions, which implies the strengthening of processes of political socialization and interest articulation.

The present study marks a beginning of the Institute's efforts in the field of empirical research on relations between political and administrative elite. The study helps extend our insights into the problem and throws new hypothesis for further research. There is obviously scope for sophistication of underlying concepts in further studies. Relations between politicians and administrators operating within the framework of Panchayati Raj institutions deserve a separate study. It may be desirable to distinguish between basic and operational policies in studying the perceptions of political leaders and administrators of their role in policy decisions taken at the district level. The desire on the part of political leaders and administrators to share in certain areas each other's role as defined by policy-execution dichotomy is not necessarily a disquieting feature. It represents an emerging, though inadequate, form of mutual adjustment. Policy-execution is a

continuum and does not admit of water-tight compartmentalization, particularly at the district level where most of the policy-making is of an operational character.

We are grateful to Professor Shanti Kothari, John F. Kennedy Professor of Politics, for guiding this difficult and high-quality piece of research and breaking altogether new ground. We have no doubts that the study will be found greatly useful by scholars and practitioners both of public administration and politics. We would also like to thank the Ford Foundation for their generous financial support for this project as well as several other studies taken up by us recently on problems of administrative improvement and functioning of the machinery of government.

J. N. KHOSLA

*Director*

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

NEW DELHI,  
August 17, 1968.

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
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## CHAPTER I

### THE ADMINISTRATOR AND THE POLITICIAN THEORETICAL CONCERNS

THE developing countries are distinguished from the developed ones by the fact that they are set upon a course of planned rapid social change. This statement may seem to be a truism; nevertheless it emphasizes a very significant aspect of the change to be brought in these countries. This pertains to the fact that such a change is intended to initiate a process of what Karl W. Deutsch refers to as social mobilization, that is,

... an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life.... It... brackets together a number of more specific processes of change, such as changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, of face-to-face contacts, of association, of institutions, roles and ways of acting, of experience and expectations, and finally of personal memories, habits and needs, including the need for new patterns of group affiliation and new images of personal identity.... Social mobilization can be defined, therefore, as the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour.<sup>1</sup>

It would appear, then that the scope of intended change is quite extensive pervading almost all spheres of life in these countries. It is of course true that all societies are subject to change, but it is only in the developing countries that change on such a large scale and in such a short span of time is sought to be brought about. This is what distinguishes the developing countries from the developed one and underlines the immensity of the task that confronts the people in the developing

<sup>1</sup> "Social Mobilization and Political Development", *American Political Science Review*, LV, 3 (September, 1961), pp. 493-94.

countries. It is immense because it involves a tireless but at the same time tiresome process of transforming ways of life of the crucial, if not all, sectors of population. Models of the developed countries do provide some guidelines but they cannot become a substitute for the traumatic experience that people in the developing countries must undergo in getting themselves loosened from their traditional moorings, letting themselves adrift in the stream of the unknown and striving to find new moorings, new identities and new purposes. It involves, furthermore, acquiring of new orientations, new skills and capabilities in order to give practical shape to new purposes.

It is in yet another sense that the developing countries are distinguished from the developed ones. It is not only the immensity of the problems that must be coped with but also the fact that all these problems must be grappled with and solved simultaneously. (The experience of the developed countries indicate that they had to cope with these problems one at a time. The developing countries, on the contrary, have to transform their society by fighting simultaneously on several fronts. They have to strengthen the authority of the central government and widen the range of public participation in political processes. At the same time, they have also to enlarge the range of the distribution of economic benefits, create new opportunities and satisfy the people's aspirations for upward mobility. In this process, the social structure itself has to be modified in order to make it consistent with other subsystems.) In short, the developmental efforts mean national integration, the opening of new opportunities and the bringing of new benefits to more and more people.

One more factor that sets apart the developing countries from the developed ones relates to the fact that in this stupendous task of nation-building, the government is to function not only as the prime energizer of developmental efforts but also as a vital agent of change. This has meant a fundamental change in the very concept of government; not only has its standing in society shifted from a purveyor of coercion to a dispenser of welfare and well-being, but even the range and character of its activity has acquired a new dimension and a considerable depth and penetration into the social and psychological basis of civic society. This has an added importance particularly in a country like India where the democratic form of government puts certain normative as well as operational constraints on the freedom of government action. And

yet the role the government has to play in initiating, implementing and sustaining development programme is enormous.

But before the government can hope to succeed in the task of social mobilization, four problems—national integration, legitimization of the political regime, democratization, and economic development—must be solved. It is a well known fact that the developing countries are characterized by what Edward Shils calls “fragmented nationality”. The existence of parochial and sectional loyalties based upon a plethora of diversities promote at best only a tenuous identification with the national community which may at any moment be submerged in the conflicting claims of various contending forces. The forging of national identity is, therefore, the first problem that the developing countries must solve. Similarly, the political institutions, borrowed largely from the western democracies, have been grafted on societies where normative as well as operative codes of behaviour provide little sustenance to these institutions. Unless they are perceived as legitimate instrument of satisfying people's aspirations, there is little hope of these institutions being accepted by the people. The legitimization of the political regime is, therefore, the second problem that needs solution.

The third problem pertains to democratic sharing of political power, internalization of democratic norms and commitment to “the rules of the game”. Since democratic institutional framework has been made the fulcrum of political development, it is vital that the prevailing particularistic, ascriptive and functionally diffuse criteria of social organization and distribution of power should give way to universalistic, achievement-oriented and functionally specific criteria. In other words, it is necessary that for the successful functioning of democratic institutions appropriate socio-psychological conditions be created. Lastly, legitimization of political regime and democratization depend, to a very great extent, on the capacity of the government to bridge the gap between people's material aspirations and their satisfaction. The extremely backward nature of the economy, lack of resources, technical know-how and appropriate attitudes—all make rapid economic progress a difficult proposition. However, if economic development lags behind, it may lead to disaffection and alienation posing a great threat to the stability and effectiveness of the political regime.

In short, then, the capacity of the developing countries to solve their problems and get ahead with the task of nation-building depends

on the viability of their internal political system, its continued capability to lend coherence and meaning to a medley of contending internal political forces, maintain law and order, insure sustained economic growth and promote consensual identification with the nation and the national government on the part of the people divided into numerous religions, races, ethnic groups, etc.) It is apparent that the loads on the developing countries are significant and unless they are effectively handled there is always present the possibility of what S. N. Eisenstadt calls "breakdown of modernization."

The fact that the purpose, the goals and the techniques of development are unfamiliar, and not inofthen alien, to the accustomed ways of the thinking and working of the people makes it necessary that a general acceptance of and commitment to the purposes, goals and techniques of nation-building must somehow be created. It is necessary that the developmental goals must be communicated to various social sectors, support of citizens be mobilized and translated into new patterns of actions. In other words, it is essential that the whole society, or at least the crucial segments of it, be a partner in the gigantic effort of transforming the nation and shaping its destiny. A simple awareness of national goals is not enough; what is even more important is that people should accept these goals as legitimate, commit themselves to their implementation, and make sustained efforts to translate them into actions.

It must, however, be emphasized that old habits die hard. The strength of traditional modes of thought and workways greatly impedes the process of harnessing of energies to the task of nation-building. Yet the task is urgent and cannot be left to the mechanism of gradual process of evolution in which different forces work out their own balance and somehow things move ahead. If misutilization of human resources, economic imbalances and the miseries that unbalanced growth entails are to be avoided, it is necessary to work out a well co-ordinated plan of development as well as control its direction. Here again, the success of such an endeavour depends on the kind of relationship and interaction that obtain between the mass of the citizens and the governing elites. It must be admitted that the values that are sought to be achieved as a result of development are the values of those who have felt acute dissatisfaction with the prevailing system and want to reorient it to a totally new system of values. This necessarily sets the

modernizing sector apart from the traditional sectors and creates a difficult problem of communication and interaction between the two.

All this points to the necessity of social mobilization with a view to insuring a sustained support to the efforts of nation-building. To put it differently, the problem confronting the developing countries is to "accommodate the past with the modern present, to economize resources in the face of mounting and cumulating crises, and to elicit intelligent and meaningful cooperation from a public thus far ignorant and indifferent in its orientations towards the distant government."<sup>2</sup> No doubt, accommodation of the old and the new and economization of resources are important but more important in this regard is the active and willing cooperation of the people whose destiny the developmental plans are to affect and change. For, without such a support even a well conceived plan of development is likely to flounder on the rock of indifference, inertia, and inaction.

Whether or not the public participates in the nation-building activities in a meaningful and intelligent way depends upon three sets of factors: (1) the degree of value-congruence between the modernizing elites and the mass of citizens; (2) effectiveness of the political sector in problem-solving; and (3) the extent of structural shift in the distribution of political power. We noted earlier the divergence that exists between the values held by the ruling elites and the citizens. The developmental aspirations symbolize the values that are held by the ruling elites who want to change, through conscious and deliberate efforts, the structure of the society in such a way that it will favourably respond to the demands of development planning. It needs no evidence to demonstrate that the traditional criteria of social organization and distribution of power, that is, the prevalence of particularistic, ascriptive and functionally diffuse criteria of social organization and distribution of power, hamper and, at times prevent, developmental process. It is, therefore, necessary that the citizens must be induced to change their outlook, their orientations and methods of work. Without forging a value-congruence between the ruling elites and the citizens, developmental process is likely to be characterized by tensions, conflicts and frustrations.

<sup>2</sup> S. J. Eldersveld, A. P. Barnabas and V. Jagannadham, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy: An Empirical Study in Delhi State* (New Delhi: The Indian Institute of Public Administration, 1968), p. 2.

Besides the question of value-congruence, there is also the question of effectiveness of the political order in problem-solving. Effectiveness means "actual performance, the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of government as most of the population and powerful groups within it . . . see them".<sup>3</sup> Included in it are such basic functions as maintenance of law and order, defence against external aggression, etc., and successful execution of developmental plans. It should be emphasized here that it is the actual performance of the political system that promotes effective orientation in the citizens towards the government. It is the rock bed on which legitimacy of a political system rests. If government performance falls below a particular level and popular feeling that the government is getting ineffective grows, there is every likelihood that legitimacy of the government will gradually erode.

Equally important is the phenomenon of structural shifts in the distribution of political power. The modern period is characterized by an increasing demand for participation in decision-making processes and a share in political power. Such a demand naturally tends to jeopardize the privileged position of the traditional power holders. A move on the part of traditional power holders to block access of under-privileged strata of the society of political power may lead to conflict and eventually to political instability. If, on the other hand, access to power is relatively easy and is achieved without any major conflict, people develop a sense of legitimacy in the political system. "Political systems which deny new strata access to power except by revolution also inhibit the growth of legitimacy by introducing millenial hopes into the political arena."<sup>4</sup>

We have thus far considered some of the conditions which must exist for the political system to be able to receive support for itself and its programmatic values. But what are the structures which are instrumental in mobilizing such a support? Two critical structures can readily be identified: the administrative system and political leadership. "Administration," as Eldersveld observes, "is a set of critical structures and processes serving as intermediaries between citizens and leaders, between consumer-producers and planners".<sup>5</sup> In the vastly increased

<sup>3</sup> S. M. Lipset, *Political Man : The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1960), p. 75.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>5</sup> S. J. Eldersveld, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

functions of the government, administrators occupy a crucial position. Once policies have been laid down and the course of action in each policy area has been determined, the performance of the governmental functions rests squarely on administrators. The administrator is primarily concerned with what is called the 'output' function of the political system. It should, however, be noted that output functions have a great bearing on input functions because they determine, to a great extent, public orientation towards the government, the expectations that the public has from the government and the demands that are channeled into the political process. In other words, the administrative structure forms a crucial link between polity and society.

Of even more importance is the fact that in both the developed and the developing nations the government has become a major agent of change. "The time is evidently past when public officials are expected to sit on the developmental sidelines, limiting their roles to the fixing of general rules and to providing certain basic services and incentives for those private entrepreneurs who are the major players in the complicated and exciting game of fashioning profound changes in economic and social systems."<sup>6</sup> There is hardly any aspect of life which is beyond the scope of government activity. Whether this massive involvement in social change is due to ideological reasons or due to the fact that the bureaucracy is the only stable and continuous social organization to carry out the tasks of development, the fact remains that not only have the traditional functions of the maintenance of law and order, collection of revenue and provisions of public utilities to be performed against a changed perspective but several new and complex functions have to be undertaken.

All this has necessitated a change in orientation as well as workways of administrators who are responsible for implementing developmental plans. A change in the predispositions of those occupying various positions in the bureaucracy is a *sine qua non* of success in nation-building efforts. For, it is a known trait of any institutional occupation, especially one with an elaborate framework of rules and traditions, to get so routinized that a slow change in tasks to be performed do not necessarily induce commensurate change in capabilities and predispositions. It is only after the process has gone far enough that the lag

<sup>6</sup> Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 4.

between tasks and abilities is revealed and the need for urgent change is felt. In India it is only recently being realized that the administrator has to go beyond his traditional skills and orientations and develop a new approach to his responsibilities, a new style of conducting himself, and a new level of commitment to programmatic values that development emphasizes. If the public bureaucracy is to succeed as a major instrument of social transformation, it has to break away from some of its traditional attitudes and workways, immerse itself in the values of social change, reorient its attitude towards the people it has been in the habit of ruling, and form a partnership with them and their representatives for performing the tasks that the country has set for itself.

In short, then, administrators in a country like India, where a massive programme of social transformation has been launched, occupy a crucial position in the formulation of policy decisions, implementation of developmental plans and influencing public disposition towards the political regime as well as its programmatic values. If administrators fail in playing their changed role skilfully and judiciously, the entire development effort is likely to be jeopardized.

Not less important is the role of political leadership in nation-building. It constitutes that stratum of society which is most actively engaged in the performance of those tasks that give direction and content to development. These tasks include, to enumerate a few important ones, the building of structure of support, the mobilization of different elements and, through all this, authoritative allocation of values in the public at large. It is this stratum which is most articulate and politically alive and plays a crucial role in policy formulation and implementation. Further, it mobilizes public support not only for the political regime but also for those activities that a political regime usually undertakes.

Occupying a central position and manning the channels of communication and decision-making the leadership at various levels forges a link between political institutions and the mass of the population, and functions as centres of transmission for the diffusion of proper incentives, beliefs and behaviours. Particularly in a developing nation where the hiatus between society and the political stratum is great, the role of the leadership assumes a central importance. In such a society, the politically active strata and the traditions they develop are perhaps the only effective links that bridge the gap between the regime and the

people, between town and country and the upper and lower classes. If such an effective and sensitive leadership fails to emerge at various levels—or having emerged hesitates to act—the hiatus between traditional society and the modernizing segments will remain unbridged endangering the viability of the political regime—especially as technological and educational processes will throw up amorphous and unorganized mass that is easy to manipulate by adventurists and anomic forces that are likely to be at large.

Like the administrators, the leadership in the developing countries constitutes an important link between society and polity and is responsible for the diffusion of those norms that give sustenance to a democratic political order, mobilizing support for the political regime, creating a sense of legitimacy in the public towards the government, and resolving the crisis of participation thereby promoting a structural shift in power distribution. Both these structures,—that is, administration and leadership—contribute in their own different ways to the system maintenance and performance of the basic functions of the system. Given this similarity of roles, however, there is a great amount of divergence in their respective roles. First, administrators are public servants and are supposed to be “value neutral” in implementing policy decisions made by political leaders. Political leaders, on the other hand, would be wanting in their duty if they refrained from taking sides on public issues. It is through the conflict of opposing ideologies, points of views and interests that a consensus on policies and programmes usually emerges. The politician is primarily responsible for forging a consensus. When this consensus has been forged and programmatic strategies worked out, the administrator steps in to give practical shape to policy decisions and is held responsible for the implementation of policies without any reference to his own value preferences.

It would, however, be an exaggeration to say that all political leaders do or should support the existing political regime or its programmatic values. Ideological differences frequently divide them into hostile camps and there is a constant struggle among political parties for capturing the seats of power. But as long as these conflicts remain within the bounds of ‘rules of the game’, they do not pose any threat to the stability and effectiveness of the political regime. When these conflicts, however, relate to fundamental differences stability of political regime is threatened. Whatever the case, what is important

is the fact that political leaders concern themselves not only with the process of obtaining popular consent to the course of public policy for buttressing the authority of the government but also with organizing discontent and dissatisfaction against the existing political regime. Administrators, on the other hand, do not function in an oppositional role; functioning within the range of existing consensus, they perform a crucial role in formulation of goals, planning of strategies, assigning of priorities and implementation of developmental programmes.

Secondly, political leaders are primarily concerned with the functions of interest articulation and interest aggregation. Not infrequently political leaders represent particular interests and endeavour to obtain preferential treatment for the interests they represent. However, the nature of political process compels them to rise above giving expression to particular interests and work for the broader, general and aggregated interests. Administrators, on the other hand, do not perform such functions. They have to deal with particular interests, to be sure, but in such dealings their behaviour is guided by the legal-rational norms of bureaucracy. It is contrary to their legitimate functions to have partisan identification with particular interests.

We discussed above some of the salient points about administrators and political leaders. Working in their respective fields, they are charged with the responsibility of maintaining the system and help it to perform its basic functions. Each of them occupies a different set of roles with its own normative referents and behavioural codes. But in actual practice there are many contact points and many occasions when both the administrator and the politician have to interact and influence the behaviour of each other. Take, for example, the determination of policy goals, supposedly an exclusive preserve of the politician. Here also administrators influence the behaviour of the politician by their virtual monopoly on collections of facts as bases of policy decisions, determining policy alternatives and pinpointing pragmatic restraints associated with each of the policy alternatives. To take another example, implementation of policies is supposed to be the exclusive concern of the administrator. But in actual situations, behaviour of the administrator is much more influenced by political leaders with whom he comes into contact in the process of programme implementation. The administrator may have to yield to mounting pressures created by political leaders and modify or change

programmatic strategy.

Of even more importance is the fact that administrators have to function in an environment which has its own norms, behavioural codes, a set of expectations from the administration and a standard of evaluating administrator's role in the society. If there is a great divergence between what an administrator thinks his role is and what people at large think his role should be, the administrator may be seriously handicapped in performing his duty successfully. This is also true in the case of the politician. If politicians and civil servants are

held in low esteem, if their work is derided, if abuse and invective is poured on them continuously, if loose and unsubstantial allegations are made about incompetence, dishonesty, laziness and indifference to the public interest, it is unlikely that officials will develop or display qualities of integrity, industry and public spirit.<sup>7</sup>

It would appear, then, that, in spite of the fact that administrators and politicians both occupy different role sectors and are supposed to work more or less independently of each other, there are numerous occasions for them to interact and influence each other's behaviour. In view of this the question as to what kind of relationship should obtain between the administrator and the politician assumes a great theoretical as well as practical importance. A quick review of pertinent public administration literature reveals that this question has too often been analysed from a normative point of view. Instead of analysing empirical situations where the administrator and the politician interact and then ascertaining the nature of such an interaction, scholars have started by positing certain norms of such an interaction and then drawing certain behavioural standards for both the administrator and the politician. The result is that the vast literature on public administration reveals practically very little of significance about the relationship between the administrator and the politician.

The conventional concept of the relationship between the administrator and the politician visualizes such a relationship purely in terms of a neat division of labour between the two: the politician formulates the policy and the administrator executes them. In the process of decision-making and implementation—collection of facts, formulation of policy alternatives, etc.,—the administrator is supposed to be

<sup>7</sup> William A. Robson (ed.), *The Civil Service in Britain and France* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1956), p. 13.

objective, impartial and neutral. The conventional maxim insists that ultimately determination of public policy is the responsibility of political leaders. It aims to hold administration to an instrumental role.

Whatever merit this maxim may have as a statement of behavioural norm, it fails absolutely to guide the behaviour of either the administrator or the politician in complex situations of interaction between the two.

It is true that the problem has been lurking in the minds of the analysts of public administration and deviations from the above mentioned norm have been noted but no systematic analysis of such a relationship is available to illumine this area. However, the fact remains that relationship between the administrator and the politician assumes a special significance for developing countries because of a pronounced shift in the focus of bureaucracy from preservation of law and order to the "assessment of total capital resources not only in terms of fiscal means but also by way of the general institutional resources and of the critical societal plus administrative behavioural values available".<sup>8</sup> The recent literature on bureaucracy discusses this problem. It, however, sets the problem in a larger setting, that is, the role of administrators in political development.

As Lucian W. Pye argues, "During the era of colonialism it was universally assumed that the process of political development involved primarily the creation and the effective operation of the authoritative instruments of the modern state."<sup>9</sup> Towards this end, the colonial countries focussed upon the establishment of a legal system encompassing standardized rules and regulations based upon universalistic considerations and a competent administration. Historically speaking, then, establishment and strengthening of the authoritative structures of government preceded in almost all the developing countries the creation of coherent political forces that can make meaningful people's feeling of association with the polity. This resulted in the non-emergence of political group that may assume responsibility for determining the appropriate goals of administration while at the same time respecting the integrity of the administrative system.

When the ex-colonies emerged as independent nations, there

<sup>8</sup> V. A. Pai Panandikar, "Development Administration: An Approach", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. X, No. 1 (Jan.-March, 1964), p. 37.

<sup>9</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1966), p. 15.

developed an imbalance between administrative traditions and political forces and politicians began assaulting administrative institutions. Pye argues that such assaults are inspired by relative weakness of the political sector, not strength. He observes:

Where they have, in a sense, had their day of popular acceptance, nationalist movements have now settled on the easy alternative of preserving their power rather than striving to build up permanent autonomous bases of power. The leaders of such nationalist movements have tried to achieve their destiny by politicizing, and hence corrupting, the upper reaches of the administrative structures while allowing the mass base of their movements to wither and decline.<sup>10</sup>

The relative weakness of the political sector endangers not only the representative political processes but also affects the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. Pye, therefore, suggests that "... the authoritative organs of government, weak as they are, tend to overshadow the non-bureaucratic components of the political system. Until these components have been strengthened, the new countries will have neither effective administration nor the bases for stable political processes".<sup>11</sup> This, in other words, means that the vitality and resilience of the political sector is an important factor in political development. If it is weak and ineffective, the administrative system also will be weak and ineffective.

The above discussion no doubt highlights a crucial problem of viability and relative importance of two crucial structures in the context of political development in the new countries. It does not, however, throw much light on the kind of relationship that should, or does, obtain between the administrator and the politician. The present study is an attempt to illumine this vital area of relationship between the administrator and the politician. The primary objective of this study is to explore and identify some crucial dimensions of the relationship between the administrator and the politician.

The main focus of this study, therefore, relates to the way actors in each of the interacting units, that is the administrative and the political structures, view their role in the context of district as a system of

<sup>10</sup> Lucian W. Pye, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23. For a similar view see Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View", in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 120-167.

interaction between administrators and political leaders. This interaction concerns, on the part of the administrator, a mixture of conventional bureaucratic functions of maintenance of law and order, collection of revenue and the recent one of implementing developmental plans for the purpose of transforming social, political and economic life of the country. In other words, the bureaucracy which was traditionally supposed to play only a limited role affecting a small segment of people's life is now expected to take on and implement programmes which impinge upon almost all aspects of social life.

Apart from the fact that the changed context in which bureaucracy has to operate means the acquirement of new orientations, new motivations, new commitments, and new workways, a changed relationship with political leaders who claim to have a stake in developmental plans is also indicated. If we consider for a moment the attitude of political leaders towards bureaucracy during the days of struggle for freedom movement, the necessity of reorientation in administrators' relationship with political leaders becomes obvious. Branded as the watch-dog of the interests of an alien government, administrators had always to encounter scorn and hostility from politicians. Even after independence, the left-over of hostility still persists, but the compulsions of backward society bring the two together more often in more functional forms requiring them to contribute to the realization of systemic goals in their respective fields of operation.

Given the primacy of objectives that relate to endeavour of nation-building, it is legitimate to expect both the administrator and the politician to organize their relationship in such a way that achievement of systemic goals is not seriously hampered. If developmental plans are to succeed the most efficient utilization of resources both material and human must be insured and energies of the entire nation must be channeled in the direction of systemic goal gratification. This means that all other considerations, however intense and important, must be subordinated to the overwhelming goal of nation-building. This may impose a behaviour pattern functionally conducive to systemic goal gratification on the administrator as well as the politician. It implies "a breed of bureaucrats different (e.g., more free-wheeling, less adhering to administrative forms, less attached to the importance of hierarchy and seniority) from the type of man who is useful when the primary concern of the bureaucracy is the maintenance of law and

order.”<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, it requires, on the part of the politician, commitment to the national goals, a self-imposed abstention from pursuing the partisan as well as the parochial, and a skill to relate people's aspirations to national development goals. It requires also an interaction between the administrator and the politician which is characterized by mutual trust, appreciation, understanding and cooperation.

This may, however, seem to amount virtually to the abrogation of the role of politics in nation-building. In view of the fact that this emphasizes the criteria of rationality and efficiency in the management of resources, politics loses its prime functions of control, conflict-resolution and interest articulation. Bureaucracy becomes the dominant sector in public life and politics is subjugated to realizing bureaucratic objectives. Apart from this, such a situation acts as a dampener on the emergence of forces that give sustenance to democratic politics. Bereft of its essential functions and working in subservience to bureaucratic purposes, politics tends to promote what Almond and Verba call “subject political culture”.<sup>13</sup> Further, political leaders, required to perform only the support mobilization function, settle down for “preserving their power by crowding in on the administrative structure rather than striving to build up permanent and autonomous bases of power”.<sup>14</sup> The functions of interest articulation, conflict resolution and integration are ignored. With the result that the political organs get weaker. “The relative weakness of political organs means that the political function tends to be appropriated, in considerable measure, by bureaucrats. Intra-bureaucratic struggles become the primary form of politics.”<sup>15</sup>

In a democratic political system, however, it is the strength and resilience of both the bureaucratic and the political structures that guarantees stability of political system. As Pye argues, “The great problem today in nation-building is that of relating the administrative and authoritative structures of government to political forces within the transitional societies.”<sup>16</sup> Two factors make this problem all the

<sup>12</sup> La Palombara, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

<sup>13</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 19.

<sup>14</sup> Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>15</sup> Fred W. Riggs, “Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View” in La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, p. 120.

<sup>16</sup> Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

more pressing. Firstly, administrative structures, built up during the colonial period to rule rather than to respond to political forces, have yet to be transformed into instruments of popular representative politics. Secondly, the administrator and the political leader have developed quite separate traditions of viewing and doing things. More important, having had no opportunity and tradition of working with the administrators, political leaders still harbour the memories of intense conflicts during freedom struggle. It is true that the coming of independence has erased much of this memory and the administrator and the politician have been thrown together to work out the destiny of the nation, there still persists a feeling of antagonism and opposition mentality in a sizable section of political leadership.

Now that circumstances have thrown them together, they have to work out a relationship which permits not only the maintenance of boundary between the 'bureaucratic' and the 'political' but also allows both of them to work together for accomplishing the tasks undertaken for nation-building. The necessity of an effective administration and a coherent political mobilization demands the maintenance of the autonomy of both the systems as well as forging of a relationship between the administrator and the politician which allows both of them to work in conjunction in such a way that does not jolt the system. The fulfilment of these conditions, however, is dependent upon (1) the role each of them sets for himself as well as the norms each believes should guide his behaviour, (2) images one has of the other, and (3) the kinds of issues and problems that shape their interaction.

It does not need much evidence to show that the administrator and the politician have developed separate traditions, normative referents, and patterns of behaviour. We need not go into the details of the differing traditions that influence the behaviour of the administrator and the politician except to observe that, in the case of the administrator, the dispositions and the workways that constituted the dominant attributes of administrative system in the colonial period still retain much of their significance even today. The colonial administrative system derived, to a very considerable extent, its basic pattern from the system of district administration which was geared to tightening the bonds between central, provincial, and local powers. And, "administration of the district in India was a major influence in shaping administrative attitudes of the higher civil service." However, "district work was

essentially autocratic, involving very little consultation among equals and equally little complex staff work. A premium was placed on quick decision, independent and firm action, not unlike the attributes of field military administration. Such habits and attitudes towards consultation, democratic planning, and clientele were necessarily transferred to secretariat work, where . . . the needs may have been quite different.”<sup>17</sup> As another observer notes, “the district, indeed, was an image of total government writ small.”<sup>18</sup>

The collectorate model of district administration, however, underlined formalism, impersonality and deferential character and emphasized security and lack of bureaucratic initiative. The administrators in the district demonstrated, as Philip Woodruff describes,<sup>19</sup> a tough-minded sense of reality, a pragmatic approach to problems, and the courage to disagree with superiors, to be sure, but excessive formalism, a tendency to remain aloof from the main stream of life, a feeling of superiority, a patrimonial attitude towards the people, and hierarchical articulation of bureaucratic performance. All these factors bred bureaucratic impersonality, compulsive professionalism and procedural rigidity. As Park observes, “The Collectorate model, however, was efficient and responsive to central control, if not so readily responsive to local needs.”<sup>20</sup>

These attributes, however, serve as impediments in the context of new values of social transformation emphasizing the instilling of a dynamism in society to make it capable of working out its own solution to social and economic problems. The deliberate attempts to introduce radical changes have made much of the traditional administrative dispositions and workways obsolete. As Park observes, “whereas the collectorate was calculated to operate effectively when the pace of movement and change was slow or routinely haphazard, the new developmental effort was dynamic, irregular in motion, often nervous and called for hand-tailored, snappy attention and thus was not adopted to the routines of file noting.”<sup>21</sup> The emphasis on popular participation

<sup>17</sup> Ralph Braibanti, “Reflections on Bureaucratic Reform in India”, in Ralph Braibanti and J. J. Spengler (ed.), *Administration and Economic Development in India* (Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1960), pp. 30-31.

<sup>18</sup> Richard L. Park, “Administrative Co-ordination in the District”, in Braibanti and Spengler, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>19</sup> Philip Woodruff, *The Guardians* (Vol. 2 of “The Men Who Ruled India”, New York).

<sup>20</sup> Park, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

in the execution of developmental plans underline the qualities of adaptability, innovativeness, responsiveness, and efficiency in the administrator. "Bureaucratic impersonality, compulsive professionalism, and procedural rigidity must give way to pragmatism, populism and perhaps even personalism if the system is to work."<sup>22</sup>

The politicians, on the other hand, have inherited a tradition which in the pre-independence days manifested itself in denigration of political authority and condemnation of the bureaucratic apparatus as instruments of oppression and exploitation of the native population. Given to expressing opposition to colonial regime values and programmes and violating government edicts on a large scale for a long time, the political leaders, it can be safely assumed, not only acquired an anti-authority disposition themselves but were also instrumental in propagating this attitude widely in the populace. Apart from this, although political leaders professed their commitment to democratic ideals and to the employment of governmental authority for common good, their commitments were very meagerly reinforced by experiences of concrete situations in terms of either undertaking responsibility for making policy decisions or working with administrators for insuring implementation of policies.

It is true that political leaders in the pre-independence days had the opportunity to come into power at different levels and became familiar with the functioning of the government institutions. However, such experiences were limited to a very small number of political leaders. Further, their participation in governing institutions was not only sporadic but also vitiated by the negative and flippant attitude with which they shouldered the responsibility of working these institutions. For them, the successful termination of the freedom movement was much more important than the working of representative institutions. Even when they entered these institutions, their objective was rather to wreck than to run them. The conclusion that their limited experience with representative institutions in the pre-independence days did not much reinforce their commitments to democratic ideology does not seem to be harsh.

The coming of independence, however, required the leaders to abandon their posture of opposition and agitation and function as the guardian of political authority and transmitter of democratic values.

<sup>22</sup> Eldersveld, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

The launching of developmental programmes made it necessary for them to revise their opinions about the administrator, recognize his crucial role in implementing these programmes, and create conditions which may facilitate the role performance of the administrator. The reversal of the role of the politician—from opposition to and agitation against political authority to that of sustaining and utilizing it for bringing about national transformation—also necessitated a change in his orientation, motivations, and behaviour patterns. The politician is now expected to transmit democratic values to the populace, mobilize support for the programmatic values of the regime, and cooperate with the administrator in his regime goal gratification activities, or, at least, avoid creating unsurmountable difficulties in the administrators' task performance. In other words, the politician's task consists of reducing the gap between the political authority and the mass of the citizens and to develop public confidence in and meaningful utilization of political institutions, such as the bureaucracy, which are adopted from the past to the needs of today, and to involve as well as motivate citizens and mobilize their support for programmes of social and economic change.

Ideally speaking, for the developmental goals to be efficiently carried out, it is argued that the less one encourages local social and political forces to become entangled in the growth process, except as assisted workers, the better. However, it must be recognized that development in India is not meant to be only an economic effort; it is a multi-pronged effort which aims both at economic as well as social and political development. As we argued earlier, if a balanced development is to be insured, it is necessary to strengthen, activate and vitalize both the administrative and the political processes.

It becomes, therefore, necessary that leadership is not relegated to a role of playing second fiddle to the administrator.

In order that political leaders play their role, they must be fully cognizant of the systemic values, committed to the operational codes of democratic political system and capable of meaningfully relating their role to the systemic values. Inasmuch as individuals differ from each other in respect of orientations and motivations, it is futile to expect that every political leader will have the same degree of commitment to the systemic goals as well as perception of his own role. It is, therefore, not surprising that leaders differ in regard to the norms they hold and the role they define for themselves *vis-a-vis* bureaucracy. They are


concerned not only with the universal concerns but also with the partisan and the parochial. And they also differ in the means they adopt to realize these concerns.

It is true that the realm of the administrator and that of the politician differ in many respects. (However, the nature of relationship between them depends on the types of normative referents each of them feels himself bound to take into account while adopting a course of action and how each defines his role in regard to the institutional set-up he operates in as well as in relation to the person occupying the counterposition.) To be more precise, it can be hypothesized that an administrator, who feels himself too much bound by the legal-rational norms of bureaucracy, will tend to define his role in terms of a functionary whose official conduct must reflect his abounding faith in the rightness of bureaucratic procedures and regulations and his acceptance of these as viable standards for his behaviour. In other words, such an administrator is likely to interpret his role as strictly following administrative rules and regulations in handling particular situations. It is not unlikely that he will be rigid, officious and conservative in performing his role. This role conception is most likely to incline him to visualize the role of the politician as subordinate to that of the administrator, if not superfluous. As a consequence, his relationship with the politician is likely to be characterized by misunderstanding, distrust and conflict.

Similarly, the politician may be inclined to view his own role as superior to that of the administrator and, as such, may not think it improper to exploit administrative structure for furthering partisan and parochial interests. (And, if his commitment to democratic norms is weak or he gives his allegiance to undemocratic principles, it can be expected that he will have little respect for administrative procedures. Further, even if he is not moved by the considerations of furthering partisan and parochial concerns, he is likely to be stand-offish, impatient, uncooperative, and intolerant in his dealings with the administrator. Admittedly this conception of politicians' role is least conducive to a good working relationship between the politician and the administrator.

It should be enough to show the importance of exploring and examining the normative referents and role perception of both the administrator and the politician for a better understanding of their relationship. It should, however, be emphasized here that what we are interested in is not the totality of conception of one's role but only that

part of one's role that has relevance for the relationship between the administrator and the political leader. In other words, we are interested in examining a particular role sector that impinges upon such a relationship. This can be shown as below.



1.1 DIAGRAM SHOWING THE AREA OF INTERACTION  
BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATOR AND THE  
POLITICIAN.

Both the administrator and the politician have their separate universe of role-sets. When they interact, only a part of their role universe becomes relevant for relationship between the administrator and the political leader. Our focus, therefore, is on that role sector which coincides with the interacting aspects of administrator-politician relationship.

In addition to the norms actors in each of the interacting units perceive to be relevant for their role performance and the role they define for themselves, the types of evaluative standards one position holder applies in judging the characterological attributes of the occupant of counterposition are also of vast significance to our investigation. One of the measures of evaluative standards is the image one holds of the other. Images represent not only the outcome of evaluation a person makes of another but also the nature of his affect orientation towards the object of his evaluation. Moreover, an actor's behaviour towards his counterpart is influenced, to a considerable extent, by the former's image of the latter. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate the images each has of the other.

Normative referents, conceptions of role and reciprocal image perceptions provide us only with those elements that help us in identifying the contours that interaction between administrators and political leaders may take. They do not allow us to definitely ascertain the

nature of such interaction. What they allow us to say is: given the dispositions administrators and political leaders manifest towards their own roles as well as towards each other, their interaction is likely to be of such and such character. On the basis of these, we cannot say whether it is so. The relationship between administrators and political leaders has, however, a behavioural dimension. That is, both interact in concrete situations and their relationship is also influenced by the kinds of problems and demands political leaders bring to administrators, the pressures and the way administrators respond and react to political leaders' demands and pressures. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the behavioural dimension of interaction between administrators and political leaders.

In the following chapters we will be concerned, then, with (1) normative referents and role perceptions of administrators and political leaders; (2) reciprocal images perception; and (3) behavioural dimensions of their interaction. In Chapter II, we discuss the setting and the sample followed by a discussion of administrators' normative referents and role perception in Chapter III. Chapter IV deals with the normative referents and role perceptions of political leaders while Chapter V is devoted to analysis of reciprocal image perception. In Chapter VI, we explore behavioural dimensions of interaction between administrators and political leaders. In the last chapter, we gather various strands of our analysis, seek to identify some recurring themes in this interaction and present an overview of the relationship between administrators and political leaders.

## CHAPTER II

### THE SETTING AND THE SAMPLE

GIVEN our theoretical concerns, the district was thought to be the most appropriate level where the study could be carried on most profitably. Our choice of a district as a unit of observation was influenced by several considerations. In the first place, the district is the basic unit of administration as well as of political organization. It is here that governmental policies are given practical shape—law and order is maintained, plans are implemented and facts for policy formulation collected. The district is the locus of administrative action and therefore a most appropriate unit for studying administrative behaviour. Similarly, it is the district that offers to political parties and leaders the basic unit for mobilizing political support, organizing public opinion on issues of current interest and articulating various interests.

In the second place, it is at the district level that interaction between the administrator and the politician assumes a crucial importance. It is here that the administrator and the politician come into frequent contacts while performing their different roles. Apart from the fact that political leaders have been officially associated with the conduct and direction of various development programmes, the interaction between the administrator and the politician revolves round various aspects of life in a district. The politician brings to the administration problems faced by people, requests for preferential treatment towards certain sections of the society, pressures for getting certain things done or restraining from taking certain actions, complaints about administrative lapses or high-handedness and claims for official acceptance of one set of programmes as against another. Similarly, the administrators seek the help of political leaders in maintaining law and order, in executing developmental programmes, and in solving their own personal problems. In other words, the interaction between the administrator and the politician at the district level reveals the interplay between the universal and

the parochial and, therefore, assumes a crucial importance for the study.

In the third place, it is at the district level that interaction between the traditional society and the modern political institutions assumes a vital significance for the course of political development. The reason for this is very simple. The district—the base for the administrative as well as political hierarchy—represents a geographical area which is very close to the traditional society. It is here that the traditional criteria of social organization and distribution of power can be expected to hold sway over people's mind. The administrative as well as political institutional arrangements, on the other hand, represent a value system based more or less on universal, achievement and functionally specific criteria. The gap between the traditional and the modern is great and success and effectiveness of the modernizing sectors of society depend on the extent to which non-congruence between the traditional and the modern can successfully be reduced. Further, the entire structure of the administrative system in India is founded upon legal-rational norms, that is, standardized, universalized and impersonal operational order of behaviour. If administration fails in influencing its environment and getting its basic norms accepted as legitimate codes of behaviour by the people whose behaviour it attempts to influence, the task achievement capacity of the administration will be greatly reduced. The question as to the extent of congruence between the traditional and modern values assumes a great importance. Also, we are interested in finding out the kinds of demands and pressures applied for their fulfilment are brought to the administration and the way administration responds to them. In other words, the district as a unit of observation provides ample opportunities to explore fully the theoretical dimensions of our study.

It were these considerations that led us to select district as a unit of observation. A further delimitation became possible when we decided to make this study a pilot one. However, the question of selecting one out of more than three hundred districts in India presented some problems of judgment and formulating criteria of selection. It needs no demonstration to indicate that even if the district were to be categorized on the basis of some objective criteria, the selection of one district out of many did involve some judgment. However, we settled for three considerations for selecting our unit of observation. These

criteria are detailed below:

1. *Level of politicization*: The first criterion relates to the level of politicization of the district. We decided to select a district which manifested a high degree of political awareness, political mobilization, and a greater variety of demands being put on the administration. A high degree of political awareness as well as of political mobilization are related to the variety of demands that are channeled into the administrative process. Not only does it mean a frequent and intensive interaction between the administrator and the politician but also a capacity on the people to appreciate and evaluate administrative procedures and functions and a sense of responsiveness on the part of the administrator. This criterion, therefore, allows us to select a district which manifests more or less continuous interaction between the administrator and the politician.

2. *Level of economic development*: A high degree of economic development calls for high aspirations and achievement motivations among the people, which leads to placing of frequent demands on the political and administrative systems. Secondly, high economic development in a planned economy, functioning within a democratic framework, is possible only if administration is efficient, responsive and innovative to a certain extent. The logical outcome of such a set of given premises is a multifaceted network of politician-administrator relationship.

3. The third criterion, very crucial for selection of our sample, is the history and complexity of administration of the sample universe selected for study. Public administration in India in the pre-independence era varied in form, content, training and purpose from one place to another. The spectrum varied from areas with a history of presidency administration geared and set up entirely by the British rulers at one end to the Princely States with complete administrative autonomy forming the other extreme of the spectrum. The present all India system of administration bears close resemblance to the British Administration end of the spectrum. To maintain closer resemblance to the representativeness of the sample to the prevailing all-India pattern, it was decided to select a district with a long history of district administration. Such a district can be assumed, with a fair amount of certainty, to possess a high degree of institutionalization and of awareness and acquaintance with administrative procedures on the part of the people, their representatives, and the politico-administrative system in which the politicians, the

administrators and the people participate. It is a natural corollary, therefore, that the study of such a district will provide us with right data on relationships between politicians and administrators.

#### RATIONALE FOR SELECTING MEERUT

Several districts in India satisfy these criteria of selection in one way or the other. The list gets narrowed down considerably, however, if we concentrate on only those which satisfy our criteria of selection on all the three counts. Meerut is one of those districts and was selected for the study. Additional considerations for selecting Meerut are given below:

(1) As pointed out earlier, the study being of a pilot nature and confined to one district alone, we are not interested in identifying explanatory variables in a comparative context. The study will have achieved its purpose, if it fulfils the limited objectives of throwing up hypotheses, suggesting conceptual and theoretical framework capable of analysing the problem, and evolving a set of tools and instruments for investigating the problem. Therefore it is inconsequential as to which district in particular is selected (provided it satisfied the three principal criteria laid down for selection).<sup>1</sup>

(2) Although logistic and economic considerations should not enter into theoretical interests, and are definitely subservient to them, yet they are important from a pragmatic point of view and sometimes put serious restraints. Proximity of the unit of observation to the project Headquarters facilitates greater control over field operations, and brings down the cost of field work to a considerable extent.

(3) There is a comparatively rich amount of data available on some aspects of the district administration and the local milieu of Meerut which has marginal importance for a better understanding of our problem.

#### THE SETTING

Meerut District is one of the western districts of Uttar Pradesh. This part of the State is regarded as prosperous, and Meerut gives a

<sup>1</sup> It will be necessary, though, to prepare a classified and stratified list of districts for drawing a sample for an all-India study. Sampling by selective or randomized method, or by a combination of both, is an essential requirement of an enlarged study only—either in spatial terms, or in terms of the aims, and not for a pilot study.

lead in industrial development and averages along with other districts in agricultural development. The district boundary coincides with the boundary of the Union Territory of Delhi in the south and is surrounded by Moradabad, Muzaffarnagar and Saharanpur on other sides. The district headquarters is in the city of Meerut, the biggest urban centre in the district. Meerut city is well connected with all cities and towns within the district and with urban centres outside by well maintained road and rail. Importance of Meerut City is enhanced in the region because the divisional headquarters of the district is located there. Meerut City also houses the Court of the District Civil and Sessions Judge.

Population of the Meerut District is 27,12,960 of which 14,72,006 are males and 12,40,954 females<sup>2</sup>, 79.4 per cent of this population lives in rural areas and 20.6 per cent in urban areas, the density per square mile being 950 in the rural areas and 10,162 in urban areas.<sup>3</sup> Literacy rate in the district is fairly high as compared to other mofussil districts of U.P. —42.6 per cent in urban areas and 17.2 per cent in the rural areas.<sup>4</sup> Agriculture is the direct source of employment to 88.79 per cent of population while 21.21 per cent of population engages in non-agricultural activities.<sup>5</sup>

Meerut ranks next to only Kanpur in industrial development in the state. It ranks first in U.P. in the size of its factories. Meerut has a thriving bicycle, electrical, and ferrous and non-ferrous basic metal industries.<sup>6</sup> Meerut developed into a major centre for the sports goods industry after the partition of India in 1947 when many craftsmen of sports goods migrated to Meerut. The handloom industry is very important from the point of view of employment in rural areas. With the easy availability of power, sugarcane industries have sprung up all over the district manufacturing Gur and Khandsari. The Gur and Khandsari industry gives a stiff competition to the sugar mills (eight in number) in the district regarding the procurement of sugarcane from cultivators.

Meerut District has three parliamentary constituencies, one of which is predominantly urban and the rest two are more or less rural

<sup>2</sup> *Census of India 1961*, Vol. XV U.P. Part-II B (i), p. 26

<sup>3</sup> *Census of India 1961*, Vol. XV U.P. Part-II A, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 275

<sup>5</sup> *Census of India 1961*, Vol. XV U.P. Part-II B (i).

<sup>6</sup> *Census of India 1961*, Vol. XV U.P. Part-IV A, pp. 33-72

with only a marginal element of urban areas falling within them. The district has 15 assembly constituencies, of which 7 are almost entirely rural, 2 are urban, 2 are predominantly urban, 2 are predominantly rural and 2 are partly-urban partly-rural in composition. Holding a commanding position in the electoral battle till the Third General Elections, the Congress holds only a marginal position now. It had won all but 3 assembly seats and had made a clean sweep of the parliamentary seats in the Third General Elections. It could capture only 4 assembly seats and lost all the parliamentary seats in the Fourth General Elections.

Meerut District has been keeping pace with the current trend of Indian political scene which has generated a spate of debates in the press, among the people and within the precincts of legislatures—namely, change of party affiliations by elected representatives of the people. Of the four M.L.A.s elected from the district on Congress ticket, only one remains in the Congress today, the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (B.K.D.) attracting the defectors. The B.K.D. has also been successful in gaining the allegiance of two members elected as Independents. The Republican Party of India is the other loser, having lost two M.L.A.s (out of 3 candidates elected on its ticket for the State Legislative Assembly) to the Samyukta Socialist Party.

This spate of 'party crossings' vitiates any attempt at party-allegiance/strength analysis from the electoral data. If party preferences of the people override personality preferences, only then does an electoral analysis have any meaning. In the absence of any conclusive evidence in this regard, one cannot hazard any opinion on this aspect of political behaviour in Meerut. On the contrary, all available evidence from Meerut points to the other direction, namely, party allegiance of people is secondary to their candidate allegiance. No other conclusion can be drawn from the continuing mass support of defector M.L.A.s. Although no assertion can be made regarding the mass base of the political parties in effective or absolute terms, relative estimates can nevertheless be made on this matter.<sup>7</sup> The Bharatiya Kranti Dal appears to have a strong following in the district, closely followed by the Samyukta Socialist Party, the Republican Party of India, and the Congress. Jan Sangh is believed to have a sizable support

<sup>7</sup> No reliable empirical data can, however, be produced to substantiate these relative estimates.

in the main urban centres of the district, namely, Meerut City, Hapur and Ghaziabad, and is supposed to be particularly weak in the rural areas. The S.S.P. is stronger in industrial areas as compared to other parties, the C.P.I.(R) being a close second to it. The B.K.D. gains a strength from the rural areas, followed by the Congress, S.S.P. and C.P.I. in that order. The Republican Party enjoys the solid support of the scheduled castes and depressed classes and is known to represent their interests. Similar assertions are made regarding B.K.D. which is said to have the backing of Jats, Ahirs, Gujars and Rajputs; and Jan Sangh is variously bracketed with the militant Hindu as well as Bania-Brahmin interests.

#### SAMPLING OF RESPONDENTS

The task of sampling the respondents did not pose any difficult problem. The topic of inquiry itself defined the criteria for drawing the respondent's sample, namely, political leaders and administrators operating at the district level. Comprehensive list of all actors in the interaction process was found to be within manageable limits.

Among the politicians, the sample includes all M.P.s, M.L.A.s and M.L.C.s returned from the district in the Fourth General Elections, district presidents and secretaries of all political parties, and a 25 per cent selective sample of Zila Parishad members. Since the closest rivals in the elections evidently have a sizable following behind them, all runners up in the parliamentary and assembly elections from the district were included in the sample. Sample from the Zila Parishad was restricted to 25 per cent only to prevent disproportional weighting of the data by a section of political leaders who perhaps do not play a major role in district politics or administration. Selective sampling was preferred to the random one to obviate any possibility of the exclusion of important members from the sample. Members holding some office in the Zila Parishad or who are on some sub-committees can be reasonably expected to have more frequent contacts with administrators, and can be expected to be more intimately involved in the decision-making processes as compared to other members. Since this is a pilot study, and not a cross-sectional study of the phenomenon, the use of selective sampling does not vitiate the data in any way; on the contrary, it ensures more meaningful responses which is of greater importance for a pilot

study.

The classified list of politicians drawn for sampling purposes is as follows:

(1) Members of Lok Sabha	3
(2) Closest rivals in Lok Sabha elections	3
(3) Members of State Vidhan Sabha	15
(4) Closest rivals in Vidhan Sabha elections	13*
(5) Members of State Vidhan Parishad	6
(6) District President and Secretaries of political parties	9
(7) Members of Zila Parishad	19
<i>Total</i>	<i>69</i>

\*Although the respondents in category (4) should equal the number of respondents in category (3), the former is short by 2 because one individual has been included otherwise in the capacity of district president of a party, and another is a sitting M.L.C.

Six political parties were found to have some organization in the district: Congress, S.S.P., Jan Sangh, R.P.I., B.K.D. and C.P.I. (Right). The size of the sample in this category was reduced because one post (president) does not exist in the C.P.I. party structure, and two individuals have been included in category (3) by way of being elected members of the State Vidhan Sabha.

Sampling of administrators, contrary to our expectations posed some problems. Although the terms of reference clearly specified the level of study—namely district—thus implying the horizontal level only, the team was a little uncertain whether to include the vertical relationship within its compass. The uncertainty arose due to the promise of rich awards awaiting the explorer who delves into the realm of vertical and horizontal interplay of demands, pressures and supports in administrator—politician relationship. The team had, however, to drop the idea because that would have led to a proportionate neglect of the central (and main) area of inquiry designated for research.

Sample of administrators was, therefore, limited to all district departmental heads, and their deputies or assistants who looked after any aspect of administration for the entire district. Meerut being the divisional headquarters as well, it was, therefore, inevitable that we include some administrators above the district level too in the sample. Both Central and State Government officials were included in the sample.

The classified list of administrators sampling is as under:

(1) Central Government—above district* level	5
(2) Central Government—District Departmental Head	2
(3) State Government—above district level	16
(4) State Government—District Departmental Head	23
(5) State Government—Assistant or deputy to the District Departmental Head	15
<i>Total</i>	<i>61</i>

\*Above 'district level' includes all offices above the district level but below state level situated in Meerut.

The sample could have been very well limited to the two sets of incumbents who are main participants in the field of interaction taken up for study. But since the study is banking heavily on the perceptual dimensions to reach conclusions, it was considered necessary to include a control group to act as a corrective, and also to provide substance to areas of inquiry concerning inputs and outputs in relation to the politico-bureaucratic system. The search for a 'knowledgeable group' led to the decision of including a non-political, non-bureaucratic elite in the sample.

Consensus regarding the names of elites was obtained during the initial stages of field-work by collecting lists from all those the team met. A list of important or influential people in the district was thus prepared and the first 15 names were selected for interviewing. All persons included in the sample have subsequently been found to be either well connected with the politicians, or with the administrators, or both. The important citizen's sample can be classified as under from the point of view of their vocation or means of livelihood:

(1) Industrialists	3
(2) Educationists	3
(3) Aristocrats	2
(4) Medical profession	1
(5) Legal profession	1
(6) Ex-political leader of eminence	2
(7) Journalist	1
(8) Retired high ranking civil servants	1
(9) Cooperative leaders	1
<i>Total</i>	<i>15</i>

The size of important citizen's sample has been deliberately kept

at 15.<sup>8</sup> A larger sample would have been difficult to justify in view of the small size of the main sample. A smaller sample has not been taken in the hope that one more district will at least be studied, thus making it possible to draw meaningful correlations of this section of the study as well.

The overall sample is thus as given below:

Political leaders	68
Administrators	61
Important citizens	15
<i>Total</i>	144

<sup>8</sup>We have, however, not been able to include citizens' responses in our analysis.

## CHAPTER III

### ADMINISTRATORS: NORMS AND ROLE

AS we indicated earlier, the perception by actors of the norms that should guide their behaviour as well as the role they define or set for themselves has an important bearing on the interaction taking place between administrators and political leaders. By role definition we mean what the actor himself thinks is required of his office. The actor is placed in some institutional setting in which he occupies a particular position. He is, therefore, exposed to two related influences: one emanating from the position he occupies and the other from the institutional set-up he belongs to. What he expects from his own position and what he can actually do while performing his role are influenced, to a considerable extent, by the norms the institution he belongs to has developed over the years. It is, therefore, necessary to look closely at what the actor believes to be his role and, at the same time, what norms he believes to be salient for his role performance. We are, therefore, interested in finding out the normative referents he perceives to be pertinent for his behaviour and the role he defines for himself.

We, therefore, discuss in this chapter the normative referents and the role perception of the administrator. In the following chapter we turn to politicians and examine their normative referents and role conception. Our purpose in this chapter is to see, on the basis of responses of administrators to a number of questions related to both the dimensions discussed above, (1) the amount of consensus among administrators on both normative referents and role perception, and (2) distribution of administrators on various items of questionnaire relating to both these dimensions in order to find out their profile on these items as a group. This will, we hope, give us a fairly good idea of the differential patterns of normative commitments and role perception of the administrator.

Before we undertake a detailed discussion of the concerns delineated above, it is better to stop at this point and indicate (1) the considerations that went into the making of the components on a particular

dimension; (2) the method of obtaining data on the normative referents as well as role perception of the administrator; and (3) the methods of obtaining measures of the degree of administrators' consensus on their normative referents and role perception.

Regarding administrators' normative referents, we were interested mainly in two components of this dimension, namely, the extent to which an administrator feels himself committed to bureaucratic norms and his embeddedness in democratic orientation. If we keep in mind the theoretical concerns informing this study, the reason for selecting these two components would become readily clear. Bureaucracy as a social system develops over time a set of norms into which each entrant is socialized. (The norms, however, differ from one type of bureaucracy to another.) As such, bureaucracy can be distinguished on the basis of normative referents it subscribes to. (We can, for example, distinguish between those acknowledging the supremacy of purposive rationality, as, against those acknowledging the even higher principle of welfare maximization of the community.)<sup>1</sup>

The type of normative referents that prevails in a bureaucracy has certain implications for systemic goal gratification. Speaking in a very general sense, if there is a large gap between the value system of the bureaucracy and that of the universe it operates in, the bureaucracy will either be ineffective in carrying out its task for its functioning will be overly characterized by conflict and tension. In either case, it will fail to perform effectively its task of systemic goal gratification. This indicates the necessity of a greater degree of congruence between the value system of the bureaucracy and that of the political system at large. As we have been arguing, the realization of developmental goals in India is predicated upon changed orientations of administrators in terms of greater pragmatism, treatment of bureaucratic procedures as instrumental to achieving systemic goals, and responsiveness to people's and their representatives' ideas and opinion. Accordingly, it is of interest to examine whether administrators accept supremacy of rules and regulations and instructions received from above or tend to accept the view that, since these may ignore variations in situations from one milieu to the next, they must depend upon their own experience and judgment. Or, to phrase the question differently, to what, in fact, do the

<sup>1</sup> Bert F. Hoselitz, "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures", in La Palombara (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 173.

administrator orient his behaviour—to the solution of problems or strict adherence to rules and regulations? Also the administrators' orientation towards elected and other political leaders as representatives of people and their aspirations has to be examined in this context.

Coming to the role perception of the administrator, we decided to concentrate on only those aspects which have direct relevance for relationship between the administrator and the politician. In the context of their relationship, one very important consideration relates to whether or not such a relationship allows for boundary maintenance between the bureaucratic and the leadership structures. If, for instance, the administrator is willing enough to acquiesce to the demands of a politician without pausing to consider their propriety, he will greatly attenuate bureaucratic autonomy. If, on the other hand, he tries to uphold the supremacy of bureaucratic rules and regulations in deciding an issue without taking into account legitimate and just viewpoints of local people and leaders, he may inadvertently create a considerable amount of animosity against the administrative system and thus may reduce its efficiency. We may conceive of yet another situation where the administrator, either for personal reasons of career stability and promotion or administrative strategy of securing support, seeks alliance with or promote local leaders or groups of leaders. However, such expediency considerations are bound to lead to a symbiotic relationship between the administrator and the politician which allows both to exploit each other for furthering his own or his group interest. This relationship, no doubt, benefits both but it does not prevent the blurring of the boundary between the administrative and the leadership structures. This symbiotic relationship makes both the administrator and the politician dependent on each other and its continuance depends upon the extent to which each proves useful to the other often without any consideration of the propriety of action. This often leads to favouritism and sacrifice of legal-rational standards of bureaucratic action.

These considerations led us to devote our attention mostly to three aspects of administrators' role: (1) what evidence is there to show that the administrator conceives of his role in subservience to the politician?; (2) what is the evidence to show that the administrator is compelled to take recourse to expediency considerations and seek alliance with powerful political leaders or groups?; and (3) does the administrator

think himself responsible for maintaining bureaucratic autonomy?

We asked each administrator a battery of questions on these two dimensions, that is, normative referents and role perception. The available response categories for each item in the normative referent dimension were: Agree, Partly Agree and Disagree. In the case of the role perception dimension, however, we wanted to know the extent to which the administrator feels himself obliged to do or not to do a particular thing. With this end in view, three response categories were provided on each item: Must do, May or May not do, and Must not do.

Having disposed of some of the considerations relating to constructing of the questionnaire pertaining to the dimensions of normative referents and role perception, we now turn to a discussion of the measure of consensus among administrators on normative referents. Two procedures can be identified which can be used to secure data for the analysis of consensus. "The first is to focus on the degree of agreement among (the respondents) on which one, or which range of alternatives, among a set of available alternatives, the incumbent of a position should adopt in a particular situation. The second is to focus on their consensus on a single evaluative standard that might be applied to him."<sup>2</sup> We choose the second alternative because this allowed us to investigate consensus on a greater number of role segments.

It should be indicated here that our analysis of consensus falls in the category of what is called intra-position consensus. That is, we are interested in the amount and patterns of consensus on different items among administrators as a group. The procedure to measure intra-position consensus boils down to the question of obtaining scores on a series of distributions comprising of the set of responses of a sample to a single item with three response categories which will rank the items on a continuum of consensus.<sup>3</sup> It can be readily accepted that if all respondents in a sample respond to a particular item in a similar manner, there will be perfect consensus in the group on that item. But this kind of consensus cannot be expected to prevail in regard to all the items related to normative referent dimension. As our data show, on none of the items do the administrators show such an extent of consensus.

<sup>2</sup> Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason, and Alexander W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis: Studies of the School Superintendency Role* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 101.

<sup>3</sup> This section heavily draws from Neal Gross, *et. al.* *Explorations in Role Analysis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 105-109.

There is only one item on which the responses of the administrators reflect a more or less near unanimity (94.3 per cent of the administrators fall in one response category).

Apart from this, in the absence of a standard measure of comparison, it is difficult to assess the degree of consensus on certain types of distribution. We can conceive of two types of distribution in the first of which a large percentage of responses falls in one response category while the rest of the responses are distributed in the remaining two response categories. In the second type, however, all the responses are inequally distributed in only two adjacent response categories. Clearly, both of these patterns of distribution reflect some consensus but what criteria can be used to decide which shows more? To deal with this problem, it is necessary to consider both central tendencies and variability of distribution.

Another problem in this regard arises when we are confronted with two types of dissimilar distributions. In the first type all the responses are equally distributed in all the three response categories while in the other type all the responses group themselves in two extreme response categories. Both the types show the lack of consensus among the respondents. However, in the first type there is no consensus because each response occurs with equal frequency, while in the second type it stems from the existence of two completely contradictory evaluative standards applied to the same normative referent. This only suggests the need of caution in interpreting whatever statistical measure is used to represent response variability.<sup>4</sup>

In Figure 3.1 are presented percentage histograms of responses of administrators to four items selected from normative referent instrument with variance scores ranging from 0.036 (high consensus) to 0.640 (low consensus). It will be seen that there is a high consensus on disregarding instructions from elected leaders and following that of the higher level administrators when faced with different instructions from them. There is a very high consensus among administrators that what is important for an administrator is to follow the instructions of his superior even though he is asked by elected leaders to do otherwise. On the item with the next highest consensus, 'to be guided only by his


<sup>4</sup> These considerations led us to select variance of difference as a measure of consensus. For this purpose we gave each response category a numerical weight, ranging from 3 for "Agree" to 1 for "Disagree". Using a standard formula, we computed variance.

superior's instructions whatever the situation', there is apparently a fair amount of agreement among administrators that they should be so guided. However, a sizable number of administrators, 18.9 per cent, disagrees and another sizable group of administrators, 39.6 per cent, only partly agree on this normative referent item. In other words, the necessity of being guided by their superior's instructions is recognized by administrators, yet they would not like their behaviour to be entirely influenced by this consideration. The fact that 39.6 per cent of administrators only partly agree on this item means that a majority of administrators does not want his behaviour to be strictly bound by this norm.


Items (c) and (d) of Figure 3.1 reveal even more striking disagreements among administrators. On item (c) a majority of administrators opts for 'partly agree' response category which indicates that a sizable number of administrators are in agreement that the statement 'observance of all rules and regulations only amounts to a lot of paperwork and less of concrete work', is only partly true. However, a large number of administrators falls on both sides of this response category. This indicates that there is a very low amount of consensus among administrators on this item. The nature of prevailing consensus on this item, although low, indicates a critical evaluation on the part of administrators on this normative referent item. It can be seen that there is no consensus among administrators on item (d); there is a sizable number of administrators falling almost equally in all the three response categories.

The examples given above only illustrate some patterns of consensus among administrators on normative referent items. It by no means demonstrates the prevalence of a high degree of consensus among administrators on different normative referents. The administrators can be ranked on a continuum of high consensus to no consensus on different items. In addition, the nature of consensus differs from one item to another; if in one case administrators agree or disagree that a particular normative referent does or does not constitute a standard of behaviour, in another case their response does not reflect the acceptance or rejection of a particular normative referent. Consensus, for example, on items where the administrators opt for the 'partly agree' response category allows them a large area of freedom of action. The prevalence of this kind of consensus is indicative of low commitment to certain normative referents and of administrators' freedom to adjust his behaviour


(a) Follow elected leaders' instructions when faced with different instructions from superiors and elected leaders  
 $\sigma A^2 = 0.036$




(b) Administrators should always be guided by superiors' instructions  
 $\sigma A^2 = 0.552$



(c) Wastefulness of Administrative rules  
 $\sigma A^2 = 0.584$



(d) Rigidity of Administrative procedure  
 $\sigma A^2 = 0.640$



### 3.1 EXAMPLES OF FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ADMINISTRATORS ON FOUR NORMATIVE REFERENT ITEMS.

certain concrete situations rather than to certain procedures of actions. To put it differently, the first kind of consensus is mandatory in effect inasmuch as a large number of administrators accepts or rejects the validity of certain norms. The second type of consensus, on the other hand, is permissive in that it has low salience and, therefore, allows variation in administrative behaviour.

This analysis, however, does not take into account the extent of variation in administrators' commitment to various normative referents. It only gives us an idea of the types of consensus that obtain among administrators. We, therefore, now turn to an analysis of variation in administrators' commitment to various items on normative referents. For this purpose, we examine below the frequency distributions of administrators' responses on 17 items of normative referents divided into two major components—Acceptance—Non-acceptance of bureaucratic norms and Commitment—Non-commitment to democratic orientations. We further subdivide the former component into three parts; favourable-unfavourable evaluation of rules and regulations, submission to superior authority, and primacy of rules and regulations.

Regarding evaluation of rules and regulations, we were interested primarily in finding out the pattern of evaluative orientation of administrators to rules and regulations they are to follow as well as the procedures they have to adopt for disposing of problems. Our intention was to know whether or not they favourably evaluate the operational aspects of bureaucratic structure. To this end, we asked whether they considered the rules and regulations as well as procedures to be rigid, wasteful and inimical to the employment of personal experience and judgment in handling problems.

When asked the question, "Rules are framed at higher levels, they do not take into account local problems and local situations," 47.2 per cent of administrators accepted that it was so. However, 37.7 per cent of administrators only partly agreed to it and only about 13.1 per cent disagreed. One of the essential qualities of administrative rules and regulations is their generalized and universal character providing only broad guidelines for deciding issues and disputes. Naturally these rules and regulations cannot take into account confusingly varied local situations and problems. However, in the context of development administration, the test of efficacy of administrative rules and regulations lies in their utility and relevance in coping with fast

changing local situations and problems. The administrative system has increasingly to face growing demands for providing social welfare facilities, financial assistance, etc., and has, at the same time, to deal with various kinds of economic and political problems. To the extent that administrative rules and regulations fail to cope with varying local situations and problems, administrative efficiency will suffer. It is, therefore, significant that a sizable number of administrators agree that rules and regulations do not take into account varying local situations and problems. This is indicative of the fact that administrators find it difficult to handle local situations and local problems, which they have to deal with daily, on the basis of existing rules and regulations. In a way, then, this reflects administrators' unfavourable evaluation of administrative rules and regulations.

Supporting evidence for this observation comes from the responses of administrators on another item of normative referent instrument. Responding to the question, "administrative procedures are so rigid that the administrator has little scope for employing his experience and better judgment in improving implementation of programmes", as much as 30.2 per cent of the respondents agreed, 35.8 per cent partly agreed, and 34.0 per cent disagreed. As we pointed out earlier, there is no consensus one way or the other among administrators on this item. But what is of importance here is the fact that about a third of the entire sample thinks administrative procedures to be rigid. Further, there is a large section of administrators who are in agreement, although only partially, about the rigidity of administrative procedures. In other words, there exists an awareness among the administrators of the rigidity of administrative procedures.

Another implication of this is that the rigidity of administrative procedures does not allow administrators to employ their experience and better judgment in improving implementation of programme. It is an indirect indication of the fact that conformity to administrative procedures is valued more than the employment of experience and judgment in dealing with programme implementation problems. It is true that insistence on adherence to administrative procedures insures uniformity of practice, prevents arbitrariness, and protects administrators. But it is also true that excessive adherence to procedures makes for delay in programme execution, kills individual initiative, and breeds a feeling in administrators of playing safe. We are not in a position to

definitely say that procedural rigidity does incline administrators to play it safe and to be conservative in their approach. However, our data do indicate the dysfunctional effect of procedural rigidity on administrators' employment of their experience and better judgement.

Yet another indication of administrators' unfavourable evaluation of bureaucratic norms is the fact that a sizable number of administrators accept that 'observance of rules and regulations only amounts to a lot of paper work and less of concrete work'. In response to this question, 30.2 per cent of administrators agreed, 41.5 per cent partly agreed, and only 28.3 per cent disagreed. It will be noticed that frequency distribution on this item is very similar to the previous one with the exception that the percentage of those who only partly agree is larger in this case. It is significant that more than 27.0 per cent of administrators as against 28.0 per cent think, one way or the other, that observance of rules and regulations amounts to less concrete work. The wastefulness of rules and regulations is indicated but we must exercise caution in our interpretation because a sizable section of administrators gives it a benefit of doubt.

The discussion above highlights some of the dimensions of administrators' evaluation of bureaucratic rules, regulations and procedures in terms of their perception of these as wasteful, rigid and divorced from local situations and problems. There is adequate, although not sufficient, evidence to show that, on the whole, administrators evaluate rules, regulations and procedures unfavourably. However, a majority of administrators think that adherence to rules and regulations protects administration from unreasonable demands and influences. As much as 69.8 per cent of administrators agreed on this, 24.5 per cent partly agreed, and 5.7 per cent disagreed. Whatever the extent to which administrators perceive the rules, regulations, and procedures as inadequate and wasteful, there is at least this recognition on their part that these rules and regulations provide at least a protective device to them to ward off unreasonable demands and influences.

Our discussion so far deals primarily with the evaluative aspect of bureaucratic rules and regulations. It can be expected that when such an evaluation is unfavourable, the salience of rules, regulations and procedures for providing standards of administrative behaviour will also be low. In other words, administrators will be unwilling to treat them

as legitimate guidelines in handling concrete situations. This, in effect, indicates a situation where administrators may lose their faith in the efficacy of rules, regulations and procedures and refuse to be guided by them in performing their role. Or, they may go on being guided by them without taking any interest in their work. Whatever the case, it is of interest to ascertain whether or not administrators give primacy to rules, regulations and procedures.

TABLE 3.1  
ADMINISTRATORS' PERCEPTION OF PRIMACY OF  
RULES AND REGULATIONS

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL N=53
	AGREE	DISAGREE		
The primary concern of the administrator is to see that rules and regulations are strictly followed.	58.5	18.9	22.6	100.0
Even if it delays implementation of programmes one should insist on strict observance of administrative procedures.	43.4	26.4	30.2	100.0
Administrator should use his better judgment to meet the demands of particular situations instead of following rules literally.	79.2	18.9	1.9	100.0
If by ignoring some rules and regulations solving of certain problems is facilitated, the administrator should not hesitate to do that.	60.4	24.5	15.1	100.0

Table 3.1 presents frequency distributions of responses of administrators on four items. Responding to the question, the primary concern of the administrator is to see that rules and regulations are strictly followed, 58.5 per cent of administrators agreed, 18.9 per cent partly agreed, and 22.6 per cent disagreed. This indicates that adherence to rules and regulations is supposed by a majority of administrators to be the prime concern of administrative system.

Speaking generally, then, the primacy of rules and regulations is recognized by administrators.

Given this recognition, administrators can be expected to give primary importance to following rules and regulations rather than to depend on their experience or judgment. However, administrators may come across situations where the existing rules and regulations are silent or confusing or they do not exist at all. Alternatively, administrators may find that adhering strictly to the existing rules and regulations would either lead them to make wrong decisions or would not help them in making any decision. In such situations, what does an administrator do? Is he to stick to the existing rules and regulations, or wait for instructions above, or depend upon his own judgment and experience? Our data show that most of the administrators are likely to follow the last course.

Note, for example, that 27.2 per cent of administrators would be willing to use their better judgment in meeting the demands of particular situations rather than following rules literally. Similarly, 60.4 per cent of administrators would be prepared to ignore rules and regulations if this facilitates solution of certain problems. In other words, administrators recognize that their primary responsibility is to see that rules and regulations are strictly followed, but they do not attribute any absolute sanctity or inviolability to them. Inasmuch as rules and regulations are generalized principles for guiding administrative behaviour, they do not take into account variations in situations. When rules and regulations fail to provide sufficient guidelines for administrative action, administrators are thrown upon their own device to meet the situation. In such a contingency, they are more likely to use their own better judgment in handling a particular situation and, more important, ignore rules and regulations.

This is revealing in that it points to a very significant aspect of administrative behaviour in Meerut. This is indicative of administrators' willingness to recognize rules and regulations as only instrumental and of their pragmatic orientation towards role performance. However, this picture gets slightly altered when we consider the fact that 43.4 per cent of administrators agree to the proposition that "even if it delays implementation of programmes, one should insist on strict observance of administrative procedures". It is true that about a third of administrators is willing enough to ignore administrative

procedures for expediting programme implementation, it does not detract from the fact that a large number of administrators would not venture to violate administrative procedures even for the objective of programme implementation. This clearly brings to the surface a latent conflict that seems to characterize bureaucratic norms. The administrators show a low degree of affect to administrative rules, regulations and procedures, consider it necessary to ignore, even violate them, and yet they give their primary allegiance to adherence to rules, regulations and procedures. This is symptomatic of the gradual erosion, under compulsions of development administration, of the legitimacy of the colonial bureaucracy without crystallisation of newer, unambiguous development norms.

This is confirmed by administrator's orientation towards superior authority. As Table 3.2 shows, 41.5 per cent of administrators agree.

TABLE 3.2  
ADMINISTRATORS' PERCEPTION OF HIERARCHICAL  
VALUES

ITEMS	AGREE AGREE	PARTLY DISAGREE	TOTAL N=53
Whatever the situation the administrator should be guided only by the instructions received from his superior.	41.5	39.6	18.9 100.0
The concern of an administrator should be to see that his superiors are satisfied.	60.4	22.6	17.0 100.0
When the instructions received from his superiors do not apply in certain special, local situations, the administrator should not be bound by them.	66.0	18.9	15.1 100.0

that in all situations they should be guided by their superior's instructions. It should be noted that only 18.9 per cent of respondents disagree with it while 39.6 per cent give only a qualified answer. The large number of cases falling in ambiguous response category of 'partly agree', however, indicates the strength of this norm. All the persons

falling in this category recognize the necessity of being guided in all situations by their superior's instructions but would not make it an absolute standard of administrative behaviour. They would tend to evaluate their superior's instructions in terms of their applicability. The fact, however, remains that a large number of administrators perceives the necessity of making superior's instruction a referent of their behaviour. That it is so is further confirmed by the fact that 60.4 per cent of administrators consider it important that they should keep their superiors satisfied. The satisfaction of the superior authority may mean either a faithful obedience of his instructions in the execution of government policies and programmes or establishment of personal relationship. We are not in a position to say which of the two is meant by administrators; however, satisfaction in terms of satisfactory performance of official duties is the thing which concerns most of the administrators inasmuch as good rating of job performance and promotions depend upon it. We can, therefore, safely infer that obedience of superior's instruction has a great relevance for administrative behaviour.

Another aspect of this is that there seems to be a strong tendency of upward deference in the district bureaucracy. Evidence contrary to this proposition is, of course, forthcoming. For example, 66.0 per cent of administrators do not feel themselves bound by instructions received from superiors when these instructions prove inadequate or inapplicable in certain special, local situations. What is noteworthy here is the phrasing of the question emphasizing 'certain special, local situations'. In special local situations, administrators may be justified in ignoring their superior's instructions in cases where either such instructions are too broad and generalized to provide any guidance in handling special situation, or they reflect a lack of appreciation of the complexity of the real situation. Barring these situations, administrators feel themselves bound by their superiors' instructions in normal cases. We, therefore, do not find it necessary to revise our general observation about the prevalence of upward deference. This is due perhaps to the excessive centralization of authority and control—a dominant characteristic of Indian bureaucracy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Jay B. Westcott, "Governmental Organization and Methods in Developing Countries", in Irving Swerdlow (ed.) *Development Administration; Concepts and Problems* (Syracuse : Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 47.

Our data, then, underline administrators' low affect for rules and regulations but their propensity to conform their behaviour to the requirements of a bureaucratic system where rules and regulations are given excessive primacy and instructions emanating from higher levels are given much more importance. Does it, then, mean that administrators will be less oriented to democratic norms? Our data show that it is so. As will be seen from Table 3.3, a large number of administrators responds favourably on items which contain, innocuous statements, such as, referring people's needs and requirements to higher authorities and seeking advice of local leaders in dealing with local problems. But when it comes to matters which purport to make administrators more responsive to local leaders' recommendations, instructions, wishes, etc., an overwhelming number of administrators disagree. This will be clear if we looked at the data more closely. In order to make policies and programmes realistic and relate them to people's aspirations and needs, it is essential that administrators ascertain the needs of the people and communicate these to policy making level. Similarly, seeking of advice of political leaders by administrators in dealing with local problems is an essential duty the negligence of which may prove detrimental to administrative efficiency. These administrative functions, however, cannot be said to reflect democratic orientation of administrators inasmuch as they constitute essential functions of bureaucracy. Moreover, in the context of development administration, these functions have added importance because the success of development programmes is predicated upon the effective performance by the bureaucracy of communication function as well as involving local leaders in administrative processes. The democratic orientation of bureaucracy must, therefore, be measured in terms of the extent to which administrators defer to the wishes, recommendations and instructions of people's representative, whether elected or not, without, however, sacrificing administrative autonomy.

In the light of these considerations, it is not surprising that 83.0 per cent of administrators agree that the primary concern of the administrator should be to see that people's needs and requirements are presented to higher authorities before decisions are made. In other words, administrators recognize their communication function. But when it comes to seeking advice of political leaders in dealing with local problems, the picture immediately changes; only 35.8 per cent of

administrators agree that they should do so. Even seeking of advice of political leaders seems to administrators to be yielding much ground to the politicians. On the rest of the items purporting to measure

TABLE 3.3  
ADMINISTRATORS' ORIENTATION TO REPRESENTATIVE  
POLITICS

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL*
				N=53
The primary concern of an administrator should be to see that people's needs and requirements are presented to higher authorities before decisions are made.	83.0	9.4	7.5	99.9
The administrator is discharging his duty well if he seeks the advice of political leaders in dealing with local problems.	35.8	35.8	28.3	99.9
The primary responsibility of an administrator is to give effect to the wishes, proposals and recommendations of local leaders.	7.5	18.9	71.7	98.1†
An administrator can be effective only if he accommodates people's wishes on every issue.	13.2	13.2	73.6	100.0
An administrator should refrain from taking decisions which may displease local leaders.	7.5	11.3	81.1	99.9
When faced with different instructions from higher level administrators and elected leaders, the administrator should usually follow instructions of elected leaders.	nil	3.8	94.3	98.1†

\*Totals not exactly 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

†Excludes 1.9 per cent of response in the category 'other response'.

administrators' democratic orientations, that is, giving effect to the wishes, proposals, and recommendations of local leaders, accommodating people's wishes on every issue, avoiding taking decisions which may displease local leaders, and following instructions of elected leaders as against super-ordinate authority, an overwhelming number of administrators respond in the negative.

It is apparent, then, that administrators' normative frame of reference puts much more emphasis on adherence to rules, regulations and procedures. It is also clear that administrators do not want to sacrifice their freedom of action and be influenced in their behaviour by politicians.

Our discussion of normative referents highlights the underlying structure of administrators' dispositions. We now turn to a discussion of their role perception. It may be recalled that we are interested mainly in those role sectors that have a direct bearing on the relationship between administrators and political leaders. We propose, in this connection, to examine administrators' perception of their role *vis-a-vis* political leaders in terms of subservience—*independence* and *expediency* power consideration dimensions. But before we take up detailed analysis of our data, we will pause here to examine the patterns of consensus among administrators on these dimensions. We asked each respondent whether and to what extent he felt he was obligated to do what was specified in the particular role perception item. The available response categories for each item in the role perception instrument were: Must do, May or May not do, and Must not do. Figure 3.2 presents the various patterns of consensus of five role perception items.


As will be seen from Figure 3.2, administrators demonstrate varying degrees of consensus on different items; if there is complete consensus in the case of item 'a', there is also almost a complete dissensus on item 'e'. In between these two extremes exist varying degrees of consensus among administrators. Regarding the question of protecting subordinates from the interference of local groups or politicians, administrators are in complete unanimity about fulfilling this obligation. Similarly, there is a very high degree of consensus on the necessity of explaining programmes and policies to political leaders but not without some dissentient voices which is, however, very insignificant. In other words, administrators feel a high sense of

obligation for conforming to these role expectations.

(a) Protection of subordinates from interference by local groups or politicians.

$$\sigma A^2 = \text{nil.}$$


Percent



(b) Explain programmes and policies to local political leaders.

$$\sigma A^2 = 0.36$$


Percent



(c) Modify policy decision on political leaders' advice.

$$\sigma A^2 = 0.220$$


Percent



(d) Keep powerful faction of local leaders satisfied.


$$\sigma A^2 = 0.550$$

Percent



(e) Turn down leaders' demand if against policy although in the interest of the district.  $\sigma A^2 = 0.605$

Percent



### 3.2 EXAMPLES OF FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF ADMINISTRATORS ON FIVE ROLE PERCEPTION ITEMS.

On other items of role perception, however, consensus among administrators varies to a considerable measure. On item 'c' in Figure 3.2, for example, not a single administrator feels that he is obliged to modify policy decision on the advice of political leaders. As a matter of fact 66.0 per cent of administrators feel that they must not do so. However, about a third of administrators would not commit themselves to conforming to this expectation one way or the other. They would like it to be an open question to be determined in the light of each situation. On item 'd' in Figure 3.2, however, the pattern of consensus changes considerably. The positive response on this item intended to tap whether administrators feel obliged to keep a powerful faction of local leaders satisfied, declines sharply while responses in other two categories taken together cover more than half of the respondents. Also, 17.0 per cent of administrators refuse to conform to this expectation while 35.8 per cent remain undecided. In other words, only a minority, by no means small, feels obliged to conform to this expectation; the rest either feels no obligation or does not have any definite opinion. The last item in Figure 3.2 demonstrates almost a complete lack of consensus among administrators. This reflects a lack of any crystallized expectation on this particular item.

Given this variation in the patterns of consensus among administrators on role perception, what do they perceive their role to be? Table 3.4 presents administrators' response to four items intended to ascertain whether they feel obliged to carry out wishes and decisions of political leaders. If they do so what are the fields in which administrators accept such obligation? Speaking in a very general sense, administrators distinguish between sound and unsound, legitimate and illegitimate, and proper and improper decisions and demands on the part of elected bodies and political leaders. It is expected that administrators would employ bureaucratically relevant criteria in adjudging propriety of any decision and demand. It is also expected that they would not feel inclined either to accept or execute a decision which they adjudge unsound or improper. We must, however, distinguish between a decision which is solely within the competence of administrators and that solely within the competence of elected bodies, such as, Panchayat Parishad. There is also a third type of decision which is within the competence of elected bodies but the execution of such a decision is the responsibility of the administrator who can, however,

decline to execute it if he thinks it improper.

In the case of the first type of decision, administrators are guided in their behaviour by the criteria and procedures either laid down by the rules of conduct or derived from precedents. It is for them alone to take a decision or execute a programme in the light of what they understand the rule or the precedent to be. They will be within their rights to resist encroachment and interference by elected bodies and political leaders. In the case of the second type of decision, however, administrators are bound to carry out the decisions made by elected bodies. It is in the case of the third type of distribution of power that much of the conflict between administrators and political leaders arises.

This type of distribution of power is, no doubt, the result of still prevalent suspicion of representative institutions reinforced by their malfunctioning. It is also a hangover of tendency, prevalent in the pre-independence days, towards subordinating representative politics to bureaucracy. When decisions of elected bodies are put in a limbo, there naturally develops a bad blood between the administrator and the politician. The politician, convinced of the necessity of a particular action which has been democratically approved<sup>6</sup> but may raise some sanctimonious eyebrows, considers the administrator arrogant and stiff-necked when he refuses, following, what seems to the politician, hackneyed rules, to carry out an elected body's decision. The administrator, on the other hand, considers the politician impractical and ignorant and incapable of managing public affairs. There is inherent in such situations possibilities of constant conflict between the administrator and the politician.

It should, however, be emphasized that it is not necessary that conflict should arise only in the case of the third type of power distribution. Even in the case of the first two patterns of power distribution conflict may and does arise. This is due perhaps to the fact that the administrator and the politician may refer to two different sets of normative referents and considerations. Also, a weak attachment to the rules of the game may incline them to question the finality of any decision and to take steps to either modify or reverse the decision. That each of them has access to the upper echelons in their respective

<sup>6</sup> It may also be added that elected bodies may pass legislation in order to meet popular demand which they know cannot be carried out and may in effect pass the responsibility to the administrator.

hierarchy helps to prolong the conflict and delay its resolution.

Another aspect of this relates to the expansion and extension of representative politics. Political leaders, who consider themselves as promoter and protector of the interests of the people bring to the administration various kinds of proper and hardly proper demands and press for their fulfilment. Inasmuch as their capacity to get things done at the administrative level strengthens their power position in the community they are encouraged to intensify their campaign against bureaucratic rigidity and inflexibility. This puts the administrator on the defensive and may lead him to adopt any one of three courses open to him. He may stick to his own ground refusing to be brow-beaten by the politician and do his best to safeguard bureaucratic autonomy. Or, he may choose to come to terms with the politician and do his biddings. The third course open to him is to avoid former two courses and seek to mobilize support in his favour in order to neutralize the politician.

TABLE 3.4

ADMINISTRATORS' ROLE PERCEPTION: SUBSERVIENCE TO  
POLITICAL LEADERS

ITEMS	MUST	MAY OR	MUST	TOTAL N=53
	DO	MAY NOT	NOT DO	
	DO			
Carry out decisions made by elected bodies.	50.9	32.1	5.7	11.3 100.0
Carry out decisions made by elected bodies which in your opinion may be unsound.	11.3	11.3	69.8	7.6 100.0
Take action against a subordinate official on the insistence of political leaders.	3.8	22.6	73.6	nil 100.0
Modify a policy decision on the advice of political leaders.	nil	32.1	66.0	1.9 100.0

In the light of these considerations, it is of interest to find out the

course administrators are most likely to follow. As will be seen from Table 3.4, most of the administrators, 50.9 per cent, feel obliged to carry out decisions made by elected bodies. However, the fact that about a third of administrators does not feel obliged to do so suggests that this obligation does not have universal acceptance. If we consider in this regard administrators' refusal to modify a policy decision on the advice of political leaders, the impression that administrators are negatively oriented towards representative politics becomes strong. It is interesting to observe that not a single administrator feels obliged to modify a policy decision at the instance of political leaders while 66.0 per cent are decidedly against this.

It is clear from the pattern of distribution of administrators' responses on the remaining two items in Table 3.4 that, in general, administrators do not perceive their role as subservient to political leaders. An overwhelming majority of administrators feel that they are obliged to refuse carrying out unsound decision made by elected bodies (69.8 per cent) and taking action against a subordinate on the insistence of political leaders (73.6 per cent). However, it must be pointed out that as much as 11.3 per cent of administrators feel obliged to carry out elected body's decisions even if they are unsound. Although it does not weaken our observation that administrators have negative orientation to representative politics and do not define their role as subservient to political leaders, the willingness of 11.3 per cent of administrators to carry out even unsound decisions of elected bodies does point to a trend, however small, towards subservience. Further, the fact that about a third of administrators fall in the response category 'may or may not' is also an indicator of at least a small number of administrators' willingness to accept the advice of political leaders.

Confirmation of these observations comes forth from our examination of administrators' role perception in regard to safeguarding of administrative autonomy. As Table 3.5 shows, administrators do not, speaking in a very general sense, feel any sense of obligation towards accommodating the wishes and aspirations of various socio-economic interests. Only a very small number of bureaucrats feel it their duty to be influenced by such considerations. For example, only 9.4 per cent of administrators are inclined to compromise with local pressure groups and only 18.9 per cent to give considerations to the feelings of local groups in undertaking of new programmes.

This reflects a lack of recognition on the part of administrators that local socio-economic interests have a very vital role to play in representative policies in regard to articulation of interests and influencing government policies. Whether or not these socio-economic interests are capable of playing such a role does not concern us here. What is of importance here is the fact that administrators do not allow the consideration of accommodating various socio-economic interests to influence bureaucratic decision-making and programme execution. In other words, they are much more concerned with maintaining and safeguarding administrative autonomy than with making bureaucratic decision-making process responsive to legitimate aspirations of various social sectors.

TABLE 3.5

ADMINISTRATORS' ROLE PERCEPTION: SAFEGUARDING  
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY

ITEMS	MUST	MAY OR	MUST	TOTAL N=53
	DO	MAY NOT	NOT DO	
Gives some considerations to feelings of local groups in undertaking new programmes.	18.9	26.4	49.1	94.4*
Occasionally compromise with local pressure groups.	9.4	28.3	60.4	98.1†
Modify policy in the face of insistent popular demand.	41.5	39.6	17.0	98.1†
Turn down a demand of political leaders when it is against government policy even if it is in the interest of the district.	37.7	37.7	24.5	99.9
Take definite stand against any unreasonable demand which may come from local leaders.	94.3	nil	5.7	100.0

\*Excludes 5.6 per cent of responses in the response category 'other'.

†Excludes 1.9 per cent of responses in the response category 'other'.

It is not surprising to find that an overwhelming number of administrators should feel obliged to take a definite stand against any unreasonable demand of local leaders. What is surprising is that only 41.5 per cent of administrators should feel obliged to modify a policy in the face of insistent popular demand. That this reflects a very meagre sense of responsiveness to popular aspirations on the part of administrators is further confirmed by the lack of consensus among them about what to do when they are confronted with a demand of political leaders which is in the interest of the district but against government policy (Item 3 in Table 3.5). All this points to the fact that the administrative system at the district level is still steeped in the old bureaucratic tradition and had yet to orient itself to representative politics in which bureaucracy is required to be sensitive to popular aspirations and needs.

What is, then, the role conception of administrators *vis-a-vis* political leaders? We indicated earlier that the onslaught of representative politics, impatient of time-consuming administrative procedure and rigid rules and regulations and bent upon quickening the pace of the distribution of divisible and indivisible benefits, has put the administrative system on defensive.

As our data show, they have not responded to this challenge by favourably orienting themselves to representative politics. Their normative referents as well as their role perception remains more or less bureaucratic in the sense that administrators highly value the norms of adhering to rules and regulations, manifest upward deference and do their best for safeguarding administrative autonomy. However, expectations that people have of them have changed and administrators find it difficult to fulfil these expectations. They have, therefore, to devise ways and means to protect themselves as well as to insure that their role performance is not impeded. The easiest way for them to attain this is to secure the goodwill and support of powerful leaders or group of leaders. This is, in essence, expediency power consideration.

Confirmation of this observation is provided by Table 3.6. It will be seen that about two-third of administrators feel obliged to maintain good relation with those local leaders who enjoy backing of the people. It is also noteworthy that only 5.7 per cent of administrators do not feel obliged to do so.

Even more interesting is the fact that 47.2 per cent of administrators feel that it is essential to keep a powerful faction of local leaders

satisfied if this helps implementation of government programmes. Only 17.0 per cent of administrators are categorically against this. It should not, however, be taken to mean that administrators will go all the way

TABLE 3.6

ADMINISTRATORS' ROLE PERCEPTION: EXPEDIENCY  
POWER CONSIDERATION

ITEMS	MUST	MAY OR	MUST NOT	TOTAL N=53
	DO	MAY NOT	DO	
Maintain good relations with those local leaders who have backing of the people.	71.7	22.6	5.7	100.0
Keep a powerful faction of local leaders satisfied if this helps implementation of government programme.	47.2	35.8	17.0	100.0
Give helping hand in the elections of those leaders who usually help government officials in solving day-to-day problems.	5.7	3.8	90.5	100.0
Consider favourably proposals of leaders enjoying public support even if such proposals are not sound.	5.7	15.1	79.2	100.0

to maintain favourable relationship with political leaders. As a matter of fact, they draw a line between what they can do without sacrificing their self respect and independence and what they cannot do without damaging their own image. As our data show, only an insignificant number of administrators would go out of their way to either give a helping hand in the election of those leaders who usually help government officials in solving day-to-day problems or consider favourably proposals of leaders enjoying public support even if such proposals are not sound. In other words, they would like to seek support at the cost of their independence and by sacrificing the notion of propriety.

Apart from this expediency power consideration, the administrators recognize that the true essence of their role lies in providing a

communication channel between local political leaders and the bureaucratic structure. This communication function consists of conveying wishes and demands of political leaders to higher level officials and explaining government programmes and policies to them (94.3 per cent of administrators admit that they must perform these functions).

To recapitulate, our discussion of the normative referents and role perception of administrators reveals that there is great variation in the consensus that characterizes administrators as a group on various items of normative referents and role sectors. On certain items administrators show a complete or near unanimity but on others they differ among themselves and in certain cases there is no consensus. It varies from item to item leaving a distinct impression that normative referents have varying degrees of acceptability. This means that bureaucracy at the local level is characterized by a value system which is by no means pervasive. In certain cases, attachment to norms is very strong while in certain others it is very weak. In other words, the existence of disagreement among administrators as to which norm should have greater validity reflects a comparative freedom of action in behavioural terms from restraints that greater consistency of normative system and its greater hold on the members of the group usually enforce.

This is not to suggest that administrators do not demonstrate their attachment to certain bureaucratic norms. As we observed earlier, the predominant norms refer to administrators' propensity to give precedence to bureaucratic rules, regulations and procedures and depend much more on the instructions of super-ordinate authorities. They do acknowledge the necessity of employing individual judgment and experience but such an individual judgment and experience would most probably be socialized in bureaucratic norms. We also observed that administrators feel much less inclined to allow their behaviour to be influenced by any criteria other than the bureaucratic ones. They are much less oriented to representative politics than can be expected from two decades of development administration.

Similarly, our analysis of administrators' role perception reveals that administrators tend to define their role in a way which reflects their unwillingness to come to terms with representative politics. They do not feel obliged to take into consideration popular demands and aspirations while making policies or executing programmes. They consider it their duty to defend bureaucratic autonomy from the

onslaught of political leaders. They do try to seek political leaders' support and establish good relation with them but this does not reflect their responsiveness to representative politics. It is symptomatic of their search for security. In other words, administrators have still to recognize and accept the change in system goals and orient their normative referents and role perception accordingly.

## CHAPTER IV

### POLITICAL LEADERS: THEIR NORMS AND ROLE PERCEPTION

IN the preceding chapter we discussed normative referents and role perception of administrators. We turn in this chapter to discussing normative referents and role perception of political leaders. It may be recalled that our frame of reference is relationship between administrators and political leaders in a local political system, the district in our case. It is at this level that, as we argued earlier, such a relationship assumes a crucial significance because it is here that the bureaucratic structure and leadership structure intermingle and interact in giving a definite shape to policy formulation and programme execution. Inasmuch as the district is the basic unit of administration as well as of political organization, administrators have to collect relevant informations about the areas earmarked for development and achievements in programme execution. These informations constitute a basic datum on the basis of which policy makers determine the direction and content of policies and programmes. The political leaders, on the other hand, bring to the notice of the administrator the problems which must be solved for the good of the district or a part of it and mobilizes support for acceptance of certain programmes and policies as well as for programme implementation.

Before the dawn of independence the interaction between the administrator and the politician was never intimate nor frequent. Whatever interaction there may have been was characterized by distrust, antagonism, and scant understanding of each other's role. The political leader in a sense did not belong to the system in which the administrative structure provided the sole or the major instrumentality of managing public affairs and maintaining law and order. As Pye observes, "political development was assumed to coincide with administrative development—the characteristic rationale, of course, of colonialism."<sup>1</sup> Naturally, the realm of politics was relegated to a position of

<sup>1</sup> Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

insignificance. It was either treated as a supportive structure for the regime or a nuisance which must be suppressed for the good of the system. In the context of this conception of political process, it is not surprising that political leaders conceived of their role as debunking the notion of good government which emphasized the prior role of administration and expected the leaders to support the essentials of a rational administration.

(The extension and expansion of representative politics at the local level and elsewhere has completely changed the role of political leaders. Responsible for the management of democratic politics, they have to perform the essential function of relating the administrative and authoritative structure of government to political forces within the system. They have not only to strengthen the bases of representative politics so that it can confidently and vigorously discharge its responsibility of articulating and realizing systemic goals, and keeping administrative as well as authoritative structures of government responsive to popular aspirations and needs. They have also to recognize the importance of administrative structure in making significant contributions to systemic goal gratification and allow it to function uninhibitively subject, of course, to its adherence to systemic values. In other words, political leaders are charged with the responsibility of creating capabilities in the system for systemic goal gratification and controlling its direction for balanced political development. Occupying a crucial position in the system as political elites, they have not only a major share in defining systemic goals, but also a prime responsibility of deciding the strategy for realization of these goals, mobilizing support and supervising their implementation.)

Given these considerations, it is of utmost interest to explore the attributes of leadership in order to ascertain whether or not they are supportive of systemic values. (It is now generally recognized that for the smooth functioning of the system there must prevail a greater degree of congruence between institutional values and the values of strategic elites. The higher the degree of non-congruence the greater the possibility that tension and conflict will characterize political process in the system. In view of the fact that developmental goals in India are to be achieved through democratic processes, it is essential to ascertain the norms that influence political leaders in their actions. We are particularly interested in this regard in exploring : (a) the concept of the

role of representative that the political leaders hold; (b) the extent to which political leaders give allegiance to democratic ideals; and (c) the extent to which they commit themselves to realizing broader goals as against narrow and partisan goals.


We asked a sample of 57 political leaders drawn from different political spheres a battery of questions in order to get at their normative referents. As in the case of administrators, the format of each question provided three response categories—agree, partly agree and disagree—and each respondent was asked to select the response category that fitted most with his conception. We examine in this section normative referents of political leaders on the basis of their responses to seventeen items under this category.

Before we take up a detailed examination of political leaders' normative referents, we will first discuss the pattern of consensus that is discernible among them. Three basic patterns of consensus among political leaders can be identified (see Figure 4.1). First pattern reflects a very high degree of consensus among political leaders inasmuch as about 90 per cent of them agree that use of unscrupulous means should not be forgiven even if it strengthens the party of a political leader. Only 3.5 per cent of political leaders, an insignificant proportion, would be willing to forgive the use of unscrupulous means. The second pattern of consensus reflects a high degree of agreement among political leaders on, say, the necessity of making compromises in politics. However, consensus on this particular item, although high inasmuch as 63.2 per cent of political leaders endorse its content, is marked by some disagreement as to the applicability of this standard in actual practice: 12.3 per cent of political leaders disagree and 22.8 per cent are neutral. In the third pattern of consensus is reflected a more or less bipolar division of political leaders on means-end issue. Responding to the item, "what matters is quick and tangible results, no matter by what methods they are achieved". 43.9 per cent of political leaders endorsed the prior importance of results without caring for the purity of means. This offers an example of lack of consensus among political leaders stemming from the existence of two completely contradictory evaluative standards applied to the same behaviour.

The above examples illustrate only three very general patterns of consensus prevailing among political leaders to which they all conform. However, within each type there is great variation in the degree of


(a) Use of unscrupulous means  
may sometimes be forgiven  
if it strengthens party.

$$\sigma^2 P^2 = 0.190$$




(b) Politics being what it is,  
one has often to compromise with  
principles.

$$\sigma^2 P^2 = 0.499$$



(c) What matters is result, not methods.

$$\sigma^2 P^2 = 0.927$$



4.1 HISTOGRAM OF POLITICAL LEADERS' RESPONSES  
ON THREE ITEMS OF NORMATIVE REFERENCES.

consensus. For example, seven of the 17 items manifest the first pattern of consensus, eight items, that of the third pattern while only two items that of the second pattern. In the first pattern, the degree of consensus ranges between 71 per cent and 89 per cent—a difference of 18 per cent—while in the third, between 47 and 54 per cent. The variation within each pattern as well as a tendency among political leaders of applying two contradictory evaluative standards on about 50 per cent of the items indicate that political leaders as a group have not yet developed a coherent set of norms to which they should refer to while acting. No doubt, there exists consensus among political leaders on more than 50 per cent of items, but here again the variation in consensus is large: the lower limit of such a consensus is 59 per cent while the upper limit is 89 per cent—a variation of 30 per cent.

It must be emphasized here that political leaders as a group manifest much more diversity than, say, the administrators. In the case of administrators, similar social background, the homogenizing influence of higher education, similar professional training and more or less similar experiences on the job and their belonging to a distinct group—all these factors may be instrumental in the forging of a set of norms which are homogenous.

In the case of political leaders, however, diversity in these respects can be supposed to create diversity also in the realm of their norms. However, a modicum of consensus on standards of actions must be there in order to facilitate the functioning of the political system. That there exists some consensus among political leaders on certain norms is supported by our data. But what is surprising is the fact that the leaders should entertain contradictory evaluative standards on items pertaining to one particular normative sector. This is very nicely illustrated by leaders' responses to two of the several questions intended to ascertain the extent to which political leaders place their faith in democratic ideals. Table 4.1 presents leaders' responses to these two questions.

As is apparent from two questions below, both of them intend to tap leaders' adherence to democratic principles. The first question is set against the background of planned development and the second relates to management of conflict. If a respondent is consistent in his belief in adopting democratic methods for tackling problems, he should react favourably to the first question and unfavourably to the second one,

But frequency distribution on both these questions indicates that a very large majority of respondents respond favourably to both the questions

TABLE 4.1  
POLITICAL LEADERS' RESPONSES TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL N=53
	AGREE	7.0	8.8	
Even if it delays development of the country, adherence to democratic principles should be insisted on.	84.2	7.0	8.8	100.0
If some misguided sections of the people do not listen to persuasion they should be suppressed in the interest of the country.	86.0	7.0	7.0	100.0

leading to a definite conclusion that they are not consistent in their response. This in a sense indicates that in spite of the fact that there is a very high degree of consensus among political leaders on both these items, this may lead to erroneous conclusion inasmuch as taking leaders' responses on these items together they tell different stories. There is in fact no consistency in the attitude of a majority of political leaders and, as such, the seeming consensus hides a very great amount of inconsistency and contradiction. This last point is further confirmed by the fact that on about 50 per cent of items political leaders apply two contradictory evaluative standards. We shall return to this point later.

Having disposed of some considerations about patterns of consensus among political leaders in relation of normative referents that should influence their behaviour, we now turn to a detailed examination of their responses to different items pertaining to normative referents. The first set of items that we examine here relates to political leaders' concept of a representative. We are interested in exploring the character of representational norms that political leaders at the local level hold.

Generally speaking, social scientists have advanced three models of behaviour of the representative. The first model, the classical rational-man model, conceives of the representative as a person who individually measures proposed courses of action against an objective standard of

public interest. The second model, the social class interest model, defines the role of the representative in terms of a person who acts according to the dictates of norms and values acquired by virtue of his class status. The third model, pressure politics model, typifies the representative as passively moving according to the mechanical combinations of forces which happen to impinge upon him.<sup>2</sup>

Instead of following these models very closely, we adopted a slightly different approach in ascertaining the dominant norm about representation. Inasmuch as the role attributes of the representative are defined by the relationship between leader and the people he represents, it is essential to take into account the character of such a relationship. The representative's perception of his role depends upon what he thinks such a relationship should ideally be. We can visualize two bipolar conceptions of such a relationship. On one polar end can be placed all those leaders who define their role as representatives independently of the wishes, opinions and aspirations of the people they claim to represent. According to such a conception, the representative is answerable for his behaviour to his own convictions, judgment and sense of responsibility. Following in the footsteps of E. Burke, he does not accept any externally determined standard of behaviour; he supplies his own standards and does not recognize that anybody else but he can define his role for him.

At another end of this pole can be placed all those leaders who conceive of the role of representative in a diametrically opposite fashion. In such a view, the representative is totally subservient to the people he represents. He is guided in his role performance solely by what people expect him to do for them. His standards of behaviour are externally determined; he does not allow his own convictions and judgment to interfere in his role performance.

These polar types, however, do not exhaust the types of representational role conception. We do not intend to discuss in full all the possible types of representational role definition except to point out one variation each of these two polar types. (The leader may conceive of his role independently of his constituents but may perceive a wide gap between what he thinks and what his constituents think is the best

<sup>2</sup> See John C. Wahlke, "Behavioural Analyses of Representative Bodies", in Austin Ranney (ed.), *Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics* (Urbana: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 178.

course of action in a given situation. Perceiving this wide gap, he feels constrained in taking any action for fear of arousing extensive opposition. In spite of the fact that he as a representative defines his role as being autonomous, he is prevented from taking any action as long as he is not sure that his action will receive wider acceptability. In contradistinction to this, another representative, in addition to defining his role as being autonomous, may go to the extent of applying pressure on people in taking action whose validity he is himself convinced of. He does not wait for a favourable attitude to develop on the part of the people towards his own conception of the best course of action; he goes ahead to mould public opinion in favour of his programme.

Similarly, we can identify a variation in the second polar type also. This type, as we noted earlier, is characterized by the representative's willingness to let others define his role. In practice, however, we may not find many representatives who will strictly conform to this pattern. He may go only to that extent in faithfully representing the wishes of his constituents which does not excessively conflict with his conscience and conviction. In other words, he will critically examine the wishes and demands of his constituents before committing himself to carrying them out. If he thinks that the people are mistaken in their views he will refuse to oblige them.

We have thus four different conceptions of the role of a representative and each of them has different functional relevance for relationship between the administrator and the politician as well as for the political system in a developing country. However, let us now turn back to examining political leaders' conception of the role of a representative.

As will be seen from Table 4.2, the respondents endorse favourably all the items except item 2. 56.1 per cent of political leaders think that they should implement the demands and expectations of the people and not act independently. But in view of the fact that 28.1 per cent of political leaders do not express agreement with this statement and 14.0 per cent agree only partly, conformity to this norm does not seem to be that strong. If we examine the responses of political leaders on this item in conjunction with their responses to the next item in Table 4.2, the observation that political leaders do not usually define their role as representative in terms of subservience to those whom they represent becomes irresistible. For example, only 43.8 per cent of political leaders own that they would be willing to follow the wishes

of the community even if he thinks the people are mistaken. In addition to the fact that there is no consensus among political leaders on this item, non-endorsement of this statement by 47.4 per cent of political leaders indicate leaders' weak attachment to this norm.

TABLE 4.2  
POLITICAL LEADERS' RESPONSES TO REPRESENTATIVE ROLES

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL
				N=53
A political leader should only implement the demand and expectations of the people and not act independently.	56.1	14.0	28.1	98.2*
A leader is obliged to follow the wishes of the community even if he thinks the people are mistaken.	43.8	8.8	47.4	100.0
The most important thing for a leader is to follow his conviction even if this is different from what the constituency expects.	71.9	17.5	8.8	98.2*
If the leader is himself convinced of what is the best action he must try to implement even though he has to use some pressure on the people.	87.7	7.0	5.3	100.0

\* Excludes 1.8 per cent of responses falling in category 'other'.

What is more significant in this connection is the fact that political leaders are more in favour of autonomous role of the representative. About 72.0 per cent of political leaders agree with the statement that the most important thing for a leader is to follow his conviction even if this is different from what the community expects. The insignificance of disagreement with the statement is evident from the fact that only 8.8 per cent of responses fall in the category 'disagree' and the permissive category, 'partly agree', is twice as much large in size as the category 'disagree'.

That political leaders give more preference to autonomous role of the representative to a subservient one is clearly indicated by their

response patterns on all items. Also noteworthy is the fact that about 88.0 per cent of political leaders conceive of the role of the representative in an active sense, that is, they will go to the extent of applying pressure on people in trying to implement an action programme if they are convinced of its validity. In other words, a vast majority of political leaders not only attributes autonomy and independence to the role of the representative but also believes in taking steps for creating favourable public attitude towards what the representative thinks to be the best course of action.

It seems, then, that the autonomous-active conception of the representatives' role is the dominant tendency prevailing among political leaders at the local level. It is true that the existence in political leaders of favourable orientation towards both the subservient and autonomous role conception of the representative throws doubt on the validity of our conclusion. However, two considerations incline us to accept the validity of our observation. In the first place, if we treat all favourable responses of all respondents on all the four items as constituting a scale of preference, the items are automatically ranked from high to low preference. It will be seen from Table 4.2 that political leaders indicate highest preference for 'autonomous-active' role definition of the representative. In the second place, it can be assumed that greater the number of persons consistent in their attitude towards one particular item as against another, the greater the operational relevance of that item for behaviour. Working on this assumption and reversing the direction of the last two items in order to make them consistent with the content of the first two items in Table 4.2, we find that only a little over 5.0 per cent of political leaders score high on the scale of 'subservient representational role definition' while 28.0 per cent score high on autonomous representational role definition. In other words, 28.1 per cent of political leaders consistently hold to the autonomous role conception of the representative while only 5.3 per cent are consistent in their orientation towards subservient role conception of the representative.

We recognise that the tendency on the part of political leaders to express their agreement with contradictory perceptions of the representatives' role poses some problem in interpreting with exactitude the distribution of attitudes of political leaders on this dimension or the relative strength of a particular representational norm. The data

certainly indicate an inconsistency in the attitude of a majority of political leaders and, therefore, the possibility that this norm has not reached the stage of crystallization suggests itself. We shall return to this point later. For the moment, however, we are left with a strong impression that political leaders generally hold to autonomous role conception of representation.

The fact that political leaders as representatives do not generally recognize the necessity of deferring to the wishes and demands of their constituents may be taken to mean that they do not conform to the democratic ideal of acting in accordance with people's wishes and demand. That this may be the case is further supported by the leaders' willingness to apply pressure on the people to make them accept the programme the leaders think is best. This, then, raises the question: Have political leaders at the local level been socialized in democratic norms? If yes, what is the extent to which they give allegiance to democratic ideals?

TABLE 4.3

NORMATIVE REFERENTS OF LEADERS: DEMOCRATIC  
ORIENTATIONS PERTAINING MEANS AND END

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL N=57
	AGREE	7.0	8.8	
Even if it delays development of the country strict adherence to democratic means must be insisted on.	84.2	7.0	8.8	100.0
What matters is quick and tangible results no matter by what methods they are achieved.	43.8	7.0	47.4	98.2*
It is permissible for a political leader to act sometimes in an unauthorised manner if he is convinced that his action is ultimately for the good of the people.	52.6	12.3	35.1	100.0

\* Excluding 1.8 per cent of response under the category 'other'.

In Tables 4.3 and 4.4 we present data to show whether or not

political leaders at the local level have internalized democratic norms. Table 4.3 presents data regarding end-and-means dimension of leadership attitude. It will be seen from the Table that an overwhelming majority of political leaders express their agreement with the statement that even if it delays development of the country strict adherence to democratic means must be insisted on. The way leaders respond to this question indicates a very high degree of commitment on their part to the democratic ideal of maintaining purity of means. It is to be noted that the necessity of adhering to democratic means is set against the generalized objective of realizing developmental goals of the country. Considering the fact that developmental goal gratification has been given top priority, it is expected that leaders will, generally speaking, give preference to quick implementation of developmental programmes even if it occasionally ignores strict adherence to democratic means. But, as our data show, local leaders are more inclined to safeguard the purity of democratic means than to sully it for developmental goal gratification.

However, our data suggest that such a strong dedication on the part of political leaders to democratic means cannot be taken for granted. This is indicated by their response to two other items in Table 4.3. For example, responding to the question, "what matters is quick and tangible results no matter by what methods they are achieved", 43.8 per cent of political leaders express agreement while 47.4 per cent disagree with it. It is apparent that there is very little consensus among political leaders on this standard of behaviour, but given the fact that 43.8 per cent of leaders are inclined to give preference to quick and tangible results without caring by what means they are achieved suggests that leaders' commitment to democratic methods is not total.

This is further confirmed by the fact that 52.6 per cent of leaders agree that it is permissible for a political leader to act sometimes in an unauthorized manner if he is convinced that his action is ultimately for the good of the people. It is also to be noted that a little over a third of political leaders refuse to justify adopting unauthorized manner even for the good of the people. However, the fact remains that a majority of political leaders do not see any conflict between impure means and the general good. In other words, what matters for them is realization of a desired end no matter by whatever means it is achieved.

This may be taken to mean that leaders' allegiance to democratic

values is verbal; deep within them there exists a tenuous and weak attachment to these values. It is only at the verbal level that leaders profess to treat democratic values as offering viable standards of behaviour. But when it comes to applying these values in real life situations, they tend to be ambivalent and inconsistent. Their preference for democratic values is clearly indicated by our data. But our data also show a contradiction in their belief system in that a large number of leaders is favourably disposed towards adopting undemocratic means for achieving a particular end.

But can it be assumed that for the successful functioning of a democratic political system political leaders should manifest total and absolute adherence to democratic principles? It should be emphasized that norms symbolize generalized standards of behaviour and function as control mechanism. The relevance of generalized norms lies in their capability to provide guidance for behaviour in all possible situations. However, exigencies of certain situations compel the actor to disregard dictates of norms and handle the situation in whatever manner he thinks fit. In this case, his behaviour is guided more by what we may call 'exigential values' rather than generalized norms. Yet another factor that we should keep in mind pertains to a developing polity which is usually characterized by an incoherent and inchoate democratic value system permitting political leaders less socialized in democratic norms to accept guidance for behaviour from whichever source of normative referents seems to them most favourable to the course of action they have decided.

We refer here to two factors which may induce political leaders to give verbal allegiance to one set of norms but apply another set of norms in most of the real life situations. One factor relates to the inapplicability of a set of norms because of the exigency of certain situations. Another factor relates to the availability of alternate sets of norms with equal salience for the behaviour of the actor. In such situations, then, the actor, even if he sees the necessity of giving allegiance to a generalized norm, will tend to be influenced in his behaviour by the exigency of a particular situation and decide the course of his action accordingly. For lack of a better term we call it "exigential values".

In Table 4.4 we present evidence to show that most of the political leaders at the local level are moved much more by exigential values than by a generalized set of norms. Support for this observation comes

from the fact that when respondents are confronted with a statement without referring to any situational exigency, but containing some aspects of democratic norms, they express their agreement with that norm. Notice, for example, that 73.7 per cent of leaders disapprove a politicians' acting undemocratically even under certain compelling

TABLE 4.4  
NORMATIVE REFERENTS OF LEADERS: EXIGENTIAL  
VALUES

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL N=57
	19.3	7.0	73.7	
Under certain compelling conditions a politician is justified in acting undemocratically.	19.3	7.0	73.7	100.0
Politics being what it is one has often to compromise with principles.	63.2	22.8	12.2	98.2*
You cannot act according to the principles of democracy with those who themselves do not believe in democracy.	49.1	10.5	40.4	100.0
If some misguided sections of the people do not listen to persuasion they should be suppressed in the interest of the country.	86.0	7.0	7.0	100.0

\*Excluding 1.8 per cent of responses falling in the category 'other' situations. Seemingly it is a strong indication of leaders' attachment to democratic principles. It is, however, not so is revealed by their response to other items in Table 4.4. For example, 63.2 per cent of leaders recognize that exigencies of politics make it necessary for them to often compromise with principles. Also significant is the fact that 22.8 per cent of leaders, who give a neutral reply to this item would not like their behaviour to be bound by any rigid standard of action in this regard.

More revealing is the fact that almost half of the total respondents are in agreement with the suggestion that one cannot act according to the

principles of democracy with those who themselves do not believe in democracy. It is true that political leaders employ two contradictory evaluative standards in this regard. However, willingness on the part of 49.1 per cent of leaders to take recourse to undemocratic means in dealing with those who do not believe in democracy suggests the strength of existential values in influencing leaders' behaviour.

Further confirmation of this conclusion comes from the fact that 86.0 per cent of leaders are in favour of suppressing in the interest of the country any section of people which refuses to listen to persuasion. It is a common experience of most of the democratic countries that a well organised and persistent group of people does sometimes bring the functioning of the political system to a grinding halt and refuses to respond to persuasion. This is an exasperating situation and even those leaders who are greatly attached to democratic principles are swayed by the exigency of the situation to take recourse to coercion and force. In a developing democracy, however, such situations are much more salient and it is not, therefore, surprising that an overwhelming majority of political leaders are not unwilling to suppress those sections who are not amenable to persuasion.

Our data, then, show that, in spite of the fact that political leaders at the local level pay homage to democratic principles, they tend to be guided in their behaviour by what we have called existential values. Given this duality in their belief system, can it be expected that they are more likely to identify themselves with partisan rather than universal entities? This issue is of crucial importance to developing democracies inasmuch as integration of the political system depends much more on forging broader identity transcending ethnic, regional and religious loyalties. Furthermore, intense partisanship makes for intense political struggle and adversely affects the prospects of political stability. The realization that political parties are only instruments for serving the interest of a much more broader entity, that is, nation, serves to temper political struggle. We, therefore, felt it necessary to find out what is it that leaders identify themselves with. Table 4.5 presents data on this dimension.

It is our expectation that a political leader, who is excessively partisan in his attitude and orientation, will always try to give priority to the interest of his party in preference to other entities. In behavioural terms, he will tend to support his partymen even if they are in

error, will not hesitate to adopt unfair means if the interest of his party is involved, and will give more preference to the preservation of consensus in the party than working for the good of the community. It will be observed that three items in Table 4.5 intend to measure all these facets of partisanship.

TABLE 4.5  
NORMATIVE REFERENTS OF LEADERS: PARTISAN  
VERSUS UNIVERSAL IDENTITY

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL N=57
	3.5	7.0	89.5	
Use of unscrupulous means by a politician may sometimes be forgiven if they lead to the strengthening of his party.	3.5	7.0	89.5	100.0
A political leader should always support his partymen even if their actions are at times unjustified.	8.8	5.2	86.0	100.0
A political leader should refrain from making proposals that may cause division in the party even if these proposals are important for the community.	36.8	12.3	49.1	98.2*

\*Excluding 1.8 per cent of responses falling in the category 'other'.

Our data, however, do not indicate that the leaders we interviewed are influenced by partisan considerations. As a matter of fact, there is ample evidence to show that political leaders do not consider partisanship as a legitimate value. For example, only 3.5 per cent of political leaders accept that use of unscrupulous means by a political leader may sometimes be forgiven if they lead to the strengthening of his party. About nine-tenth of political leaders express themselves against adoption of unfair means even for the purpose of strengthening one's party.

Further confirmation of this observation comes from leaders' response to the statement that a political leader should always support his partymen even if their actions are at times unjustified. 86.0 per

cent of political leaders are decidedly against supporting colleague whose actions cannot always be justified. It appears, then, that political leaders at the local level are not intensely partisan; their commitment to the party of their choice does not blind them to the necessity of drawing a line between what is fair and what is foul. In other words, their partisan interest is based on the sanctity of the rule of the game.

It does, however, seem that what political leaders value more than intense partisanship is the preservation of consensus in the party. It should be noted here that consensus as a value is highly preferred in Indian society. Drawing from the tradition of old village panchayat system as well as movements for national freedom, Indian political leaders put much more emphasis on consensus even in the present-day political processes. When asked to respond to the statement, "Any decision that threatens to alienate a section or group in the community should be given up", six out of ten political leaders expressed their agreement with it. It is, therefore, not surprising that consensus in the party should also be highly valued. This is evident from the fact that as much as 36.8 per cent of political leaders agreed that a political leader should refrain from making proposals that may cause division in the party even if these proposals are important for the community. It should also be noted in this connection that there is a very meagre consensus among political leaders on this item inasmuch as 36.8 per cent of responses accumulate on the positive response category and 49.1 per cent on the negative side. In spite of the fact that there is not much agreement among political leaders about proper conduct in this regard, the fact that 36.8 per cent of leaders are willing enough to go to the extent of even sacrificing the interest of the community in order to prevent division in the party, does show the strength of consensus as a value.

Having discussed some of the facets of political leaders' normative referents, we turn now to a brief discussion of political leaders' willingness to identify themselves with political institutions. The absence of intense partisanship does indicate that leaders are favourably inclined to uphold the sanctity of the rule of the game insofar as this relates to party-building activities. They would not take recourse to methods which are unfair but promise to further the interest of the party they belong to. However, absence of intense partisanship is not enough to make a democratic polity function well. It is also essential that

political leaders should commit themselves to maintaining and preserving certain conventions that develop in due course of time. It is, for instance, essential that political leaders once elected to an office, should identify themselves with that office and defend it against popular criticism if they do not find any justification for such criticism. It is absurd for a minister to openly criticize the government and let it down in the face of strong public demand. Similarly, it is also essential that the decision taken by their predecessors should be given effect to in order to protect the legitimacy of the regime. How far do political leaders subscribe to these conventions?

Our data show that there is not much attitudinal support for these conventions. It can be seen from Table 4.6 that only 29.8 per cent of

TABLE 4.6  
NORMATIVE REFERENTS OF LEADERS:  
INTERNALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC  
INSTITUTIONAL VALUES

ITEMS	AGREE	PARTLY AGREE	DISAGREE	TOTAL N=57
When elected to the public office a political leader must stand by the government in the face of even strong public demands.	29.8	15.8	54.4	100.0
After being elected to a public office a political leader is not obligated to carry out decisions made by his predecessors.	49.1	17.5	29.8	94.4*

\* Excluding 3.6 per cent response falling in category 'other'.

political leaders agree with the statement that when elected to the public office a political leader must stand by the government in the face of even strong public demands. Inasmuch as 54.4 per cent of political leaders reject the validity of this norm, the conclusion that election to a public office does not in their view create any obligation for them to stand by the government seems irresistible. It signifies a lack of awareness on the part of political leaders of the necessity of functioning as a team when

charged with the responsibility of managing public affairs. It signifies, further, a complete dissociation between the requirements of private political career and that of the functioning of a collectivity. This feeling is further heightened if we consider the fact that only 29.8 per cent of political leaders feel that, once elected to public office, they are obliged to carry out decisions made by their predecessors. This, in essence, reflects that, although political leaders have been associated with the functioning of democratic institutions for a long time, they have not yet come to accept the restrictions on freedom of their behaviour imposed by their participation and sharing of responsibility in government. However, as long as these conventions are not accepted, working of democratic institutions will be made difficult.

Our discussion up to this point has highlighted some of the facets of belief system of political leaders at the local level. We are aware that the nature of our data does not permit firm conclusions; however, certain dominant patterns of leadership belief system are certainly indicated. For example, our data indicate that political leaders are characterized by an activist-autonomous conception of the representative's role, tend to be influenced more by existential values, and, although not intensely partisan, are disinclined to accept conditions of joint responsibility and collective functioning.

Given these characteristics, what would be the leaders' conception of their role *vis-a-vis* administrators? It can, on the basis of our knowledge of political leaders' normative referents, be hypothesized that although they would be aware of the necessity of respecting the autonomy of the administrative structure, they would tend to perceive their role *vis-a-vis* administrators in terms of protector of the public interest and a check on administrative conduct. (The function of a check on administrative conduct is most likely to be interpreted in terms of keeping the administrator on the right track by taking recourse to one or the other of the following methods. First, political leaders may decide to bring to public notice the lapses of the public official. Second, if it does not have any effect on the administrator, they may seek the intervention of either higher officials or higher level political leaders for providing correctives. Lastly, the leaders may decide to forcefully dramatize the issue by supporting and organizing agitation.

We do not intend to suggest that this is the only significant conception of political leaders' role in relation to administrators. There are,

in fact, several dimensions to the role political leaders define for themselves. They recognize their linkage function, that is, functioning as an important communication link between administration and the common mass, advisory function and partnership function. But what is important is the fact that leadership should perceive its role as a curb on administrative ills, in addition to functioning in all the respects mentioned above.

Two considerations prompt us to advance this hypothesis. In the first place, our data show that political leaders conceive of the representative of the people as a person who forms the notion of the best course of action or of public good on the basis of his own independent judgment. If such a notion is at variance with what is popularly supposed to be the best policy or course of action, the representative is prepared to take steps in order to bring public opinion in harmony with his own views rather than revising or modifying them. Once a particular disposition has been developed in regard to one set of object it becomes very easy to transfer the same disposition in regard to another set of object. We can, therefore, expect political leaders to evaluate administrators' action according to their own conception of how they should function and to intervene when they find them committing what to them seems mistakes.

However, perception of administrative lapses is not enough to induce political leaders to take recourse solely to agitational methods when other methods of redressal of complaints are available. There must be present some other dispositional factor which inclines them one way rather than the other. As we observed earlier, political leaders are not inclined to identify themselves with or conform to democratic institutional values, such as, adherence to operational conventions of a collectivity. In the second place, then, their reluctance to completely identify themselves with democratic institutional values, may induce them to look with suspicion on or doubt effectiveness of well established procedures of correcting administrative ills. These two factors taken together should, in our view, account for political leaders' propensity to take recourse to agitational methods for keeping the administrator on the right track.

This indicates a greater degree of agreement among political leaders about what their role should be in relation to administrators. In other words, differences of social origin, political experience and party

identification do not prove to be of any importance for how political leaders define their role. Further, it is also symptomatic of the universality of role contents inasmuch as there is little, if any, difference among political leaders on their role. But how do political leaders define their role?

It may be indicated here that leaders' role perception in the context of their interaction with administrators can be placed on a spectrum ranging from affably passive to agitational-interventionist role. Leaders influenced by affably passive role conception see their role purely in terms of facilitating the task of administrators. They restrict themselves to functions whose relevance lies in conveying peoples' wishes and opinion to administrators and providing them with informations necessary for policy making. Such leaders do not allow their own notion of desirable policy or course of action to influence administrative decisions. They serve simply as a link in the communication network and submit themselves to the judgment and experience of administrators.

A variation on this theme can also be noted. There are leaders who are not satisfied with defining their role in affably passive terms. They do see the necessity of letting administrators function in their own way and assist them in policy formulation and policy implementation by providing them with relevant informations and a feel of public mood. But more than this, they feel that they should also tender advice and suggestions about both formulation and implementation of policy. They also find it necessary to actively cooperate with administrators in programme implementation. Such leaders do not passively pass on informations up and down and accept administrators' judgment on a particular issue. They visualize their role in terms of active participation in administrative functions. However, their attitude towards administrators remains affable. We call this role perception affably active.

In contradistinction to this, there is a totally different conception of leaders' role *vis-a-vis* administrators. It is quite possible that leaders may not be affably disposed towards administrators. They may be inclined to interpret their role in terms of watch-dog of public interest insofar as it is affected by administrative operations. They may feel that it is their responsibility to see that administrators do not stray away from their proper role and, if they do stray far away from

what they should be doing, intervene in order to set matters right. This is what we characterize interventionist role conception.

We can identify two variations of this role conception. First, leaders may see the necessity of intervening in order to insure that administrators function in a proper way. However, their intervention may not violate the boundary of procedural nicety. They will remain within the boundary of what is conceived of as proper procedures or right conduct. We call this constructive-interventionist role conception. Second, all those leaders who see the necessity of intervention, may, in addition to performing constructive-interventionist role, find it essential to go beyond such measures and take recourse to agitation and seek intervention by higher authorities. Such leaders may be inclined to dramatize the issue by agitating people's mind about administrative ills and lapses. We call this agitational-interventionist role perception.

It will be seen that this spectrum of leaders' role perception is cumulative in nature. That is, if a leader defines his role in terms of agitational-interventionist dimension he will tend to take recourse to other three dimensions too. If, on the other hand, he defines his role in terms of constructive-interventionist dimension, he will also be disposed to accept the other role conceptions but not the agitational-interventionist role. What role conception the leader will have depends, of course, on his other attitudinal factors which we are not in a position at present to go into. However, it seems to us that these four types of role conception adequately take into account various dimensions of leaders' role conception.

Having disposed of some preliminary considerations pertaining to leaders' role perception, we now turn to analyse leaders' responses to questions on role perception instrument.

Table 4.7 presents data on affably passive role perception of leaders. As is apparent, there exists overwhelming support for all the three items in Table 4.6. As a matter of fact there is complete unanimity among political leaders about the fact that it is their responsibility to convey wishes and opinions of the people to administration. Similarly, they also recognize that providing administrators with relevant informations for making decisions is one of their vital functions. However, when it comes to accepting judgment of administrators in matters of policy implementation, only 73.6 per cent of political leaders think it

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obligatory. Of course, there is only 5.3 per cent of responses to the negative, accumulation of 21.1 per cent of responses in the neutral category of 'may or may not do' signifies the intention of at least one-fifth of political leaders not to treat this item of behaviour as mandatory. In other words, these leaders would prefer to examine the validity of such a judgment before committing themselves one way or the other.

TABLE 4.7  
LEADERS' ROLE PERCEPTION : AFFABLY PASSIVE

ITEMS	MUST DO	MAY OR	MUST NOT	TOTAL
	MAY NOT	DO	N=57	
	DO			
Convey wishes and opinions of the people to administration.	100.0	—	—	100.0
Provide administrators with relevant informations for making decisions.	89.5	3.5	7.0	100.0
Accept judgment of administrators in matters of policy implementation.	73.6	21.1	5.3	100.0

It is apparent, then, that there is a high degree of acceptance among political leaders of affably passive role conception. Similar is the

TABLE 4.8  
LEADERS' ROLE PERCEPTION : AFFABLY ACTIVE

ITEMS	MUST	MAY OR	MUST NOT	TOTAL	
	DO	MAY NOT	DO	N=57	
	DO				
Advise Administrators about the best course of action.	87.7	8.8	3.5	100.0	
Cooperate with administrators in carrying out government programmes.	96.5	3.5	—	100.0	
Protect administrators from public demands and unreasonable criticism.	93.0	3.5	3.5	100.0	

case with affably active role conception. As will be seen from Table 4.8, there is a very high degree of positive agreement among political leaders on all the three items in the Table. For example, 87.7 per cent of leaders feel the obligation of advising administrators about the best course of action, 96.5 per cent of cooperating with administrators in carrying out government programmes, and 93.0 per cent of protecting administrators from public demands and unreasonable criticisms. It should be noted that the content of all the three items in the Table above reflects an active conception of the leaders' role. Moreover, political leaders' acceptance of the obligation implied in these role sectors is affable inasmuch as leaders indicate a cooperative disposition towards administrators. This role conception is active in the sense that political leaders do not remain satisfied with passively functioning as an adjunct of administrative structure but also recognize that they have to discharge the functions of advising, cooperating with, and protecting administrators.

It is apparent from our data that there is a high degree of support in leadership attitude both for affably passive and affably active role conceptions. What about constructive-interventionist role definition? We present data on this dimension in Table 4.9. It is to be noted that about a third of political leaders thinks it obligatory to strictly pursue a 'hands off' policy *vis-a-vis* administration. That there is a very low degree of consensus among political leaders on this item is indicated by the nature of distribution of responses. However, about half of political leaders reject the proposition of strictly pursuing a 'hands off' policy in relation to administration. But the absence of a high degree of consensus on this item does indicate that attitude of political leaders has not crystallized into a definite role definition on this role sector.

It may be that the phrasing of the question has something to do with this low degree of consensus. Pursuing of a 'hands off' policy may mean either non-interference in administration or a posture of having to do nothing with it. That this may be the case is suggested by the fact that 91.2 per cent of leaders feel the obligation of keeping a strict watch on administrative performance. Whatever the case, the inference that political leaders view their role in terms of functioning as a check on administrative performance seems justified. That political leaders feel obliged to keep administrators on right track is confirmed by the fact that 75.4 per cent of leaders are in favour of bringing to public

notice faults or flaws of administration. It is generally accepted that the strength of democratic political system lies in the virility of public opinion, unbiased and constructive, and it is one of the functions of leaders to bring public opinion to bear on various public issues. A

TABLE 4.9  
LEADERS' ROLE PERCEPTION: CONSTRUCTIVE-INTERVENTIONIST

ITEMS	MUST	MAY OR	MUST NOT	TOTAL N=57
	DO	MAY NOT	DO	
Strictly pursue a 'hands off' policy <i>vis-a-vis</i> administration.	33.3	15.8	49.1	98.2*
Keep a strict watch on administrative performance.	91.2	3.5	5.3	100.0
Bring to public notice faults or flaws of administration.	75.4	8.8	15.8	100.0
Insist that administrators be guided in their action by advice given by politicians.	29.8	17.8	52.6	100.0

\*Excluding 1.8 per cent of responses falling in the category 'other'.

constant exposure of ills of the system helps in eradicating these ills and keeps the management of public affairs on an even keel. In other words, to attract public notice to administrative ills and create public opinion against such ills is one of the constructive and legitimate functions of leadership. Political leaders' disposition to bring to public notice faults of administration is, therefore, indicative of their willingness to play constructive-interventionist role.

This is confirmed in yet another way. Out of exasperation with continued administrative malfunctioning, political leaders may come to the conclusion that administrators must be guided in their action by advice given by political leaders. This will, however, be tantamount to subordinating administrative considerations to the political and violating bureaucratic autonomy. It cannot be expected that all political leaders will be infused with the principles of universalistic legal-rational

criteria of functioning and committed to the criterion of efficiency in goal gratification. Political considerations, and not inoften contradictory ones at that, will get an upper hand in policy implementation. This will ruin administrative system leading maybe to political instability. To insist, then, that administrators be guided in their action by advice given by political leaders is equivalent to bringing administrative structure to a certain paralysis. If, then, political leaders are committed to the performance of constructive-interventionist role, it is expected that they would not insist on administrators being guided solely be political leaders' advice. That this is so is indicated by the fact that 52.6 per cent of leaders accept that they must not insist on this. It is true that 29.8 per cent of leaders feel the obligation of insisting on this. However, more than half of our respondents express themselves in favour of resisting the temptation of subordinating administration to politics.

More than anything else, political leaders in our sample indicate their preference for agitational-interventionist role conception. If we look closely at Table 4.10, this becomes immediately clear. For example, 82.5 per cent of political leaders agree that they must intervene when administrators ignore people's demands. In order to bring pressure on the administrator to conform to what political leaders think the administrator ought to do, they would not hesitate to approach political leaders at higher levels to intervene or organize agitation against administrative lapses. For instance, 77.2 per cent of political leaders feel it obligatory to seek intervention by political leaders, 80.7 per cent to support agitation against unjust government action, as well as to prevent administrators from taking improper action by agitation. It would, then, seem that there is a very high degree of support for an agitational-interventionist role conception of political leaders.

Given these characteristics of leadership role conception, what is it that political leaders are likely to identify themselves with? In other words, is it the interest of a broader entity or only partisan interest that influences leaders' role performance. As is evident from Table 4.11 political leaders are decidedly against utilizing or exploiting administration for partisan reasons. This is abundantly clear from the fact that only one respondent out of 57 feels obliged to utilize administration for party building purposes. Even for the purposes of carrying out constructive party programmes, which have been endowed a great

amount of legitimacy by Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress Party, a majority of political leaders is against utilizing the administration. However, willingness to request administrators to help in carrying out constructive party programmes on the part of 31.6 per cent of leaders does indicate that for many the legitimacy of constructive programmes is still a strong factor.

TABLE 4.10  
LEADERS' ROLE PERCEPTION: AGITATIONAL-  
INTERVENTIONIST

ITEMS	MUST DO	MAY OR MAY NOT	MUST NOT DO	TOTAL N=57
	DO			
Intervene when administrators ignore people's demands.	82.5	12.2	3.5	98.2*
Seek intervention by political leaders at higher levels for correcting administrative ills at the district.	77.2	14.0	8.8	100.0
Support agitation against unjust government action.	80.7	12.3	7.0	100.0
Prevent administrators from taking improper action by agitation, etc.	80.7	10.5	8.8	100.0

\* Excluding 1.8 per cent of responses in the category 'others'.

It is true that political leaders are least inclined to utilize administration for partisan purposes. However, what is revealing is the fact that 80.7 per cent of political leaders feel obliged to cooperate only with those administrators who agree with their viewpoints. This is symptomatic of the phenomenon of predominance of personal relationship in the interaction between the politician and the administrator. The weakness of partisan interest as a motivational force in the context of the leaders' dealing with the administrator may be accounted for in terms of leaders' propensity to develop personalized relationship with administrators. Such a relationship is, however, based on similarity of viewpoints or interests. This also indicates that political leaders would be most likely to refuse to cooperate with those administrators who do

not happen to be in agreement with what leaders think should or should not be done. If we consider the salience of agitational-interventionist conception of leaders' role, the impression gathers strength that political leaders, when baulked in their attempt to make administrators do what they want them to do, would be easily persuaded to take recourse to agitational methods.

TABLE 4.11  
LEADERS' ROLE PERCEPTION: PAROCHIAL-UNIVERSAL

ITEMS	MUST	MAY OR	MUST NOT	TOTAL N=57
	DO	MAY NOT	DO	
	DO			
Utilize administration for party building activities.	1.8	—	98.2	100.0
Request Administrators to help in carrying out constructive party programmes.	31.6	5.3	63.1	100.0
Cooperate with those administrators who agree with your viewpoint.	80.7	12.3	7.0	100.0

To summarize, our discussion of leaders' normative referents and role conception highlights several factors. In the first place, although political leaders profess their attachment to the role of representative as an agent of the people, they are much more inclined to define such a role in terms of autonomy of the representative. In the second place, it is true that political leaders express their commitment to absolute democratic norms, they are much more inclined in practice to be influenced by what we have called exigential values. In the third place, although political leaders recognize that they should assist and cooperate with administrators in carrying out government programmes, they view their role in terms of agitational-interventionist conception. Lastly, it is true that political leaders deny to be influenced by partisan motives in their dealing with administrators, they tend to evaluate administrative performance in terms of the satisfaction of personalized demands and expectations.

## CHAPTER V

### ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICIANS : IMAGES

IN the last two chapters we discussed normative referents and role perceptions of administrators and political leaders. The administrators in Meerut District, as our analysis reveals, reflect varying degrees of consensus in regard both to normative referents and salience of different role sectors. However, they do feel the obligation of giving precedence to administrative rules, regulations and procedures, particularly to the instructions of super-ordinate authorities. They are much less oriented to criteria other than administrative ones and less disposed to look with enthusiasm on representative politics. This is borne out also by their unwillingness to come to terms with representative politics. They find themselves face to face with fast changing environment without, however, developing an appropriate set of norms or a redefined set of professional roles for coping with the changed context. As a result, they feel insecure and in order to escape from the uncertainties that insecurity breeds, they try to enter into alliances with local leaders and seek their support.

Political leaders, on the other hand, profess their adherence to democratic values and identification with a larger entity. However, their conception of the representative's role inclines them to endow an autonomous and active attribute to the role of the leader. This is also likely to induce them to ignore the strength of public opinion on certain issues and stick to their own convictions in proposing or carrying out a particular programme. Another factor likely to induce them to deviate from democratic ideas is the leader's excessive emphasis on maintaining consensus in the community as well as in the party. This means that if a local social section is strongly opposed to a particular line of action, it may be shelved in order to keep harmony even if this leads to abandonment of a programme that is likely to benefit a large section of the community.

Yet another factor that is likely to encourage leaders to make departures from democratic principles is their marked propensity to be

influenced in their behaviour by what we have called 'exigential values'. This is, in a sense, indicative of their weak and tenuous attachment to democratic principles. In short, then, the leaders' profession of commitment to democratic principles is not as deep rooted as one would expect.

Coming to their role perception, it is clear that leaders are, by and large, in favour of a cooperative working relationship with administrators. However, their notion that they have also to perform an essential function of keeping a watchful, observant eye on administrative performance in order to assure the safeguarding of public interest, prompts them to treat the administrator as a person who must be shown his place. The agitational-interventionist conception of their role is indicative of the fact that in spite of their perception of the obligation to adopt proper methods of insuring proper administrative functioning, they are more inclined to take to agitational methods for this purpose.

Even more significant is the fact that political leaders, though claiming to be above narrow, partisan interests, tend to visualize their relationship with administrators in personal terms. For one thing, this is indicative of the fact that for local political leaders the needs and problems of a geographical unit, such as, district or state, or a social unit, such as, class or caste, have a very low degree of salience. For another, when needs and problems are viewed in personal terms, the value of the relationship between two interacting units is estimated in terms of personal satisfaction that can be derived from such a relationship. If the flow of satisfaction ceases, such a relationship, given the leadership traits we discussed earlier, is likely to be snapped and replaced by feelings of non-cooperation, indifference and, not infrequently, hostility.

What we have discussed so far represents two position-specific normative referents and role perception. That is, we have taken into account only the perception of an occupant of a particular position about the norms that impinge on his behaviour and what he himself defines to be his role. In other words, our enquiry has focussed only on role performer's conception of what his role is and what it is that he orients his behaviour to. However, administrators or politicians are occupants of two different sets of positions and a particular position is defined as "the location of an actor or class of actors in a system of social relationship . . ."<sup>1</sup> and "each position is simply a collection of rights and

<sup>1</sup> Neal Gross, *et. al, op. cit.*, p. 58.

duties",<sup>2</sup> or equivalent to "a system of rights, and duties".<sup>3</sup> Defined this way, in addition to the expectation of the occupant of a particular position about his own role, what others expect of him also assumes a crucial importance.

In the case of the present study which uses dyad model of role relationship, one useful approach would have been to treat each of the two different groups of position holders as definer of the role of the other. This would have provided us with important informations about the kinds of expectations one has from the other, interposition consensus on role definition, and the extent of congruence between the reciprocal expectations of interacting units. Exploration of this dimension would help us in ascertaining the extent to which actors in different positions have to experience conflict arising out of the pressure of incompatible expectations. It would also illumine tensions and conflict that may characterize interaction between two sets of position holders.

That we did not adopt this approach is due not to our insufficient appreciation of its relevance to our problem. We are, in fact, convinced of its usefulness as a tool which promises to unfold the underlying congruency or noncongruency in two interacting groups of actors' evaluation of each others' role. The reasons why we did not make use of this approach are mainly two. First, exploration of actor's perception of his role yields enough information to ascertain more or less accurately the factors that impinge on and determine the character of the relationship between two groups of actors. In view of the fact that we are not exploring the dimensions of relationship between two formally inter-related and continuously interacting groups of actors, a knowledge of the nature of interposition consensus is as important as the degree of congruence between normative referents, orientations and role perception of the occupant of a position in relation to his counter-position. In order, therefore, to attain economy we decided to adopt the latter approach.

Second, inasmuch as an expectation can be taken to mean as "an evaluative standard applied to an incumbent of a position"<sup>4</sup>, much more effective measures of evaluative standard can be utilized to highlight the

<sup>2</sup> Ralph Linton, *Study of Man* (New York : D. Appleton Century Co., 1936), p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> Theodore R. Sarbin, "Role Theory", in Gardener Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (Cambridge : Addison Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), Vol. 1, p. 225.

<sup>4</sup> Neal Gross, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

interaction between two groups of actors. One such measure is the image incumbent of one position has for the incumbent of a counter-position. Images represent not only the outcome of evaluation a person makes of another but also affect his orientation towards the object of his evaluation. In addition, an actor's behaviour towards his counterpart is influenced to a considerable extent by the former's image of the latter. In view of these considerations, we thought it better to focus on the image administrators have of political leaders and *vice versa*.

We, therefore, focus our attention in this chapter on the exploration of reciprocal images of both administrators and politicians. Inasmuch as we administered image instruments to both administrators and politicians, we are in a position to discuss administrators' image of political leaders and *vice versa* as well as the measure of consensus between the two on various items of role instrument. This along with the exploration of normative referents and actors' role perception should give us enough information to base our estimation of relationship between administrators and political leaders.

As we indicated earlier, we constructed two image instruments, one for administrators and the other for political leaders and both of them were asked to respond to every item in both the instruments. In other words, we were interested not only in self image of both the groups of actors but also in the images one had of the other. In the case of administrators, our image instrument included such dimensions as attributes like corrupt, rigid, inefficient, etc., that are generally imputed to administrators as a group, their fairness and impartiality, their orientation towards work facilitation, and their disposition towards people as well as political leaders. In addition to these four dimensions, we also explored other dimensions of administrators' image, such as, their innovativeness, propensity to interfere in local affairs, willingness to encourage local initiative, and awareness of local problems.

In the case of political leaders, our instrument focussed on such image dimensions as leaders' tendency towards self-aggrandizement, their ignorance of and disrespect towards administrative rules, regulations and procedures, their propensity to create trouble for administration or to serve useful functions for administration, and their incapacity to manage public affairs. In addition, we also had items which intended to tap some other dimensions, such as, functioning of

political leaders as a check on administration, their tendency to exacerbate conflict in the community and their disposition towards public welfare.

Inasmuch as each instrument was administered on both administrators and political leaders, we have enough data not only to have definite impressions about what, for example, administrators think of themselves but also about what political leaders think of administrators. Likewise our data enable us to indicate what political leaders think about themselves as well as what administrators think of them. This also enables us to know the extent to which there is agreement or difference between what administrators think of themselves and what political leaders think of them.

It is of interest to point out that on administrator's image instrument there is a considerable amount of difference between how administrators evaluate their own group and the way political leaders evaluate administrators as a group. To be more precise, administrators tend to evaluate themselves in much more favourable light than political leaders. They are much more harsh with themselves and do not hesitate to evaluate themselves unfavourably. Administrators also seem to hold very poor opinion of political leaders with the result that self-image of political leaders coincides to a considerable extent with the image administrators have of political leaders.) A very reliable measure of agreement or disagreement between actors' self-image and that perceived by others is the fact that on 22 items out of a total of 24 items in administrators' image instrument there is a significant difference according to chi-square criterion between administrators and political leaders at the .01 level. On one of the remaining two items there is significant difference between the two samples at the .05 level. In the case of political leaders' image instrument, however, an entirely different picture emerges; only on 2 items out of a total of 20 do the two samples reflect any significant difference (at the .01 level and on 3 items at the .05 level).

Having disposed of some considerations pertaining to our concerns in this chapter, we now turn to an analysis, first, of administrators' image and, then, to that of political leaders. The first dimension of administrators' image we take up for investigation pertains to certain attributes one group utilizes in evaluating another group. These attributes represent the evaluating groups' attempt to place the group


being evaluated in its evaluative and affective frame of reference. This kind of evaluation does not consider the object in relation to certain referents but attempts primarily to label the object in one way or the other by imputing to him a general, overall attribute. In Table 5.1 we are concerned with such attributes. As will be seen from this Table we are interested in finding out the way in which political leaders label administrators as a group and whether or not administrators view themselves the way political leaders do.

It is abundantly clear from Table 5.1 that administrators' self-image diverges sharply from that political leaders hold about them. Administrators reject the political leaders' perception of their image. As administrators see themselves, they vehemently reject that they are corrupt, rigid, inefficient, etc. It is also to be seen that the prevalence of a higher degree of consensus among administrators on this dimension of image indicates homogeneity in group thinking.

The political leaders, on the other hand, diverge sharply in their evaluation from that of administrators. According to them administrators are in fact corrupt, rigid, inefficient, etc. It is also to be noted that the pattern of consensus obtaining among political leaders is symptomatic of pervasive agreement among them on these attributes of administrators. It is thus evident that administrators and political leaders apply two divergent evaluative standards to administrators as a group and that there is no interposition consensus among them. This is confirmed by the fact that for each item in Table 5.1 political leaders' sample consistently has a higher mean response than the administrators' sample indicating the fact that a large number of political leaders group themselves on the positive side of the response which is scored highest (*i.e.* 3). This will be more clear if we looked at figure representing the pattern of interposition consensus.

It is evident from Figure 5.1, that evaluative standards that administrators apply to them are quite distinct from and contradictory to those applied by political leaders. That there is no agreement between the two samples on general characteristics of administrators is confirmed beyond doubt. However, there is a small but significant area of agreement between the two samples. Going back to Figure 5.1 for a moment, we find that 17.0 per cent of administrators agree with political leaders that they are corrupt and 24.6 per cent of political leaders agree with administrators that the latter are not corrupt. (In other words,

given the high degrees of divergence between image perception of the two groups, it is significant that there is recognition on the part of administrators, though small in number, that they project unfavourable image.



#### 5.1 PATTERN OF INTERPOSITION CONSENSUS AMONG ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICAL LEADERS.

There is, however, one thing that needs to be emphasized. Our data show that, speaking in very general terms, members of both the groups manifest a high degree of agreement in their perception of administrators' image. But in the case of item 3 in Table 5.1, that is, "Administrators are inefficient", there does not seem to be much agreement among political leaders: 47.4 per cent of political leaders feel that administrators are inefficient while 36.8 per cent do not. Prevalence of a very low degree of consensus among political leaders on this item is indicated by a great variance in political leaders' response distribution. This may be due to the fact that administrators have for long been characterized as efficient workers equipped with appropriate educational and professional skills to shoulder administrative responsibilities.

It is of interest to note in this connection that political leaders'

TABLE 5.1  
ADMINISTRATORS' IMAGE: ATTRIBUTES

ITEMS	SAMPLE			RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
	AD = 53	PL = 57	A	PA	DA	O			
1. Administrators are corrupt.	Ad	17.0	11.3	71.7	—†	1.453	0.587		
	Pl	63.2	10.5	24.6	1.8	2.393	0.738	.01	
2. Administrators are very rigid in their attitude.	Ad	17.0	1.9	81.1	—	1.359	0.569		
	Pl	75.4	1.8	21.1	1.8	2.334	0.675	.01	
3. Administrators are inefficient.	Ad	13.2	11.3	75.5	—	1.378	0.499		
	Pl	47.4	14.0	36.8	1.8	2.108	0.845	.01	
4. Administrators are concerned mainly with improving their own prospects.	Ad	20.8	11.3	67.9	—	1.529	0.664		
	Pl	77.2	5.3	14.0	3.5	2.655	0.517	.01	
5. Administrators do not listen to the advice of others, they do whatever they like.	Ad	20.8	11.3	67.9	—	1.529	0.664		
	Pl	71.9	7.0	19.3	1.8	2.535	0.641	.01	

\*Throughout this chapter the following keys have been used.

Ad = Administrators; Pl = Political Leaders; A = Agree;

PA = Partly agree; DA = Disagree; and O = Other responses.

†Totals more or less than 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

self-image about their educational qualification for running the government is very poor. This is indicated by the fact that 70.2 per cent of political leaders accept that they are not sufficiently educated to run the government. In contradistinction to this, the image that political leaders have of administrators indicates a favourable evaluation of administrators' capability to run the government better because of their being better educated. The lack of consensus among political leaders on whether administrators are inefficient or not stems perhaps from their poor self-image and their favourable estimation of administrators' managerial skills. However, the fact remains that 47.4 per cent of political leaders do consider administrators to be inefficient. This is significant in view of the fact that in spite of political leaders' poor self-image and the favourable image they have of administrators, such a large number of leaders has unfavourable image of administrators as inefficient workers.

It is apparent from our discussion so far that perception of administrators' self-image diverges sharply from the image political leaders hold about them. Further, while administrators have favourable self-image, their image in the eyes of political leaders is unfavourable. This is the general pattern that we come across in the case of administrators' image instrument. This is, for example, the case with all the items in Table 5.2. We have already seen that in the eyes of political leaders administrators are, in general, corrupt, rigid, inefficient, etc. In addition, political leaders also believe that administrators are not fair in their dealings with people; they are, political leaders assert, inclined to favour one group as against another. As much as 52.6 per cent of political leaders believe that fair and just treatment to all cannot be expected from administrators. It should be noted in this connection that 42.1 per cent of political leaders express their faith in fair treatment from administrators. The fact that political leaders tend to apply two completely contradictory evaluative standards to this image item is indicative of a lack of consensus among political leaders. However, one is left with the impression that, although political leaders are divided in their opinion on whether administrators are fair or not, a majority of political leaders does in fact consider administrators unfair.

That administrators are not impartial in their dealings with people is confirmed by the fact that 59.6 per cent of political leaders think

that administrators are partial to particular groups and classes in the district. It is true that a little less than one-third of political leaders are not convinced that administrators are partial. Still, consensus among political leaders on this item is higher as compared to item 1. More significant still is the fact that as much as 80.7 per cent of political leaders believe that administrators work in the interest of ruling groups.

It is evident from our data that for a considerable majority of political leaders administrators do not seem to be conforming to the universalistic standard of behaviour. That is, the belief that administrators are guided in their behaviour by the principle of meting out fair and just treatment to all irrespective of one's standing or power position in the society is not shared by political leaders. Likewise, their impartiality is also suspect in the eyes of political leaders. The tradition too of civil servants impartially implementing policy decisions made by ruling political leaders is scarcely respected by administrators according to political leaders. According to 80.7 per cent of political leaders, administrators work in the interest of ruling groups. That this image of administrators has some substance is confirmed by the fact that as much as 37.7 per cent of administrators themselves feel that administrators work in the interest of ruling groups.

It is apparent, then, that political leaders do not rate administrators very favourably. Administrators, on the other hand, are inclined to rate themselves in a much more favourable light. This inter-group difference on image is reflected also in the case of those items which relate to administrators' orientation towards performance (see Table 5.3). The test of an administrator's success, at least in the public eyes, is his capability to perform the tasks he has been assigned. Particularly in the context of increasing interaction for provision of services and solution of personal as well as community problems between administrators and citizens the carrying out of developmental programmes implies a confidence on the part of the public in the administrators' capacity to perform various tasks. This reinforces legitimacy of the political regime.

It may be mentioned in this connection that administrators might be exposed to two contradictory expectations. In the first place, administrators may be expected by their superiors to conform rigidly to rules and regulations that govern administrative performance. It is no doubt true that such an expectation does not hinder administrators in

performing their tasks. However, to the extent that existing rules and regulations delimit the alternative means available to administrators, they are restrained from acting freely and giving priority to achievement in contradistinction to adhering to rules and regulations. In other words, administrators have the freedom to show results insofar as they are in keeping with existing rules and regulations. However, the phenomenon of goal displacement is quite frequent and it is possible that administrators may find it safer to develop the habit of conforming to rules and regulations than to stick their neck out by emphasizing performance at the expense of rules, regulations and procedures.

In the second place, administrators may be expected by citizens to be oriented more to performance than to the necessity of strictly following rules and regulations. Increase in development tempo is likely to increase public pressure on administrators for quick results. However, no system can expect to last long if it allows extensive violation of its operational norms. Yet, adaptability to changing environmental pressures is a primary condition for the survival of an organization which, however, is not an easy trait to acquire. Failing to reorient themselves to changed situations, administrators may respond to increasing pressures for quick results by still more strict adherence to rules and regulations. For, rules and regulations offer protection from uncertainties that environmental pressures breed in administrators' mind.

It may be recalled that administrators, as we have already seen in Chapter III, give primacy to adherence to rules and regulations and are guided in their behaviour by their superior's instructions. It is, therefore, not surprising that political leaders consider administrators as sticklers of rules caring little for concrete work. This is quite evident from Table 5.3. For instance, 61.4 per cent of political leaders agree that administrators are sticklers of rules. What is interesting is the fact that 54.7 per cent of administrators also agree to this image of theirs. Note also that there is no significant difference on this item between administrators and politicians. This means that there exists quite an agreement between administrators and political leaders about the veracity of this image item. It should also be noted that among administrators themselves, there is practically no consensus on this item.

On the remaining two items, on the other hand, there is significant difference between administrators and political leaders. This is evident

from, first, the significant difference according to chi-square criterion at the .01 level between frequency distributions of the two samples and, second, the difference between the variance of two distributions. Political leaders, again, reflect their unfavourable evaluation of administrators inasmuch as 87.7 per cent believe that administrators have a tendency to expand departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems. With expanding government responsibility, expansion of government departments no doubt becomes a necessity. Yet this is supposed by political leaders to lead to diminishing administrative performance. That this image of administrators has a strong hold on political leaders' mind is further confirmed by the fact that 82.5 per cent of political leaders hold the view that administrators are more concerned with putting up a show than doing concrete work.

Our data, then, demonstrate political leaders' tendency to label administrators as committed less to work and more to safeguarding their vested interest in bureaucracy. It is also of interest to note in this connection that quite a large number of administrators see some substance in what political leaders believe about their propensity to sacrificing problem solving and work performance at the altar of bureaucratic rigidity. This is evident from the fact that 37.7 per cent and 34.0 per cent respectively agree that administrators have a tendency to expand departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems and that they are more concerned with putting up a show than doing concrete work respectively. This is indicative of the fact that adding of developmental activities to the pre-existing bureaucratic structure has not meant so much efficiency in bureaucratic performance as expansions of bureaucracy and proliferation of procedures. Recognition of this fact by administrators suggests a wide gap between what people expect from administrators and what the latter in fact do.

We have analyzed so far evidences which suggest that administrators' image in the eyes of political leaders is pretty low; they seem to political leaders not only corrupt, inefficient, unjust but also not much committed to doing concrete work. Another aspect of administrators' image pertains to whether or not they are well disposed towards people and their representatives. The concept of responsive bureaucracy underlines the willingness on the part of administrators to identify themselves with the people and be responsive to their needs and demands. Further, in the context of representative politics, administrators'

TABLE 5.2  
ADMINISTRATORS' IMAGE: FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY

ITEMS	SAMPLE			RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
	AD = 53	PL = 57	A	PA	DA	O			
1. Administrators guarantee fair and just treatment to all.	Ad	90.6	—	9.4	—	2.812	0.341		
	Pl	42.1	—	52.6	1.8	1.893	0.952	.01	
2. Administrators work in the interest of ruling groups.	Ad	37.7	11.3	50.9	—	1.868	0.869		
	Pl	80.7	1.8	15.8	1.8	2.661	0.545	.01	
3. Administrators are partial to particular groups and classes in the district.	Ad	15.1	3.8	81.1	—	1.340	0.526		
	Pl	59.6	7.0	31.6	1.8	2.236	0.846	.01	

TABLE 5.3  
ADMINISTRATORS' IMAGE: PERFORMANCE ORIENTATION

ITEMS	SAMPLE			RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
	AD = 53	PL = 57	A	PA	DA	O			
1. Administrators are sticklers of rule.	Ad	54.7	1.9	41.5	1.9	2.135	0.962		
	Pl	51.4	—	36.8	1.8	2.250	0.937		
2. Administrators have a tendency to expand departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems.	Ad	37.7	1.9	60.4	—	1.774	0.929		
	Pl	87.7	—	10.5	1.8	2.786	0.382	.01	
3. Administrators are more concerned with putting up a show than doing concrete work.	Ad	34.0	1.9	64.2	—	1.699	0.889		
	Pl	82.5	1.8	14.0	1.8	2.697	0.497	.01	

relationship with political leaders assumes a special significance. If administrators distrust political leaders, turn unsympathetic ear to their proposals and fail to understand their viewpoints, there is little likelihood that their interaction will prove conducive to systemic goal gratification. It is, therefore, necessary to investigate what evidence is there for the supposition that administrators are well disposed towards people and political leaders.

Table 5.4 presents data on the degree to which administrators are perceived by political leaders to be well oriented towards people. 73.7 per cent of political leaders feel that administrators keep themselves aloof from the people. The image that administrators do not attempt to identify themselves with the people is further strengthened if we consider the fact that, as 75.4 per cent of political leaders view it, administrators are indifferent to people's difficulties. In other words, it is the understanding of political leaders that administrators feel no affinity with the common mass and have, therefore, no sympathy for the difficulties of the people.

This lack of empathy on the part of administrators towards people is attributable, according to political leaders, to the fact that administrators come mainly from urban areas. Note, for example, that, when asked to respond to the item 'coming from urban areas, administrators do not care for village folks', 77.2 per cent of political leaders agreed that it is so. Whether or not administrators do in reality come from urban areas does not concern us here; what is important is the perception of political leaders which identifies administrators with urban areas and links their indifference towards and unconcern for the people with their place of origin.

It can, then, be expected that political leaders will have poor view of administrators' usefulness in redressing peoples' problems. That it is so is confirmed by the fact that about 60.0 per cent of political leaders do not recognize that administrators are helpful to people in redressing their problems.

It should be mentioned here that political leaders' perception of administrators' aloofness from the people gets some confirmation from administrators themselves. For example, about 40.0 per cent of administrators admit of keeping aloof from the people. On other items, however, they sharply disagree with political leaders.

It is thus clear that political leaders consider administrators

lacking in empathy towards the people and unresponsive to their needs and problems. What is their perception of administrators' disposition towards themselves? Table 5.5 presents data on this aspect of administrators' image. An examination of the Table shows that political leaders believe quite strongly that administrators are not well oriented towards them. Here we can distinguish two kinds of relationships that can obtain between administrators and political leaders: first is purely a functional relationship and the second goes beyond the functional one and takes on the warmth of personal relationship and emphasizes mutual trust and appreciation. In the opinion of political leaders, administrators are incapable of having not only the second type of relationship but also the first. Administrators, on the other hand, feel that they are receptive to political leaders' proposals and demands and appreciative of their viewpoints. However, there is some support that administrators do not favour a more intimate relationship with political leaders.

Given these general observations, there are variations in both the samples on this aspect of image perception. In the first place, on all the four items, quite a number of political leaders, ranging between 22.8 to 36.8 per cent, disagree that administrators are unresponsive to their demands and proposals, that they distrust political leaders or do not appreciate their difficulties. In other words, this suggests that administrators do have an intimate relationship with some of the political leaders. In the second place, administrators are in more or less complete agreement that the image which labels them as unappreciative of political leaders' viewpoints and difficulties is unwarranted. However, on items 2 and 4 in Table 5.5, there is a very low degree of consensus among them. Still, the nature of frequency distribution gives the impression that a closer relationship with political leaders is not encouraged in the group of administrators. That is why a large number of administrators agrees that they distrust political leaders (43.4 per cent) and do not appreciate their difficulties (54.7 per cent). Finally, on the first three items in Table 5.5, there is significant difference according to chi-square criterion between the two samples at the .01 level. This is a reflection of differential image perception, a very dominant feature characterizing both the samples. However, there exists interposition consensus between the two samples at least on one item in Table 5.5. Both administrators and political leaders are in agreement that

TABLE 5.4  
ADMINISTRATORS' IMAGE: ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS PEOPLE LEADERS

ITEMS	SAMPLE AD=53 PL=57	RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
		A	PA	DA			
1. Administrators keep themselves aloof from the people.	Ad	39.6	1.9	58.5	—	1.812	0.945
	Pl	73.7	3.5	21.1	1.8	2.556	0.673
2. Administrators are indifferent to people's difficulties.	Ad	11.3	1.9	86.8	—	1.246	0.441
	Pl	75.4	5.3	17.5	1.8	2.590	0.599
3. Administrators are helpful to people in redressing their problems.	Ad	92.5	—	7.5	—	2.850	0.279
	Pl	28.1	10.5	59.6	1.8	1.679	0.789

TABLE 5.5  
ADMINISTRATORS' IMAGE: ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS POLITICAL LEADERS

ITEMS	SAMPLE AD=53 PL=57	RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
		A	PA	DA			
1. Administrators do not appreciate viewpoints of political leaders.	Ad	13.2	1.9	84.9	—	1.284	0.467
	Pl	70.2	5.3	22.8	1.8	2.483	0.713
2. Administrators distrust politicians.	Ad	43.4	5.7	50.9	—	1.925	0.937
	Pl	68.4	7.0	22.8	1.8	2.179	0.860
3. Administrators do not pay any heed to proposals and demands of political leaders.	Ad	13.2	1.9	84.9	—	1.284	0.467
	Pl	52.6	10.5	35.1	1.8	2.179	0.860
4. Administrators do not appreciate the difficulties of politicians.	Ad	54.7	1.9	41.5	1.9	2.135	0.962
	Pl	61.4	—	36.8	1.8	2.250	0.937 not Sig.

administrators do not appreciate the difficulties of politicians. This is evident from the fact that there is no significant difference according to chi-square criterion between the two samples.

It remains for us to discuss a few other items on image perception that relate to administrators' innovativeness and their disposition towards local problems. In response to the statement, "Administrators are responsive to new ideas and practices", 77.4 per cent of administrators recognize it to be so, while political leaders are completely divided in their opinion, 47.4 per cent agree and an equal number of political leaders disagree.

In regard to administrators' disposition towards local problems, we present responses of both the samples in Table 5.6. It is evident from the Table that political leaders consider administrators as ignorant of local problems, interfering in local politics and discouraging local initiative. Although there is variation in the strength of support for these images (for instance, range of disagreement varies between 29.0 and 42.0 per cent), there cannot be any doubt that impression among political leaders is strong that administrators do not manifest those attributes that enable bureaucracy to perform useful functions. Particularly in the context of development planning wherein local needs are related to district, state and national plans, administrators cannot be expected to perform their role well if they have no intimate knowledge of the area they serve in. Likewise, a great amount of emphasis has been laid on the necessity of strengthening local political system so that it may fruitfully participate in development plans. Local initiative has been supposed to be a basic condition for plan success. In view of these considerations, it is very significant that political leaders evaluate administrators unfavourably in these regards. Needless to say that administrators are not convinced of their ignorance of local problems and interference in local politics. However, a little less than a third of administrators do accept that they do not promote local initiative.

With this we complete our discussion of administrators' image as perceived by the administrators themselves and by political leaders. We now turn to a discussion of political leaders' image as perceived by themselves and by administrators. As we pointed out earlier, political leaders tend to be harsh in evaluating their own group and there is a great amount of agreement between administrators and

political leaders about the low image of the latter. Apart from this general pattern, however, there is considerable variation from item to item which will be clear as we proceed on with our analysis.

We discuss first the perception of political leaders as well as administrators about the former's interest identification. Table 5.7 which presents data on this dimension clearly shows that there is almost complete agreement between political leaders and administrators about only a small section of political leaders giving priority to their self-interest. In other words, utilization of either political or administrative processes for the advancement of self-interest does not seem to be a dominant value for a large majority of political leaders. But when it comes to furthering the interests of political leaders' relatives and castemen, however, a different pattern emerges. Among political leaders, for instance, there seems to be little consensus on whether or not their image indicating their identification with parochial interests is true. Yet, 43.9 per cent of political leaders accept that they work for the furtherance of the interest of their relatives and castemen. Similarly, 54.9 per cent of administrators consider political leaders to be oriented towards parochial interests.

It is thus apparent that administrators' perception that political leaders are above the pursuit of self-interest is commensurate with the self-image of political leaders. However, there is some evidence to suggest that, although political leaders do not seek to give much importance to the pursuit of self-interest, they do express in favour of working in the interest of their kith and kin and castemen.) Does it mean that political leaders are unconcerned with the welfare of the people? 47.2 per cent of administrators believe, it may be pointed out, that political leaders do not care for the welfare of the people. We must, however, be cautious in interpreting it as an indictment of political leaders inasmuch as 39.6 per cent of administrators do not admit it to be the case. 63.2 per cent of political leaders, on the other hand, claim that they are committed to public welfare.

It may be true that political leaders are committed to and identify themselves with broader interests. But something more than commitment is needed for them to be effective in their role performance. Since they are primarily responsible for managing public affairs and it is through an efficient and purposive direction of public affairs that public good is to be realized, whether or not political leaders are

TABLE 5.6  
ADMINISTRATORS' IMAGE: LOCAL PROBLEMS

ITEMS	SAMPLE			RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
	AD = 53	AD = 57	PL = 57	A	PA	DA			
1. Administrators have no knowledge of local problems.	Ad	5.7		94.3		1.8	1.359	0.569	.01
	Pl	63.2		5.3	29.8	1.8	2.334	0.675	
2. Administrators take part in local politics.	Ad	9.4		7.5	83.0	1.8	1.265	0.383	.01
	Pl	50.9		5.3	42.1	1.8	2.090	0.938	
3. Administrators encourage local initiative.	Ad	66.0		1.9	30.2	1.9	2.366	0.847	.01
	Pl	38.6		7.0	50.9	3.5	1.873	0.911	

TABLE 5.7  
LEADERS' IMAGE: INTEREST IDENTIFICATION

ITEMS	SAMPLE			RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
	AD = 53	AD = 57	PL = 57	A	PA	DA			
1. Politicians work only in their self-interest.	Pl	28.1		7.0	63.2	1.8	1.643	0.801	not sig.
	Ad	30.2		9.4	58.5	1.9	1.712	0.820	
2. Politicians are concerned mainly with furthering the interests of their own relatives and castlemen.	Pl	43.9		7.0	47.4	1.8	1.965	0.927	not sig.
	Ad	54.9		15.1	28.3	1.9	2.270	0.773	
3. Politicians care for people's welfare.	Pl	63.2		10.5	22.8	3.5	2.419	0.716	not sig.
	Ad	47.2		11.3	39.6	1.9	2.079	0.878	

evaluated as capable managers of public affairs has much to do with their effectiveness in achieving public good. If political leaders are considered incapable of delivering the goods or have a poor opinion about themselves, their effectiveness as directors of public affairs will sharply be restricted.

It is, therefore, of interest to examine the image of political leaders as managers of public affairs as perceived by themselves as well as by administrators. Table 5.8 presents data on this dimension of political leaders' image. One thing that immediately strikes the eye is the coincidence between what political leaders think about themselves and what they are thought of by administrators. This is indicated, first, by little or no difference between the means of the two samples and, second, by the absence of any significant difference according to chi-square criterion between the two samples.

We do not intend to go into the explanations why political leaders have so poor an image of themselves. It may perhaps be due to the low esteem in which politics is viewed, to the divisive impact of politics, to the rise of power of professional politicians who exchange distribution of divisible benefits for political support and exploit social divisions for this purpose. Whatever the cause, there is no doubt that political leaders in our sample denigrate their own status by holding on to poor self-image. This also suggests that political leaders have not yet developed a strong sense of confidence in their own role.

We identify four causes which may have something to do with the poor image of political leaders as managers of public affairs. The first is their inexperience. Representative politics being a recent phenomenon in this country, the tradition of working representative institutions has yet to develop and take a firm root. Political leaders have yet to learn the intricacies and techniques of managing public affairs. It is, therefore, not surprising that about 60.0 per cent of political leaders admit that politicians do not know how to manage public affairs. It should be noted that administrators are more generous in this regard inasmuch as only 54.7 per cent agree that political leaders are inexperienced in managing public affairs.

Second, poor image of political leaders may also stem from their being ill-or-insufficiently educated. One of the characteristics of democratic politics in the developing countries is the gradual decline of intellectuals from position of dominance who provided leadership during

TABLE 5.8  
LEADERS' IMAGE: MANAGERS OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

ITEMS	SAMPLE		RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	Px <sup>a</sup>
	PL = 57	AD = 53	A	PA	DA			
1. Politicians do not know how to manage public affairs.	Pl Ad	59.6 54.7	5.3 3.8	33.3 35.8	1.8 5.7	2.668 2.200	0.874 0.920	not sig.
2. Politicians are so much involved in power struggle that they have little time to attend to actual problems.	Pl Ad	68.4 83.0	1.8 1.9	28.1 13.2	1.8 1.9	2.411 2.712	0.813 0.474	not sig.
3. Politicians are not sufficiently educated for running the government.	Pl Ad	70.2 64.2	3.5 13.2	24.6 20.8	1.8 1.9	2.465 2.443	0.748 0.669	not sig.
4. Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressures on them.	Pl Ad	84.2 90.6	3.5 —	10.5 5.7	1.8 3.8	2.750 2.883	0.401 0.221	not sig.

the days of struggle for national freedom. The rise to power of professional politicians meant in effect the recruitment to leadership positions of persons with poor or insufficient education. That poor or insufficient education of political leaders has something to do with their incapability to run government is confirmed by the fact that 70.2 per cent of political leaders admit it to be so. Here again administrators are a little generous in their estimation of political leaders because only 64.2 per cent in comparison to 72.0 per cent of political leaders agree that politicians are not sufficiently educated for running the government.

Third, one of the factors that hamper political leaders from functioning effectively pertains to intense political competition which compels them to pay much more attention to their own survival in politics than to anything else. The undifferentiated or insufficiently differentiated occupational structure fails to satisfy status mobility aspirations of the people. With the result that politics is taken to be the prime instrument of status mobility. It, therefore, attracts people and once people are drawn to politics they have to devote much of their time and energy for not only staying there but also climbing upward on leadership ladder. It is, therefore, conceivable that political leaders will have little time to attend to problems that confront the society. That it is so is confirmed because 68.4 per cent of political leaders agree that politicians are so much involved in power struggle that they have little time to attend to actual problems.

Lastly, in addition to their being too much involved in power struggles, political leaders are also subject to cross-pressure of conflicting demands. One of the conditions for success in politics is the politicians' skill in receiving support from a cross-section of the society. However, with increasing heterogeneity in the leaders' support structure, he becomes more and more vulnerable to conflicting demands which he finds hard to reconcile. This may cause him to be indecisive and fearful in taking any firm step. Indecisiveness in political leaders is reflected in 84.2 per cent of political leaders' admission that politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressures on them.

Thus our data decisively show that political leaders are handicapped in effectively functioning as managers of public affairs. Their insufficient education, inexperience, involvement in power struggle, and vulnerability to cross-pressure of conflicting demands—all these factors are

responsible for making political leaders incapable of managing public affairs efficiently. It cannot, however, be denied that political leaders have to perform some useful functions in their capacity as people's representatives. Not only they form a link between the mass of the citizens and the power apparatus of the society, they are also a watch-dog of public interest and evaluator of bureaucratic performance. They articulate demand, work for its aggregation with societal demands, formulate policies and mobilize support for government programmes.

In view of these considerations, it is of importance to investigate the extent to which political leaders perceive that they are performing these functions. Also, the image that public officials have of political leaders is important inasmuch as their conception of what political leaders in reality do as against what they should will have a considerable influence on interaction between the two. We present in Table 5.9 leaders' self-image and administrators' rating of the former's image in terms of political leaders' performing leadership functions of providing a link between the government and the public, mobilizing support for government policies and acting as a check on administrative lapses.

As will be seen from Table 5.9, on the first three items there is a considerable amount of agreement between political leaders and administrators. Members of both the group accept that political leaders perform certain useful functions which have great relevance for administration. For example, it is agreed by both the samples that political leaders are an important link between government and people: 94.7 per cent of political leaders and 79.2 per cent of administrators admit this. Similarly, both agree that politicians perform the important function of bringing people's grievances and opinions to the notice of the administrator. Also, there is agreement between political leaders and administrators that the former act as a check on administrative lapses.

Given this broad agreement between the two samples in their perceptions of the usefulness of the role of political leaders in providing a link between the governors and the governed, there is noticeable also some disagreement between political leaders and administrators on the extent to which the former are perceived by the latter to be useful. Administrators recognize the crucial position that political leaders occupy in mediating between the rulers and the ruled and of

TABLE 5.9  
LEADERS' IMAGE: FUNCTIONAL USEFULNESS FOR ADMINISTRATION

ITEMS	SAMPLE		RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
	PL = 58	AD = 53	A	PA	DA			
1. Politicians are an important link between government and people.	Pl Ad	94.7 79.2	— —	3.5 17.0	1.8 3.8	2.929 2.648	0.137 0.581	not sig.
2. Politicians bring to the notice of the administrator people's grievances and opinions.	Pl Ad	82.5 83.0	1.8 5.7	14.0 9.4	1.8 1.9	2.697 2.750	0.497 0.379	not sig.
3. Politicians are a check on administrative lapses.	Pl Ad	73.7 69.8	3.5 1.9	21.1 26.4	1.8 1.9	2.536 2.433	0.677 0.785	not sig.
4. Politicians help in making government policies realistic.	Pl Ad	61.4 34.0	7.0 9.4	29.8 54.7	1.8 1.9	2.322 1.789	0.825 0.859	.01
5. Political leaders help the administrator in getting popular support for government policies.	Pl Ad	54.4 47.2	5.3 3.8	38.6 47.2	1.8 1.9	2.161 2.000	0.920 0.961	not sig.

functioning as a communication channel between the two. However, these functions are general ones and have little specificity for policy formulation and programme implementation. By bringing to the notice of administrators people's grievances and opinions, political leaders make administrators alert to the undercurrents of public feelings. It may not give any clue to the administrators about guidelines for orienting policies to realities and improving programme implementation.

For administrators, then, the meaning of the term 'link between the government and the public' may go beyond the simple function of conveying people's wishes and aspirations to proper authorities. Administrators may expect from political leaders a much more active and constructive role than a simple communication link. Also, political leaders' functioning as a check on administrative lapses helps the administrators in avoiding mistakes and conforming to the principles of fair and just treatment. This, however, does not guarantee that government policies will be more realistic or will receive support of the people. Administrators may, therefore, expect that political leaders will serve the useful function of making government policies realistic and of mobilizing public support for them.

That political leaders do not perform these functions is confirmed by the fact that only 34.0 per cent of administrators agree that political leaders help in making government policies realistic whereas 54.7 per cent disagree. It is interesting to note that political leaders hold divergent views from that of administrators as is evident from the fact that as much as 61.4 per cent of political leaders consider themselves to be performing this function. Yet the fact remains that even among political leaders about 30.0 per cent feel that political leaders do not help in making government policies realistic. Disagreement between the two samples on this item is indicated by the fact that there is a significant difference according to chi-square criterion at the .01 level.

In regard to the last item in Table 5.9, it will be observed that in both the samples there is little or no consensus on political leaders' image. It cannot be denied that a majority of political leaders do feel that they help the administrator in getting popular support from government policies. However, unfavourable evaluation in this regard by 38.6 per cent of political leaders does cast some doubt about the universality of this image even among political leaders. Administrators, on the other hand, are evenly divided on this item reflecting the application

of two contradictory evaluative standards to political leaders' behaviour in this regard. It can, therefore, be concluded that there is not much disagreement between administrators and politicians about the latter's inability to perform the support mobilization function.

It is, then, clear that administrators recognize that political leaders perform some useful functions but, as they see it, these are only rudimentary. When it comes to assisting administrators in really significant areas of policy formulation and support mobilization for government policies, administrators do not consider political leaders performing any useful function. If we add to it the fact that political leaders are considered by administrators to be ignorant and disregardful of administrative rules, regulations and procedures as well as distrustful towards administrators, we have a phenomenon of a large perceived distance between the two.

It is significant that both political leaders and administrators agree that political leaders have little knowledge and regard for administrative rules, regulations and procedures. In response to the statement, "Politicians are not aware of administrative procedures, rules, and regulations", 68.4 per cent of political leaders and 73.7 per cent of administrators responded in favour. Similarly, in responding to the statement, "Politicians have no regard for administrative procedures, rules, and regulations", 52.6 per cent of political leaders and 69.8 per cent of administrators responded in favour. In other words, it is generally recognized that political leaders have neither any knowledge nor any regard for the rules of the game which govern functioning of the bureaucracy.

This is not likely to endear political leaders to those who have been painstakingly trained to adhere to and maintain the sanctity of rules and regulations. This is more likely to create a gap between political leaders and administrators and characterize their interaction with distrust and hostility. The question, what in fact do the administrators think of political leaders in terms of their attributes which may prove to be beneficial for administrative process, is of crucial importance. We present in Table 5.10 data on this dimension of political leaders' image.

As can be observed from the Table below, political leaders and administrators are more or less in agreement that the former are not appreciative of administrators' difficulties, nor do they cooperate with

TABLE 5.10  
LEADERS' IMAGE: ATTRIBUTES

ITEMS	SAMPLE		RESPONSES			$\bar{X}$	$\sigma^2$	$P_{X^2}$
	PL = 57	AD = 53	A	PA	DA			
1. Politicians do not appreciate the difficulties of administrators.	PI Ad	71.9 75.5	3.5 5.7	22.8 17.0	1.8 1.9	2.500 2.597	0.714 0.586	not sig.
2. Politicians are generally cooperative with administrators.	PI Ad	49.1 35.8	12.3 7.5	36.8 54.7	1.8 1.9	2.125 1.808	0.859 0.886	not sig.
3. Politicians do not trust administrators.	PI Ad	52.6 43.4	8.8 9.4	36.8 43.4	1.8 3.8	2.161 2.00	0.884 0.901	not sig.
4. Politicians are hostile to administrators.	PI Ad	24.6 26.4	7.0 13.2	64.9 58.5	3.5 2.9	1.582 1.674	0.752 0.758	not sig.
5. Politicians do nothing but create trouble for the administration.	PI Ad	35.1 69.8	10.5 9.4	52.6 18.9	1.8 1.9	1.822 2.520	0.860 0.634	.01

or trust administrators. Given this broad agreement, however, we should make note of the fact that there is a great amount of variation in the extent to which political leaders consider these images of theirs as a true reflection of reality. This is also true in the case of administrators. We find, for example, that 71.9 per cent of political leaders agree that they do not appreciate the difficulties of administrators, whereas only 36.8 per cent say that they are both uncooperative with and distrust administrators. In other words, in spite of the fact that there is a general awareness among political leaders about their lack of appreciation of administrators' difficulties, this disposition of theirs is not much likely to induce them to totally worsen their relationship with administrators.

Two explanations can be advanced to throw light on this aspect of political leaders' image. In the first place, as we discussed earlier, political leaders' awareness of and regard for administrative procedures, rules and regulations is very scant. It is, therefore, not surprising that they admit of their indifference towards administrators' difficulties. For, appreciation of counterposition holders' difficulties grows out of a sufficient knowledge of the procedural and other restraints that administrators have to function under. However, lack of appreciation of others' difficulties is also reflective of a similar lack of empathy which may lead to a situation where interaction between two units may be marked with tension and conflict. That the interaction between administrators and political leaders is not so marked, if we believe political leaders, may perhaps be due to the fact that, given the nature of role requirements of political leaders, they cannot afford to withdraw their cooperation from or go on distrusting administrators.

In the second place, political leaders distinguish perhaps between administrators as individuals who have a job to perform and whose help they may have to take occasionally and the administrative system which is seen to be an inefficient system and least suited for achieving public good. If this is the distinction that political leaders make, we can expect that political leaders will not feel hostility towards administrators but will have little compunction in creating trouble for the administration. That making of trouble ultimately affects the efficiency of administrators will, however, not influence political leaders' behaviour inasmuch as, theoretically speaking, the two—administrators and administrative system—cannot be isolated but for all practical purposes

they can be treated as separate entities.

Although we are not in a position to conclusively prove the validity of these hypotheses, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that these hypotheses are not totally out of place. For instance, both political leaders and administrators agree, to a very considerable extent, that political leaders are not hostile to administrators (64.9 per cent political leaders and 58.5 per cent administrators). Note also that 35.1 per cent of political leaders agree that they do nothing but create trouble for the administration. The fact that 52.6 per cent of political leaders disagree with this indicates a favourable self-image which is at variance with what administrators think of political leaders in this regard. For example, there is a significant difference between the two samples according to chi-square criterion at the .01 level.

We also find great variation in the distribution of administrators' responses to various items in Table 5.10. For example, 75.5 per cent of administrators admit that politicians do not appreciate the difficulties of administrators while only 26.4 per cent admit to politicians being hostile to administrators.

Before we conclude our discussion of political leaders' image, we would dispose of the final point about their image. This pertains to political leaders' image as a creator of dissension in the community. As our data indicate, 54.7 per cent of political leaders and 49.1 per cent of administrators express their agreement with the statement that politicians create more and more dissension in the community. This is indicative of the fact that the role of political leaders is held in a very low esteem and that politics is seen to have a much more divisive impact on the society than is generally believed.

We can now pull together various strands of our discussion and try to weave them together in a meaningful pattern. Our data indicate that, in the first place, there is, generally speaking, a great disjunction between the image perceptions of administrators and political leaders. It is only in the case of political leaders' image that respondents in both the samples tend to agree. In the second place, administrators have a very high opinion of their own attributes, performance, standards of performance, their orientation towards people, in general, and political leaders, in particular. In the third place, administrators hold, generally speaking, a low opinion of political leaders' attributes, capacity to manage public affairs and their orientation towards public

officials. In the fourth place, political leaders tend to unfavourably evaluate administrators' image. Lastly, political leaders are more realistic in evaluating their own image inasmuch as in most cases they make unfavourable evaluation of their own images.

## CHAPTER VI

### ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICIANS : THEIR INTERACTION

IN the preceding chapter we examined self- as well as reciprocal-image perception of administrators and political leaders. Apart from images, mention must be made of two other components that have a direct bearing on the interaction between administrators and political leaders. The first relates to placement of self by the actor *vis-a-vis* the object on the spectrum of various role definitions. The second, on the other hand, relates to the acceptance by each of the interacting units of the sanctity of division and demarcation of their respective spheres of activities and responsibilities. With the help of the former, it will be possible to ascertain whether or not there is consensus between the two samples on what is the proper function of one in relation to the other. If, for instance, there is perfect consensus between them in this regard, there will be less possibility of friction that is usually generated because of ambiguous role demarcation. Similarly, exploration of the latter dimension helps us locate the cause of tension that conflicting claims of jurisdiction produce and its impact on the interaction between administrators and political leaders.

In addition to normative referents, role perceptions, images, these two components constitute basic elements for constructing the profile of relationship between administrators and political leaders. However, these components pertain to a complex set of normative and attitudinal factors that shape the interaction. The relationship between administrators and political leaders has, however, a behavioural dimension also. That is, both administrators and political leaders interact in concrete situational contexts. Such a relationship is bound to be determined, to a very considerable extent, by the kinds of problems and demands political leaders bring to administrators, the pressures they apply for getting satisfaction from them, and the way administrators react and respond to political leaders' demands and pressures. It is, therefore, necessary to explore the behavioural dimension of interaction

between them. In other words, the analysis of how they actually interact with each other becomes necessary in order to supplement our analysis of normative and evaluative standards that have a bearing for such an interaction.

Accordingly, we undertake in this chapter a discussion of (1) reciprocal expectations about the role of the one in relation to the other and division of labour between the two, and (2) some behavioural dimensions of interaction between the administrator and the politician. Specifically, we discuss the types of problems political leaders bring to administrators, the pressures they put on them for getting their demands fulfilled, and the way administrators react and respond to political leaders' demands and pressures.

We began our discussion with reciprocal role expectations. We asked both of them a battery of five questions containing different role expectations. Each respondent was required to express his agreement with any one of the five items that came closest to what he considered to be his role *vis-a-vis* the occupant of counterposition. The information thus gathered is presented in Table 6.1.

As will be seen, all the five items in the Table below constitute a continuum one end of which represents administrators' autonomous role without any reference to political leaders. The other end symbolizes a role position for administrators in more or less complete subservience to political leaders. In between these two extreme positions are three items of reciprocal role definitions which represent different points on the continuum and varying degree of subservience or autonomy of administrators' role relations with political leaders. Looking from the viewpoint of political leaders, the various items, again, represent what should be their role *vis-a-vis* administrators, or, to put it differently, what they themselves perceive their role to be in relation to administrators.

It will be observed that a majority of administrators, 62.3 per cent, think it quite unnecessary to involve political leaders in the discharge of their duties, but 32.1 per cent would not like to have to do anything with political leaders. That is, about a third of administrators in our sample favour their role performance to be untrammelled by any association with political leaders. They have, so to say, an autonomous conception of their role. 30.2 per cent would go to the extent of explaining government policies, rules and directives to political leaders.

Here again, it must be admitted that administrators, by explaining government policies to political leaders, do not sacrifice their freedom of action. On the other hand, it may promote an understanding and

TABLE 6.1  
RECIPROCAL ROLE PERCEPTION

ITEMS	ADMINISTRA-		POLITICAL	
	TORS	N=53	LEADERS	N=57
	NO.	%	NO.	%
1. In discharging his duties an administrator should not have anything to do with political leaders.	17	32.1	11	19.3
2. The administrator's responsibility should cease once he has explained government policies, rules and directives to political leaders.	16	30.2	5	8.8
3. The administrator should consult local political leaders and get their advice in carrying out his duties.	9	17.0	17	29.8
4. The administrator should not be satisfied merely with consulting local political leaders but get their active cooperation while discharging his duties.	11	20.7	21	36.8
5. The administrator should be mainly guided by the advice of political leaders in discharging his duties.	—	—	3	5.3
<i>Total</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>100.0</i>

appreciation on the part of political leaders of administrators' actions and thus reinforce their autonomy. It will not be a mistake to infer, then, that a majority of administrators tend to dissociate their role performance from any necessity on their part to give consideration to what political leaders think or desire. This is in keeping with our findings

that administrators do not perceive their role as subservient to political leaders.<sup>1</sup>

It is noteworthy that only 17 per cent of administrators feel that they should consult local leaders and get their advice in carrying out their duties. It should be emphasized that the content of this item only enjoins administrators to consult and seek advice of local political leaders and nothing more. It leaves to the discretion of administrators whether to follow leaders' advice or not. In other words, this leaves administrators' autonomy unaffected. However, administrators' perception of the necessity of seeking political leaders' advice before they intend to take any action does put some restraint on freedom of their action. And such a restraint may in certain cases seriously restrict their autonomy. But the fact that only 17.0 per cent of administrators feel this obligation does not in any way affect our conclusion that administrators do not intend to lose their autonomy.

What may cause surprise is that 20.7 per cent of administrators feel obliged not only to consult local political leaders but also to get their active cooperation while discharging their duties. On surface, it seems that about one-fifth of administrators in our sample do not hesitate to sacrifice their autonomy. If we look closely at the wording of the question, however, this inference does not seem warranted. In getting active cooperation of political leaders while discharging their duties, administrators do not in any way sacrifice their autonomy. It is only indicative of an awareness on the part of at least 20.7 per cent of administrators of the requirements of representative politics which emphasizes a closer and intimate relationship between them for systemic goal gratification. The obligation to get active cooperation of political leaders does not bind administrators to be guided by the advice of leaders.

That administrators attach a great deal of importance to their role autonomy is suggested by their response to the last item in Table 6.1. It is significant that not a single administrator expressed his agreement to the proposition that they should be mainly guided by the advice of political leaders in discharging their duties. This suggests that they are not at all inclined to allow their own judgment and freedom of action to be influenced by what political leaders perceive should be done in particular situations. It is true that distribution of administrators'

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter III, p. 55.


responses suggests the absence of unitary, all-inclusive norm universally acceptable to all the members of the group; different role requirements are felt to be obligatory by different members. However, the fact remains that administrators do not feel it obligatory to allow political leaders to decide how administrators should function. In other words, the dominant role perception of administrators inclines them towards maintenance of administrative autonomy.

The role perception of political leaders, on the other hand, manifests a pattern different from that of administrators. Only 5.3 per cent of political leaders feel that administrators are obliged to be guided mainly by the advice of political leaders. That is, they give primary importance to the role of political leaders whose advice should be binding on administrators. That this is not by any means a dominant norm among political leaders is indicated by a very meagre support for this reciprocal role definition. Similarly, a very small number of political leaders, only 8.8 per cent, opts for a passive role of receiver of administrators' explanations about government policies, rules and regulations. As a matter of fact, there is much more support, 19.3 per cent, for the proposition that administrators should have nothing to do with political leaders.

If we rely on our data, the dominant trend among political leaders in defining their role in relation to administrators reflects a more or less active and participatory conception. They would like administrators not only to consult them but also seek their active cooperation. 29.8 per cent of political leaders feel it obligatory for administrators to consult local political leaders in carrying out their duties. Similarly, 36.8 per cent would expect administrators not only to consult political leaders but get their active cooperation while discharging their duties. In other words, in spite of the fact that there is little consensus among political leaders about what should be the universally acceptable norm in this respect, they tend to define their role *vis-a-vis* administrators in an active sense.

It is clear, then, that there exists little agreement between administrators and political leaders on reciprocal role definition. Figure 6.1 makes this point clear. As the Figure below shows, there is a very small area of agreement on each item between administrators and political leaders. More important still, dispersal of responses on all the five items points to the fact that lack of consensus within both the groups is also responsible for low interposition consensus. However, one fact

that emerges very clearly from the Figure is the mutually incompatible role definitions of administrators and political leaders.



6.1 EXAMPLE SHOWING AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICAL LEADERS ON RECIPROCAL ROLE PERCEPTION.

This is indicated by a gradual fall from left to right on the horizontal axis in administrators' responses and a gradual rise from left to right in political leaders' responses. Accumulation of a majority of administrators' responses in the last but two categories suggests a discrepancy in the way administrators define their role and the way political leaders do. Administrators would not allow political leaders to meddle in what the former consider to be their own exclusive precinct. They perceive the necessity to consult political leaders and get their active cooperation, to be sure, but without jeopardizing their autonomy. Political leaders, on the other hand, would reject their relegation to the background and assigning a passive role to them. This divergence in reciprocal role definition is indicative also of the fact that administrators still persist in dissociating their role performance from outside influences. This means that they have still to reconcile themselves to the prerequisites of representative politics which assigns as important a role to political leaders as to administrators. Political leaders, on the contrary, seem

to be more alive to the operational conditions of representative politics and more willing to establish cooperative relationship with administrators.

Given this difference in reciprocal role definition, it becomes essential to inquire into the extent to which administrators and political leaders agree or disagree on distribution of functions that concern both in one way or the other. The conventional notion that political leaders are primarily responsible for policy-decisions while administrators for implementation of these policies does not take us very far in understanding what in actual practice is the nature of division of labour between them. Not only there is occasionally a very thin line between policy determination and policy implementation, but also these two overlap sometimes in a very confusing manner. Further, actual distribution of functions depends much more on power potentials of each of the interacting groups as well as tendency towards self-aggrandizement. For instance, if leadership has little awareness of its legitimate functions and manifests insufficient willingness or capability to perform them, administrators would naturally aggrandize power to themselves.

One further point to be noted in this connection pertains to the extent to which each of the interacting groups accepts and respects the legitimacy of any pattern of division of labour. Even though there is a general consensus among them about the ideal pattern of distribution of functions and allocation of responsibilities, conformity to it cannot be assured if situational exigencies make it difficult. However, we will have to ascertain first whether or not there is consensus in each group on what should be the ideal division of labour. If each of the groups is characterized by dissensus or insufficient consensus, interaction between the two groups will tend to reflect tension, conflict and a constant tug-of-war. If, on the other hand, lack of consensus or insufficient consensus characterizes just one group, encroachment on its power prerogatives by the other group can be expected.

This should alert us against readily accepting the validity of conventional distinction between policy and its implementation, the former the prerogative of political leaders while the latter that of administrators. We, therefore, asked both administrators and political leaders a battery of similar questions in order to ascertain what according to each should be the pattern of distribution of functions. In other words, we were interested in finding out who, according to each of the interacting groups,

should be primarily responsible for taking decisions in the areas specified in different items in Table 6.2. The respondents were provided with four response categories—primarily administrators, primarily leaders, both, and none—out of which they were asked to select one which came closest to what they believed should be the division of labour. The result of this is represented in Table 6.2.

It should be clear from the Table below that items 1 and 2 which relate to formulation of policies and fixing of priorities fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of political leaders according to the conventional distribution of functions. Items 3 through 7, on the other hand, are within the competence of administrators inasmuch as they pertain to administrative routine. These are areas where policy has already been laid down by a competent authority and the administrator performs these tasks in accordance with the rules and procedures established. The last two items should legitimately fall under the jurisdiction of administrators. However, in view of the fact that actions in these two areas can be initiated by both, we have decided to treat them as falling under the jurisdiction of both.

Turning now to the Table, we find some interesting patterns emerging out of the responses of both the samples. For example, on items relating to policy formulation areas there is no consensus in either of the groups about who is primarily responsible for formulation of policies and fixing of priorities. It is surprising to find that 45.3 per cent of administrators should emphasize that formulation of policies is the responsibility both of administrators and political leaders. It should also be mentioned that as much as 9.4 per cent of administrators should think that policy formulation is the responsibility primarily of administrators. Political leaders also seem to be uncertain about it; as much as 45.6 per cent admit that both political leaders and administrators are responsible for policy formulation. It is true that administrators are intimately associated with policy formulation processes. However, this association takes the form of collecting relevant informations and formulation of alternative strategies and their comparative costs. This association does not give them the right to claim to have a decisive say in policy formulation. Their's is the advisory function and it is the discretion of political heads to accept the advice given by administrators.

This distribution of functions does not seem to have much acceptance either by administrators or political leaders. Note, for example,

TABLE 6.2  
ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICAL LEADERS: VIEWS ON DIVISION OF LABOUR

ITEMS	SAMPLE		RESPONSES			$\sigma^2$	$Px^2$
	AD=53	PL=57	1	2	3		
1. Formulation of broad policies.	Ad	9.4	45.3	45.3	—	2.642	0.418
	Pl	1.8	52.6	45.6	—	2.522	0.281
2. Fixing of priorities in programme implementation.	Ad	15.1	26.4	58.5	—	2.567	0.547
	Pl	45.6	21.1	33.3	—	3.123	0.774
3. Policy decision relating to day-to-day working of government.	Ad	83.0	3.8	11.3	1.9	3.731	0.427
	Pl	78.9	10.5	10.5	—	3.685	0.426
4. Implementation of programmes.	Ad	71.7	—	28.3	—	3.434	0.811
	Pl	91.2	1.8	7.0	—	3.843	0.271
5. Distribution of loans, grants and subsidies.	Ad	52.8	3.8	41.5	1.9	3.116	0.948
	Pl	57.9	3.5	38.6	—	3.193	0.927
6. Allocation of licences, quotas and permits.	Ad	75.5	3.8	18.9	1.9	3.577	0.828
	Pl	57.9	3.5	33.3	5.3	3.179	1.039
7. Selection of sites for programmes.	Ad	32.1	7.5	58.5	1.9	2.731	0.850
	Pl	26.3	12.3	59.6	1.8	2.661	0.759
8. Disposal of public grievances.	Ad	43.4	1.9	54.7	—	2.887	0.968
	Pl	42.1	8.8	49.1	—	2.930	0.907
9. Dealing with emergency situations such as drought, floods, etc.	Ad	17.0	—	83.0	—	2.340	0.563
	Pl	14.0	5.3	80.7	—	2.334	0.502

Key : 1=Primarily administrator; 2=Primarily leader; 3=Both; 4='None' and 'other responses'.

that only 26.4 per cent of administrators think that fixing of priorities in programme implementation is the responsibility of political leaders whereas 58.5 per cent assign this responsibility to both. Political leaders, on the other hand, would like this responsibility to be discharged by administrators. Although there is a very low degree of consensus among political leaders, the fact that 45.6 per cent favour this does point to this inclination of their's. Our inference is reinforced by the fact that only 21.1 per cent of political leaders think it their exclusive responsibility and 33.3 per cent that of both administrators and political leaders. Also interesting is the fact that there is a significant difference between the two samples at the .01 level according to chi-square criterion.

Our data show that neither administrators nor political leaders have a clear idea about the distribution of functions. If anything, administrators tend to lay their own claim over what should concern political leaders and the latter seem to concede this to a very great extent. What about those areas of decisions which fall within the competence of administrators alone ? Here again we encounter the same phenomenon but in reverse. On four of the five items there exists a good deal of agreement between administrators and political leaders about distribution of functions but on the one remaining item lack of agreement characterizes both the groups. However, this agreement points in both the directions, that is on three items both the groups are more or less agreed that these decision areas fall primarily within the competence of administrators while in the case of the fourth item both agree that it is primarily the function of political leaders.

There is a fair agreement between administrators and political leaders that policy decisions relating to day-to-day working of government and implementation of programmes are the responsibility primarily of administrators. It is surprising, though, that 28.3 per cent of administrators should feel that implementation of programmes should concern both administrators and political leaders. Political leaders seem to have a different idea in this regard inasmuch as 91.2 per cent assign this responsibility to administrators.

The next three items represent those decision areas where political pressures have a much more direct bearing than anything else. The undeveloped nature of politics coupled with its intensely competitive nature has initiated a process of political support mobilization which

emphasizes a symbiotic relationship between political leaders and their supporters. In order to ensure stability and durability of their political support structure, political leaders have to satisfy demands of their supporters or potential supporters for divisible benefits. Also prevalence of primordial considerations, such as, caste, religion and region, in the distribution of economic benefits makes decision-making process vulnerable to the pushes and pulls of conflicting demands. All these factors taken together create a situation where political considerations greatly impinge on administrative decision-making. Universal legal-rational criteria of decision-making are frequently sacrificed to give satisfaction to political leaders' need to distribute both divisible and indivisible benefits.

Viewed in this context, it is interesting to find that administrators themselves should feel uncertain about the proper distribution of functions and allocation of responsibilities in the case of those decision areas which are subject to intense political pressures. For example, only 52.8 per cent of administrators say that it is primarily for the administrator to take decision in regard to distribution of loans, grants and subsidies while 41.5 per cent express their opinion in favour of sharing this responsibility with political leaders. That this indicates a very low degree of consensus among administrators is apparent. On the question of allocation of licences, quotas and permits, administrators reflect a greater consensus among themselves about the desirability of their taking the primary responsibility of decision-making. However, only 57.9 per cent of political leaders would agree to it and 33.8 per cent would like to share this responsibility with administrators.

On the last item on this dimension there is almost complete agreement between both the samples that in regard to selection of sites for programmes the responsibility of decision-making should be shared by both administrators and political leaders (administrators 58.5 per cent and political leaders 59.6 per cent). Only 32.1 per cent of administrators and 26.3 per cent of political leaders consider it the responsibility primarily of administrators. Considering the fact that selection of sites for various programmes is based on appropriate economic and financial considerations, the admission by a majority of administrators and political leaders that they should both share this responsibility may indicate the importance of political considerations in selection of sites.

Our discussion, then, shows that unambiguous conventions regarding clear-cut distribution of functions and allocation of responsibilities has not yet crystallized. There prevails a lot of ambiguity and confusion about who should have the primary responsibility of what. It is, therefore, not surprising that even those areas of decision-making which should be the exclusive precinct of administrators are perceived to be the joint responsibility of administrators and political leaders.

It remains for us to see how do administrators and political leaders view the allocation of responsibility in matters of disposal of grievances and meeting emergency situations. In regard to the first, it should be noted that where bureaucracy is oriented to public service as a major value, responsive to popular opinions, and alive to public grievances, well developed procedures are established to handle public grievances. But where bureaucracy has not been able to shake off its maintenance-of-law-and-order mentality but has to cope with increasing demands from the people for services, it fails to quickly dispose of public grievances with the result that political leaders have frequently to intervene in order to insure public satisfaction with the administrative structure. In regard to the second, that is, emergency situations, the fact that bureaucracy in the developing countries is seldom forward looking makes for administrative confusion when it is suddenly faced with some emergency situation. As a consequence, political leaders and extra-governmental agencies have to come forward to alleviate the situation. In other words, in both these situations, administrators alone cannot handle the problem, they have to depend on the cooperation of political leaders.

This is well reflected in the responses of administrators and political leaders to two items on this dimension. In regard to disposal of public grievances, it should be pointed out, both administrators and political leaders demonstrate lack of consensus as is evident from concentration of responses in two response categories. Leaving the question of consensus apart, there seems to exist a high degree of interposition consensus that disposal of public grievances does not concern political leaders alone; it should either be the responsibility of administrators (43.4 per cent administrators and 42.1 per cent political leaders) or of both (54.7 per cent administrators and 49.1 per cent political leaders). In regard to the question of dealing with emergency situations, however, quite a large majority of both administrators and political leaders favour the

idea of sharing this responsibility jointly (83.0 per cent of administrators and 80.7 per cent of political leaders). It is interesting to note that only 17.0 per cent of administrators and 14.0 per cent of political leaders consider it the responsibility primarily of administrators. This is indicative of the fact that there is a good deal of agreement that disposal of public grievances and dealing with emergency situations cannot be left to administrators alone. It also reflects a lack of confidence on the part of administrators in the capacity of the administrative structure to cope with these two problems.

Our data, then, conclusively demonstrate the inapplicability of conventional notion of distribution of responsibility between administrators and political leaders to concrete empirical situations. As we discussed earlier, even in regard to those decision areas which should legitimately fall under the jurisdiction of political leaders, administrators claim the right to make decisions. It is not that only administrators show the tendency to encroach upon the territory of political leaders; political leaders, too, manifest such a tendency. What is even more significant is the fact that, on the normative level, none of the groups sees any anomaly in it; this state of affairs is viewed with equanimity and accepted by both the groups.

Our discussion up to this point has focussed on differential perceptions of administrators and political leaders in relation to their normative referents and role definitions. We also discussed reciprocal image perception and expectations. We now turn to a discussion of some selected behavioural dimensions of their interaction. We begin our discussion with the importance that administrators and political leaders give to contacting each other. It will be seen from Table 6.3 that only political leaders find it important to contact administrators. As much as 52.6 per cent of political leaders consider it very important and 15.8 per cent somewhat important while 31.6 per cent do not assign it any importance. If we combined the responses in the first two categories, the percentage of political leaders finding it important to contact administrators rises to 69.4 per cent. In contradistinction to political leaders, only 17.0 per cent of administrators consider consulting political leaders very important and 26.4 per cent somewhat important. 56.4 per cent of administrators do not at all think it any important. This suggests that political leaders feel the greater need of contacting administrators.

This is confirmed by yet another factor. When asked "how often

is it that political leaders contact administrators in the district to get their help", 35.1 per cent say rarely and only 5.3 per cent never. Responding to the same question, 43.4 per cent of administrators indicated that political leaders contact them frequently, 15.1 per cent sometimes, 18.9 per cent rarely and 22.6 per cent never. Although a sizable number of both administrators and political leaders (41.5 per cent of administrators and 40.4 per cent of political leaders) recognized that the latter really or never contact the former, the fact remains that political leaders do frequently contact administrators as is evident by the fact that about 48.0 per cent of both administrators and political leaders are in agreement on the point.

TABLE 6.3  
ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICAL LEADERS:  
IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL CONTACT

ITEMS	SAMPLE AD=53 PL=57	RESPONSES				TOTAL
		VERY	SOME-	NOT		
		IMPOR-	WHAT	IMPOR-		
		TANT	IMPOR-	TANT		
				TANT		
1. How important for politicians to contact administrators for getting things done.	P1	52.6	16.8	31.6	100.0	
2. How important for administrators to consult politicians in discharging their duties.	Ad	17.0	26.4	56.6	100.0	

What is it that political leaders contact administrators for ? It should be pointed out that the political leaders take to administrators various kinds of problems and demands, legitimate-illegitimate, parochial-universal. We will discuss below the kinds of problems and demands political leaders bring to administrators. We will stop here for a moment to examine the frequency of political leaders bringing

unreasonable demands to administrators. When asked 'how frequently political leaders make unreasonable demands on administrators' 50.9 per cent of political leaders admit that they do so frequently, 40.4 per cent sometimes and only 8.5 per cent rarely or never. Administrators also admit that they are frequently approached by political leaders with unreasonable demands. Note, for example, that 26.4 per cent of administrators agree that political leaders frequently bring to them unreasonable demands, 41.5 per cent sometimes, 11.3 per cent rarely and 17.0 per cent never.

It is clear, then, that political leaders, as a majority of them believes and as administrators confirm, contact administrators mostly for asking unreasonable favours from administrators. But on whose behalf do political leaders generally speak to administrators? It can be expected that political leaders will never admit of speaking of themselves and this is confirmed by the fact that only one out of 57 political leaders admit of doing so. Administrators also more or less support this because only 18.9 per cent of administrators say that political leaders speak for themselves. Granted that leaders do not give expression to self-interest, their commitment remains, however, narrow inasmuch as majority of them speak for their own area rather than for the whole district. Note, for example that 45.6 per cent of leaders admit that they speak for their own area. That this is so is also confirmed by 47.2 per cent of administrators. Yet we should not ignore the fact that 43.9 per cent of leaders claim to speak for the entire district.

It is apparent that political leaders are divided in what they perceive to be the focal point of their allegiance. For a little less than half of our respondents the referent of their identity is their own areas. This is symptomatic of their narrowly conceived loyalty. That is, they feel that they should speak only for their areas, not the entire district. In other words, they give priority to the safeguarding of the interest of their own area in preference to the entire district.

Given this narrowly conceived identification of political leaders, what can be expected from them in terms of drawing administrators' attention to certain problems? That is, what kinds of problems do political leaders usually bring to the attention of administrators and press for administrative action? We make distinction between two kinds of problems: (1) problems that are general and have no reference to either a geographical unit or a social group, and (2) problems that

either are general or particular but have one or the other kind of concrete reference to either a geographical unit or a social group. The first type emphasizes the general nature of problems on whose solution depends well-being or progress or stability of the geographical unit or social group. Insistence on administrative action in this regard stems from a perceived impediment to a particular course of action or deterioration in contextual factors due to the occurrence of certain disturbances. The second type, on the other hand, pertains to those problems which are perceived to be threatening only to people either individually or in groups and administrators are asked to help solve these problems. It should also be emphasized that these problems range from parochial to partisan to universal.

In Table 6.4 we present data on the first type of problems. We asked both administrators and political leaders a battery of six problem questions and each respondent was required to indicate his own opinion by selecting one response category out of four 'frequently', 'sometimes', 'rarely' and 'never'. It will be seen from the Table that on five items out of six there is significant difference at the .01 level according to chi-square criterion between the samples, while on the last item this difference is at the .05 level. This indicates that political leaders have entirely a different idea of what kinds of problems they take to administrators than what administrators think about the kinds of problems political leaders bring to them.

This difference points to the fact that political leaders have different role conception of their own as transmitters of problems than what administrators generally think about them. It is interesting to note that very few administrators admit that political leaders come to them to seek guidance on administrative procedures and rules, although about 49.0 per cent of political leaders say that they contact administrators either frequently or sometimes for this purpose. It can, however, be safely inferred that to most political leaders this is not a problem for which they would turn to administrators. What concerns them most is administrative delays in disposing of problems. This can be gathered from the fact that more than 80.0 per cent of political leaders contact administrators in this regard. Even 54.7 per cent of administrators admit that political leaders bring to them problems of administrative delays. It is in connection with problems concerning implementation of government plans that administrators (71.7 per cent) say that political

TABLE 6.4  
ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICAL LEADERS: TYPES OF PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

ITEMS	SAMPLE		RESPONSE			TOTAL*	Px <sup>2</sup>
	AD=53	PL=57	F	S	R		
1. Guidance on administrative procedures and rules.	Ad	3.8	7.5	18.9	66.0	3.8	100.0
	Pl	10.5	38.6	15.8	33.3	1.8	.01
2. Problems of administrative delays.	Ad	24.5	30.2	9.4	32.1	3.8	100.0
	Pl	52.6	29.8	8.8	5.3	3.6	.01
3. Problem concerning implementation of government plans.	Ad	9.4	15.1	15.1	56.6	3.8	100.0
	Pl	40.4	36.8	7.0	12.3	3.6	.01
4. Law and order problem.	Ad	13.2	13.2	3.8	64.2	5.7	100.1
	Pl	33.3	40.4	12.3	8.8	5.3	.01
5. Economic problems of the people.	Ad	20.8	20.8	7.5	45.3	5.7	100.1
	Pl	45.6	22.8	8.8	19.3	3.6	.01
6. Problems arising from conflict between groups (social, economic, political, etc.)	Ad	20.8	17.0	11.3	47.2	3.8	100.1
	Pl	33.3	24.6	15.8	21.1	5.3	.01

Keys : F=Frequently; S=Sometimes; R=Rarely; N=Never; O=Others including not ascertained.

\* Total more than 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

leaders' contact is either rare or none. Despite the claim of about 75.0 per cent of political leaders about approaching administrators in this connection, administrators' response suggests that political leaders are very much concerned with problems of plan implementation.

On the next three items in the Table, that is, problems concerning law and order, economic conditions of the people and group conflicts, we notice a wide gap between what administrators suppose political leaders do and what political leaders themselves think they do. For example, on the problem of law and order 26.4 per cent of administrators claim that political leaders contact them while 77.7 per cent of political leaders claim to contact administrators. Similarly, on economic problems of the people, 41.6 per cent of administrators say that they are contacted by leaders whereas 68.4 per cent of political leaders say they do so. Lastly, in regard to problems arising from conflict between groups the same pattern is noticeable here also. If about 58.0 per cent political leaders claim to be often contacting administrators on these problems, only 37.8 per cent of administrators admit it.

Our analysis, then, shows that there is very little agreement between administrators and political leaders about what kinds of problems the latter bring to the notice of the former. If items can be rank ordered on the basis of high to low preference it will be seen that problems political leaders say they take to administrators rank like this:<sup>2</sup> Administrative delays (82.4 per cent), law and order (77.7 per cent), implementation of government plan (77.2 per cent), economic problems of the people (68.4 per cent), group conflicts (57.9 per cent), and guidance on administrative procedures and rules (41.1 per cent). Comparing it with rank ordering of administrators' responses, it becomes clear that problems of administrative delays score highest in both the groups and 'guidance on administrative procedures and rules' the lowest.<sup>3</sup> However, if we considered the preferences of political leaders alone, two other problems—economic problems of the people and implementation of government plans—in addition to the one mentioned above, are the most recurrent problems for which political leaders approach administrators.

It may also be pointed out that according to administrators, the

<sup>2</sup> Ranking on the basis of combining first two response categories.

<sup>3</sup> It should be pointed out that association between these two scales is negative, according to Spearman's Rank-Order Correlation criterion.

three most 'popular' items that political leaders bring to them are: administrative delays, economic problems of the people, and problems arising from group conflicts. It would, then, appear that there is at least some agreement between the two groups that the two problems that have greater relevance for political leaders are administrative delays and economic problems of the people. These two can be in relation either to some common problems faced by a broad social category, such as, backward communities, or a geographical unit or they can relate to problems of individuals. Given the propensity of political leaders to identify themselves with the area they live in or represent and the compulsions of extremely competitive politics compelling them to distribute divisible benefits for assuring stable political support structure, the guess can be hazarded that for a large number of political leaders what is most relevant is the pursuit of particularistic goals. However, in the absence of conclusive evidence, this observation must be treated as tentative only.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to asking both the groups about the kinds of problems political leaders bring to administrators, we also asked them to identify those on behalf of whom political leaders usually seek administrators' help. Here, again, we provided four response categories on frequency of contacts: frequently, sometimes, rarely and never. Information on this dimension is presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5.

The data presented in Table 6.4 relate to various aspects of parochial demand articulation on the part of political leaders. The first item in the Table concerns personal interests of the leader himself which is the most narrowly defined example of parochial interests. The last item, on the other hand, represents the broadest conception of parochial interests as that of leaders' kith and kin as well as friends and supporters. Our purpose here is to see how frequently political leaders seek the help of administrators in safeguarding or promoting these interests. We will also discuss the salience of these interests for political leaders from the point of view of administrators.

One thing that strikes immediately is the fact that political leaders are more frank and outspoken in admitting that they do seek administrators' help on behalf of these interests than are the administrators. We are not in a position to advance any explanation for this.

<sup>4</sup> A very limited time at our disposal prevented us from carrying out requisite statistical analysis to identify clusters of attitudes on different dimensions.

TABLE 6.5  
ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICAL LEADERS: CONTACTS FOR PAROCHIAL CONCERNS

ITEMS	SAMPLE AD=53 PL=57	RESPONSE				TOTAL*	Px <sup>2</sup>
		F	S	R	N		
		O					
1. Problem concerning politicians' personal benefit.	Ad Pl	18.9 45.6	15.1 14.0	18.9 7.0	43.4 29.8	3.8 3.5	100.1 99.9
2. Problems concerning the interests of their relatives and family members.	Ad Pl	22.6 45.6	28.3 14.0	11.3 15.8	34.0 21.1	3.8 3.5	100.0 100.0
3. Problems concerning interests of their friends and close supporters.	Ad Pl	37.7 61.4	30.2 14.0	7.5 7.0	20.8 15.8	3.8 1.8	100.0 100.0
4. Problems concerning interests of certain caste or religious groups in the community.	Ad Pl	17.0 28.1	20.8 43.9	9.4 17.5	47.2 8.8	5.7 1.8	100.1 100.1

\*Totals more or less than 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

However, the guess can be hazarded that the reason that administrators were so guarded in their responses may have to do with their anxiety not to seem too critical of political leaders. Whatever the case, the interesting fact to note is that on two out of four items, the difference between the two groups is significant according to chi-square criterion: on item 1, the difference is significant at the .05 level while on item 4 at the .01 level. In other words, on these items administrators think differently from political leaders about the interests on whose behalf the latter approach the former.

Among the political leaders themselves, there is quite a significant amount of agreement that they do approach administrators in connection with these parochial interests. Note, for example, that 59.6 per cent of political leaders approach administrators on matters relating either to their personal benefit or the interests of their relatives and family members. Similarly, more than 70.0 per cent of political leaders admit of seeking administrators' help in connection with the interests either of their friends and supporters or certain caste or religious groups in the community.

If we compare political leaders' responses with that of administrators', it will be seen that only 34.0 per cent of administrators as compared to 59.6 per cent of political leaders admit that their help is sought for the personal benefit of leaders. Similarly, only 37.8 per cent of administrators as compared to 72.0 per cent of political leaders admit of being approached for help concerning interests of certain caste or religious groups in the community. However, on two items—interests of political leaders' relatives and family members and their friends and close supporters—relatively a large number of administrators (51.3 per cent and 67.9 per cent respectively) agree to their being approached by political leaders for help.

Looking at the data, the inference that political leaders are not averse to pursuing parochial interest seems reasonable. As a matter of fact, we can go a step further and assert on the basis of what political leaders themselves acknowledge that they give considerable importance to the pursuit of parochial interests both for themselves and others and, accordingly, frequently seek the help of administrators in either furthering or safeguarding such interests. Even if we take administrators' words, it is quite clear that if political leaders do not contact the former for personal benefit or concerning the interests of certain caste or

religious groups, they do so at least in regard to the interests of their kith and kin as well as friends and close supporters.

That political leaders put pressure on administrators for fulfilling parochial demands is well supported by our data. What about partisan and universal interests ? Do the leaders seek to advance these interests besides the parochial ones?

Table 6.6 presents information on political leaders' as well as administrators' responses to leaders' pursuit of partisan and universal interests. We must first point to the divergence existing between the two groups on the extent to which political leaders pursue partisan and universal interests. This is reflected in significant differences between the two groups according to chi-square criterion on all the items in Table 6.6. This difference is due mainly to the fact that more political leaders than administrators say that they advocate for and seek administrators' help in advancing these interests. This, again, suggests that either political leaders are more outspoken than administrators or they have a very low image of themselves.

Apart from the question of interposition consensus, consensus among political leaders on all four items is fairly high. For example, 54.4 per cent of political leaders accept that they ask administrators to do certain things in the interests of certain political factions or groups, 61.4 per cent concerning interests of particular political parties, 72.0 per cent concerning the welfare of the people of their area, and 57.9 per cent concerning the welfare of the entire district. In other words, political leaders say they work more or less equally for both partisan and universal interests. However, if we assume that the items which receive higher 'votes' from political leaders will have greater salience for them, it will be found that interests of certain political factions and the welfare of whole district get lower ranks than interests of particular political parties and the welfare of the people of the leaders' own area. Our observation, discussed earlier, that political leaders show a propensity to identify themselves with their own area lends strength to the inference that the welfare of the people of their area is closer to political leaders' heart than the welfare of the entire district.

It is of interest to mention here that only 15.1 per cent of administrators think that political leaders approach them on matters relating to the welfare of the entire district. In contradistinction to this, 50.9 per cent of administrators acknowledge that political leaders seek their

TABLE 6.6  
ADMINISTRATORS AND POLITICAL LEADERS: PARTISAN AND UNIVERSAL INTERESTS

ITEMS	SAMPLE AD=53 PL=57	RESPONSE				TOTAL* Px <sup>2</sup>
		F	S	R	N	
1. Interests of certain political factions or groups.	Ad Pl	13.2 24.6	18.9 29.8	11.3 17.5	52.8 26.3	3.8 1.8
2. Interests of particular political parties.	Ad Pl	15.1 35.1	20.8 26.3	13.2 15.8	47.2 17.5	3.8 5.3
3. Welfare of the people of their own area.	Ad Pl	22.6 50.9	28.3 21.1	11.3 19.3	34.0 5.3	3.8 3.5
4. Welfare of the whole district.	Ad Pl	1.9 31.6	13.2 26.3	24.5 31.6	56.6 8.8	3.8 1.8
						100.0 100.0
						.01 .01
						.05 .01

\*Totals more than 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

help more or less frequently in relation to the welfare of the people of their own area. On other two items, however, only between 32.1 and 35.9 per cent of administrators admit of being contacted in regard to matters relating to partisan interests.

It should by now be clear that our data do not reveal any clear pattern of political leaders' identification with or commitment to any particular variety of interests. If any thing, they claim to represent all kinds of interests, parochial, partisan and universal. This is, however, not surprising. Given the political leaders' necessity to maintain good relations with their actual and prospective supporters and given also the need of the people to seek the help of some intermediary to expedite their problems with the administration, political leaders must encounter a host of demands from the people and try to satisfy them as far as possible. The political leaders' own conception of themselves as zealous protector of people's interest must impel them to intercede with administrators on behalf of those who approach them with their own problems and demands. As a result, contact between administrators and political leaders is frequent with the latter making all kinds of demands—parochial, partisan and universal—on the former.

It is true that our analysis does not enable us to ascertain the particular kind of interests that has most salience for political leaders, some picture, however faint, does emerge from our discussion. As we have already seen, political leaders manifest greater inclination to pursue the interests of their friends and close supporters as well as certain caste or religious groups in the community. Similarly, they are well disposed to take to administrators problems relating to the interests of particular political parties and to the welfare of the people in their own area.

That political leaders ask administrators' help in satisfying various kinds of demands ranging from parochial to universal is an incontrovertible fact. However, it does not mean that administrators will readily acquiesce to political leaders' demands. Given the administrators propensity to adhere to bureaucratic procedures, rules and regulations, it is very difficult to imagine that each and every demand made by political leaders will be met or conceded by administrators. Moreover, since we know that about 90.0 per cent of political leaders admit of making unreasonable demands on administrators, it can be assumed that, given the legal-rational orientation of administrators, not a few demands of political leaders will be either rejected or ignored. Even if demands

are reasonable, several factors may intervene to make their fulfilment difficult if not impossible. In other words, political leaders may find that the fulfilment of their demands is either hampered or outrightly obstructed by administrative intransigence.

In the event of administrators' inability or failure to meet the demands of political leaders, it is natural that political leaders will react to it in certain ways depending on their personality structure, the extent of their commitment to institutional norm, and the nature of their appreciation of administrators' functions. Also, the kind of reaction political leaders will have will also determine whether or not they will pursue the matter further and go to the extent of putting various kinds of pressures on administrators to get done what they want. It is, therefore, relevant for our purposes to enquire into the reactions political leaders usually have when they are confronted with administrators' refusal to meet their demands. We, therefore, asked each political leader in our sample about how does he feel when an administrator

TABLE 6.7  
LEADERS' REACTION TO ADMINISTRATORS' REFUSAL  
TO MEET DEMANDS (N=57)

ITEMS	YES	NO	OTHERS	TOTAL
1. The administrator is prejudiced, therefore he does not listen to the demands.	47.4	47.4	5.2	100.0
2. The administrator declines to comply with the demands without giving a careful consideration.	57.8	38.6	3.6	100.0
3. The administrator is justified in refusing to comply with the demands and proposals.	59.6	36.8	3.6	100.0
4. The administrator is helpless due to procedural and administrative difficulties.	71.9	22.8	5.3	100.0

refuses to meet his demands and proposals in order to have their reaction in yes and no on eight items. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 contain

information on this dimension.

In the Table 6.7 we discuss some of the reactions that political leaders may have against the administrator who fails to comply with their demands or proposals. We may distinguish here two broad types of reactions. The political leader, when baulked in his attempt to persuade the administrator to yield to his demands may feel that the administrator may have his own legitimate reasons to refuse to acquiesce to his demand. In this case, such an appreciation would be an insurance against bad feeling between the two and prevent their relationship from getting worse. Another kind of reaction pertains to political leader's feeling of being thwarted in his attempts on either legitimate or illegitimate grounds simply because the administrator is prejudiced against him or does not want to do any real work. Political leaders having this feeling may either do nothing about this or be prompted to take certain actions that may put enough pressures on the administrator to revise his decision. We are, therefore, interested in examining what kinds of reactions do political leaders generally have when their demands or proposals are not honoured.

As will be seen from Table 6.7, only 47.4 per cent of political leaders feel that the administrator is prejudiced against them, therefore he does not listen to their demands. However, the fact that such a large number of political leaders feel this way indicates that they do not expect to get a fair deal from administrators. This is further supported by the fact that 57.8 per cent of political leaders feel that the administrator declines to comply with their demands without giving a careful consideration. The feeling on the part of many political leaders that administrators are prejudiced against them and that they refuse to comply with their demands without giving any careful consideration is indicative of a widespread dissatisfaction with the way administrators function in the district. The conventional characterization of a bureaucrat as an impartial public officer who carefully considers each demand and proposal before arriving at a decision is not supported by what political leaders in large number think.

It should, however, be indicated that this feeling is by no means the dominant one. There are political leaders who feel that it is not the fault of the administrator but the fault of the bureaucratic system within which he has to operate. Also, there is a feeling that the administrator may be justified in refusing to comply with political

leaders' demand. For example 59.6 per cent of political leaders say that the administrator is justified in refusing to comply with their demands and proposals. This may be due to the fact that about 90 per cent of leaders have the impression that their colleagues make unreasonable and improper demands on administrators. It is, therefore, not surprising that about 60.0 per cent of political leaders should justify administrators' refusal to give effect to their demands. However, the fact remains that about 72.0 per cent of political leaders feel that the administrator is helpless due to procedural and administrative difficulties. It should be noted that in this case our respondents do not think the administrator to be personally responsible for the rejection of their demands and proposals. It is rather the impersonal administrative structure that prevents the administrator from conceding to political leaders' demands and proposals. In other words, it is the system that is evaluated, not the persons who run it.

Even though about 72.0 per cent of political leaders are inclined to blame the system which makes an administrator helpless in meeting their demands, there is enough evidence to show that the transfer of animosity from the system to the persons who run it is easier for them. In this case, the leaders blame individual administrator and perceive the necessity of taking some action against him. For example, 66.7 per cent of political leaders feel that the behaviour of the unobliging administrators should be exposed in public (Table 6.8). Similarly 68.4 per cent of political leaders react in terms of branding the administrator as inept and taking some action against him. The feeling also prevails that the reason why the administrator refuses to comply with their demands lies in his unwillingness to do any real piece of work (71.9 per cent of political leaders think so).

However, the feeling of complaint and expression of anger manifested in the leaders' inclination to actions against the 'erring' administrator is in many cases matched by an equally strong sense of impotency about taking the administrator to task. As much as 77.2 per cent of political leaders are of the opinion that the administrator enjoys powerful protection so hardly anything can be done about it.

Our discussion, then, shows that, generally speaking when political leaders are confronted by the refusal of an administrator to comply with their demands and proposals, they have usually three kinds of reactions. In the first place, they feel that it is the bureaucratic system,

its procedures, rules and regulations that put severe restraints on the capability of the administrator to give effect to the demands and proposals of political leaders. In this case the feeling of animosity and disaffection is directed towards the system without, perhaps, adversely affecting the interaction between administrators and political leaders.

TABLE 6.8  
POLITICAL LEADERS' REACTION TO ADMINISTRATORS'  
REFUSAL TO MEET DEMANDS (N=57)

ITEMS	YES	NO	OTHER	TOTAL
1. The administrator's behaviour should be exposed in public.	66.7	29.8	3.5	100.0
2. The administrator is inept, therefore action should be taken against him.	68.4	26.3	5.3	100.0
3. The administrator declines most of the time because he does not want to do real work.	71.9	24.6	3.5	100.0
4. The administrator enjoys powerful protection, so hardly anything can be done about it.	77.2	19.3	3.5	100.0

In the second place, political leaders also feel that the administrators' inability to meet their demands is not so much due to the defects in the bureaucratic system as it is due to administrators' prejudice or disinclination to do real work. In this case, the feeling of animosity is directed towards individual administrators. Yet this feeling does not prevent political leaders from appreciating the role of administrators and concluding that their action is justified. However, when this feeling is, perhaps, too weak to mollify political leaders, they tend to be unsympathetic to administrators and give vent to their feelings by taking recourse to certain reprisals. In the third place, therefore, political leaders manifest hostile attitude towards administrators. However, taking reprisal against administrators is consequent upon political leaders' sense of efficacy of their action. As we have already seen, the feeling of 77.2 per cent of political leaders that the administrator enjoys powerful protection, so hardly anything can be done about it,

indicates their helplessness in improving the situation.

Our discussion of reactions stemming from administrators' inability to comply with political leaders' demands and proposals will remain incomplete if we left out of it what administrators themselves visualize political leaders adopting certain course of action in this context. This aspect is covered in Table 6.9. It is interesting to note that from 9.0 per cent to 17.0 per cent of administrators<sup>6</sup> have chosen to make neutral replies indicating their unconcern with the ways political leaders may react to their failure to acquiesce to their demands. Apart from this, administrators, in general, seem to have the expectation of two kinds of reprisals from political leaders. The first relates to the political leaders' attempt to disturb administrators' service conditions. As much as 64.2 per cent of administrators feel that political leaders would take recourse to disturbing their service conditions.

TABLE 6.9  
ADMINISTRATORS' PERCEPTION OF LEADERS'  
REACTIONS WHEN THEIR DEMANDS ARE  
TURNED DOWN

ITEMS	YES	NO	OTHERS	TOTAL
1. Politicians will understand difficulties.	43.4	37.7	18.9	100.0
2. They will cease to cooperate.	35.8	43.4	22.8	100.0
3. They will try to spoil service records.	41.5	43.4	15.1	100.0
4. They will disturb service conditions.	64.2	20.7	15.1	100.0
5. They will try to tarnish reputation.	52.8	30.2	17.0	100.0
6. They can hardly do any harm.	25.8	57.0	13.2	100.0

By this is meant affecting such conditions in the service that the administrator would be greatly inconvenienced. For example, the administrator may be transferred from what is supposed to be a good district to a very bad district. This is likely to create several problems, *viz.*, health hazards, lack of educational facilities for the administrators'

<sup>6</sup> Excluding responses 'not ascertained'.

children, etc. It is to be noted in this connection that only 41.5 per cent of administrators feel that political leaders will spoil their service, for example, by persuading superior officials to make an adverse remark in the administrators' confidential character roll.

The second relates to the administrators' fear that the political leader, if he can do nothing else, can at least tarnish his reputation. As much as 52.8 per cent of administrators have this feeling. In other words, next to the disturbing of service conditions, administrators are most concerned about their public image, which, if once blackened, may possibly prevent them from functioning effectively. Apart from these possible actions from political leaders, administrators are less concerned with other retaliatory actions. It is true that 51.0 per cent of administrators deny that political leaders can hardly do any harm, only about 36.0 per cent believe that they will cease to cooperate and only about 38.0 per cent deny that political leaders will fail to understand the restraints under which administrators function.

Given the fact that political leaders have frequently to experience disappointment in persuading the administrator to comply with their demands and given also their tendency to blame administrators personally for this, it is not unexpected that political leaders will frequently take recourse to putting pressures on administrators for making them acquiesce to their demands. What kinds of pressures do political leaders really put on administrators ? It is this question which we now examine here. We present in the following two Tables (6.10 and 6.11) responses of both political leaders and administrators to the question: 'Speaking from your experience what kinds of pressures do politicians actually apply on administrators for getting done what they want ?' Each respondent was presented eleven possible pressures and was asked to rate the frequency of each pressure applied by selecting one of the four response categories, that is frequently, sometimes, rarely, and never.

In general, we can distinguish two types of pressures that political leaders may usually take recourse to. The first type relates to those pressures a political leader himself applies on the administrator. These pressures take the form either of certain inducements or deprivations which may make the administrator amenable to political leaders' demands. In this the political leader does not seek the help of others to persuade the administrator to do what he wants. The second type

TABLE 6.10  
TYPES OF PRESSURES PUT ON ADMINISTRATORS

ITEMS	SAMPLE PL=57 AD=53	RESPONSE				TOTAL*	PX <sup>2</sup>
		F	S	R	N		
1. Promise to take responsibility of consequences on him.	Pl Ad	15.8 5.7	26.3 13.2	29.8 15.1	28.1 66.1	— —	100.0 100.1
2. Promise of better career opportunities.	Pl Ad	19.3 7.5	22.8 22.6	33.3 11.3	24.7 58.5	— —	100.0 99.9
3. Offer monetary incentives or other such rewards.	Pl Ad	29.8 1.9	17.5 7.5	12.3 18.9	40.4 71.7	— —	100.0 100.0
4. Affecting services records.	Pl Ad	26.3 13.2	26.3 24.5	22.8 30.2	24.6 32.1	— —	100.0 100.0
5. Disturb service conditions by transfers, complaints to higher levels, etc.	Pl Ad	57.9 43.4	24.6 34.0	7.0 7.5	10.6 15.1	— —	100.1 100.0

\*Totals not exactly 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

pertains to those pressures which a political leader applies on the administrator through others, that is, through friends, relatives, political leaders or officials at the higher levels. We do not mean to suggest that these two types are exclusive; they can be applied sequentially or simultaneously.

Looking at the Table we find that there is significant difference between the two samples on only two out of five items according to chi-square criterion at the .01 level. This suggests that on these items administrators differ with political leaders in evaluating the salience of the pressures signified by the items. In regard to the promise of the political leaders to take the consequences of administrators' action in accordance with the leaders' specification and offering of bribes, administrators' views do not coincide with political leaders'. That is, administrators deny that political leaders offer these inducements to them. However, when about 42.0 per cent and 47.0 per cent of political leaders respectively feel these pressures to be actually applied on administrators, we cannot conclude otherwise.

However, there is a fair amount of agreement between political leaders and administrators that promise of a better career opportunities is not a 'popular' pressure with the former (only about 41.0 per cent of political leaders and 30.0 per cent of administrators say this promise is made). But in regard to affecting service records administrators again differ with political leaders about its importance as a pressure. Only 37.7 per cent of administrators say that it is used either frequently or sometimes while 52.6 per cent of political leaders say it is used more or less frequently. The item on which both the groups agree to a very significant extent signifies political leaders' attempt to disturb service conditions of administrators by transfers, complaints to higher levels, etc.

In comparison to the first type of pressures that of the second type seem to be used more often and by more political leaders. A look at Table 6.11 will make this point clear. The percentage of those who say these pressures are applied either frequently or sometimes is more than that of those who say the same thing about the pressures of the first type. Apart from this, it is only on three items out of six that the two samples manifest significant difference according to chi-square criterion at the .01 level in two cases and .05 level in one case. In other words, lesser number of administrators than political leaders admit,

as is evident from the Table 6.1, of the recourse on the part of political leaders to persuasion through important citizens, as well as other political leaders of the district and making it a public issue by organizing agitations. That these pressures are put on administrators is supported by the fact that from 57.0 to 62.0 per cent of administrators admit of these pressures being put on them.

Given these variations in the response patterns of both the groups, however, there seems to be a great deal of agreement between them about other pressures mentioned in the Table. For example, 66.7 per cent of political leaders and 49.0 per cent of administrators mention persuasion through friends and relatives; 91.2 per cent of political leaders and 77.3 per cent of administrators mention seeking intervention of political leaders at higher levels; and 82.5 per cent of political leaders and almost equal number of administrators (81.1 per cent) mention approaching administrators at higher levels. In other words, persuasion through others seems to be the most frequently used tactic of pressure.

Our discussion so far highlights two things. In the first place, political leaders think that they personally offer inducements or threaten deprivations in case administrators fail to comply with their demands. However, a large number of administrators does not think these pressures being used as frequently as those applied through others. The only pressure in this category is the disturbance of service conditions which both the groups agree is regularly used by politicians. In the second place, most frequently used pressures are those which signify seeking of intervention by administrators' friends and relatives, political leaders and administrators at higher levels.

The putting of pressures on administrators makes their position very difficult. Inasmuch as these pressures are meant to deflect them from what they consider right and proper course of conduct, there is every likelihood that they will find themselves torn between two conflicting pulls. If they succumb to the pressure against their better judgment, they may find that this only encourages the political leaders to take more advantage of them. Further, by sacrificing legal-rational criteria of decision-making, administrators may jeopardize the whole fabric of bureaucracy by replacing universalized norms with expediency considerations. If, on the other hand, they resist political leaders' pressures and stick to administrative rules, regulations and procedures, which do not discriminate one individual against another and, therefore,

TABLE 6.11  
TYPES OF PRESSURES PUT ON ADMINISTRATORS

ITEMS	SAMPLE		RESPONSE			TOTAL *	PX <sup>2</sup>
	PL=57	AD=53	F	S	R	N	O
1. Attempt at persuasion through important citizens.	Pl Ad	38.6 7.5	43.7 49.1	5.3 9.4	12.3 34.0	— —	100.0 .01
2. Persuasion through friends and relatives.	Pl Ad	35.1 11.3	31.6 37.7	12.3 11.3	21.1 39.6	— —	100.0 not sig.
3. Attempt at persuasion through other political leaders of the district.	Pl Ad	42.1 20.8	49.1 41.5	5.3 13.2	3.5 24.5	— —	100.0 .05
4. Seeking intervention of political leaders at higher levels.	Pl Ad	64.9 41.5	26.3 35.8	5.3 9.4	3.5 13.2	— —	100.0 99.9
5. Approach administrators at higher level.	Pl Ad	47.4 45.3	35.1 35.8	10.5 5.7	7.0 13.2	— —	100.0 not sig.
6. Making a public issue.	Pl Ad	49.1 20.8	40.4 30.2	3.5 17.0	17.0 32.0	— —	100.0 .01

\*Totals not exactly 100.0 per cent due to rounding.

are not instrumental in serving political leaders' parochial or other purposes, their effectiveness may greatly be reduced because of certain retaliatory measures the political leaders may take. In this conflict, administrators are bound to feel insecure and must find ways and means to counteract political leaders' pressures. What are these counteractive measures that administrators usually take recourse to ?

One of the possible courses of action for administration is to mobilize counter forces against the political leader who puts pressures on them. The purpose of such a move is to mobilize enough support in their favour so that administrators may neutralize the pressures of political leaders. This is essentially a measure of counter-attack intended to immobilize the moves made by political leaders. In Table 6.12 we present evidence to show whether or not administrators take recourse to such measures. We also discuss political leaders' perception of administrators' adoption of such counter-measures.

It will be seen that on only one item out of five, difference between the two groups is not significant according to chi-square criterion. This item pertains to administrators' attempt to create public opinion through formal or informal channels as a counteractive measure. In other words, this suggests that both groups agree that very few administrators make use of this device. On all other items, there is significant difference between the two groups according to chi-square criterion at the .01 level. This is indicative of the fact that while administrators think that they do not take recourse to these measures, political leaders think they do. However, as administrators themselves see it, very few of them take recourse to seeking help of other local leaders and prominent citizens (15.1 per cent), or seek support from other competing political groups (7.5 per cent); create public opinion through formal or informal channels (20.7 per cent); and dealing with the situations themselves but by seeking support of higher level political leaders (18.9 per cent). What they usually tend to do when confronted by mounting pressures by political leaders is to seek the help of their own superior officers as is evident from the fact that about 70.0 per cent of administrators admit of doing so.

In addition to mobilizing support in their favour, administrators may take recourse to two other alternatives. They may either talk reason to the political leaders and persuade them to give up their demands or try to escape from cross-pressure by seeking transfer

TABLE 6.12  
ADMINISTRATORS' RESPONSE TO POLITICIANS' PRESSURES

ITEMS	SAMPLE			RESPONSE			TOTAL <sup>#</sup>	Px <sup>2</sup>
	AD=53	F	S	R	N	O		
1. Seek help of other local leaders and prominent citizens.	Ad	1.9	13.2	13.2	67.9	3.8	100.0	
	PI	22.8	38.6	22.8	14.0	1.8	100.0	.01
2. Seek support from another competing political groups.	Ad	—	7.5	5.7	84.9	1.9	100.0	
	PI	31.6	38.6	14.0	14.0	1.8	100.0	.01
3. Create public opinion through formal or informal channels.	Ad	7.5	13.2	13.2	62.3	3.8	100.0	
	PI	8.8	13.3	21.0	49.1	1.8	100.0	not sig.
4. Try to deal with the situation himself but by seeking the support of higher level administration.	Ad	37.7	32.1	7.5	18.9	3.8	100.0	
	PI	45.6	42.1	5.3	3.5	3.5	100.0	.01
5. Try to deal with the situation himself but by seeking support of higher level political leaders.	Ad	37.7	17.0	3.8	73.6	3.8	100.1	
	PI	43.9	42.1	8.8	3.5	1.8	100.1	.01

\*Totals not exactly 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

elsewhere, deferring decision, etc. One other way is to submit to the will of political leaders but we do not have any data to discuss this aspect of administrators' response to political leaders' pressure. In Table 6.12 we present evidence on these two aspects only.

Here again, we find significant difference between the two groups on the last three items according to the chi-square criterion at the .01 level, indicating difference of opinion between administrators and political leaders about the former's responses to the latter's pressure. Political leaders feel that administrators frequently try to escape from making decisions while administrators deny it. What both are agreed on is administrators' attempt to explain the limitations of rules and regulations and to dissuade political leaders from taking any improper action. Administrators, however, do not agree that they try to escape from facing the situation. Only in the case of referring the matter to higher authorities and postponing the decision till favourable situation arises do administrators (62.3 and 43.3 per cent respectively) admit of their doing so.

It seems, therefore, that administrators' responses to the pressures applied by political leaders usually take two forms. In the first place, administrators will try to persuade the political leaders to give up their improper demands. Failing in this and being confronted with pressures, administrators will, in the second place, apprise their superiors with the situation and seek their help.

We discussed in this chapter reciprocal expectations of administrators and political leaders about the role of the one in relation to the other as well as their perception of what should be the pattern of distribution of functions between the two groups. We then discussed some of the aspects of interaction between administrators and political leaders. Our discussion reveals that there exists a gap between what administrators think should be the role of political leaders and what political leaders themselves think about it. Also, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a clear-cut demarcation of responsibilities between the two; administrators claim share in policy formulation and political leaders claim to have say in programme implementation.

Our discussion of their interaction suggests that it is important mainly for political leaders to contact administrators. When they do so, they make all sorts of demands and go to the extent of putting pressures on administrators for the fulfilment of these demands.

TABLE 6.13  
ADMINISTRATORS' RESPONSE TO POLITICIANS' PRESSURES

ITEMS	SAMPLE		RESPONSE			TOTAL*	PY <sup>2</sup>
	AD=53	PL=57	F	S	R		
					N	O	
1. Explain limitations due to rules, regulations and directives.	Ad	88.7	9.4	—	—	1.9	100.0
	PI	82.5	10.5	3.5	1.8	1.8	100.0
2. Appeal to politicians' reason and good sense.	Ad	64.2	20.8	1.9	11.3	1.9	100.1
	PI	57.9	35.1	3.5	1.8	1.8	100.1
3. Refer the matter to higher authorities.	Ad	18.9	43.4	11.3	20.8	5.7	100.1
	PI	54.4	33.3	8.8	3.5	—	100.0
4. Postpone decision till favourable situation arises.	Ad	7.5	35.8	1.3	11.5	1.9	99.9
	PI	68.4	28.1	1.8	1.8	—	100.1
5. Seek transfer to some other place.	Ad	1.9	11.3	9.4	75.5	1.9	100.0
	PI	31.6	36.8	17.5	10.5	3.5	99.9

\*Totals not exactly 100.0 per cent because of rounding.

## CHAPTER VII

### SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW

IN the preceding chapters we discussed some of the factors associated with the relationship between administrators and political leaders. We began our enquiry with a consideration of the loads that political system in a developing country like India has to cope with in its attempt to lend coherence and stability to political community. It was pointed out that for political development to make headway the problems of national integration, legitimation of the political regime, democratic sharing of political power and economic development have to be successfully tackled.

The tackling of these problems, however, depends upon several factors. In the first place, a traditional society like India has been characterized not by any lack of authority but by the lack of regularly functioning, endurable and centralized authority whose existence and working make direct and considerable impact on the life of the common man. As Rienhard Bendix observes:

In Indian history there is no comparable legacy of an abstract principle of justice or of a sovereign political order in which the several estates and local communities could be integrated through a system of representation. In the absence of such legacies modern India faces difficult problems of integration, that is, of establishing orderly relationships between the constituent units of her society and the centres of governmental authorities.<sup>1</sup>

The fact that political authority was distant and its interaction with the common man only intermittent and peripheral compared to other concerns in his life did not promote effective orientations towards governmental authority in the minds of those whose life is now considerably affected by government actions. If anything, people treated the government with either hostility or docility; in any case, governmental

<sup>1</sup> Rienhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order* (New York : John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1964), p. 230.

authority was either feared or resentfully submitted to.

The vast expansion in government functions and penetration into even remote areas of the country by bureaucratic machinery have brought political authority face to face with the mass of the people. Further, the five yearly elections and the attempts by various political parties to mobilize people have created many contact points between the mass of people and political authority in its manifold manifestations. Even more important in this regard is the fact that politically ill-aware and structurally undifferentiated mass of people are now expected to make important decisions which have vital bearing on composition of the government as well as its policies and programmes. In view of the very closer relationship visualized between the rulers and the ruled and the anticipation that people will judiciously participate in decision-making processes, or, at least, influence it by wisely selecting political decision-makers, an altogether different orientation on the part of the people towards political authority is required.

The gap that exists between what people have been accustomed to feel about the government and what they are now expected to feel is immense and must be bridged if support for authoritative allocation of values by the political regime is to be insured. That this is important can be understood if we considered in this regard the experiences of numerous developing countries whose attempt in weaning people away from their old-moorings and habits has floundered on the rock of dissensus and conflict. It should be borne in mind that systemic goal gratification is consequent upon the existence of a legitimate order of authority which, in turn, is dependent upon the conception of its legitimacy being shared by those who exercise authority and those who are subject to it.<sup>2</sup>

It will be seen that congruence between the ruler and the ruled in their conception of what constitutes a legitimate order of authority is essential for sytemic goal gratification. If the existing political order is not supposed to be legitimate, its programmatic values too will not be accepted as legitimate. However, in developing countries simple sharing of the conception of a legitimate political order is not enough. The reason for this lies in the fact that such a congruence is permissive in that it allows the political authority to undertake action programmes on the assumption that public support will be forthcoming. This also

<sup>2</sup> See Bendix, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

indicates that there is a fair amount of agreement about systemic goals through habit or inclination. In the developing countries, on the contrary, the systemic goals represent the aspirations of a handful of modernizing elites who wish to persuade the general mass of people about the desirability of pursuing these goals and make claim on people's active support in implementing these goals. In the event that people at large do not accept these goals, or having accepted them, do not show much enthusiasm for them, aspirations of the modernizing elites are likely to remain unrealized for want of requisite support. It is, therefore, essential that, in addition to a widespread sharing of the sense of legitimacy of the political regime, there should be a positive orientation towards an identification with the regime goals as well as willingness on the part of the people to give concrete shape to them. The first condition for the successful handling of the loads, referred to earlier, relates, therefore, to the forging of value-congruence between the articulators of national goals and objectives and those whose acceptance and support make these goals and objectives a reality.

In the second place, the effectiveness of the political order in successfully disposing of the demands that are channelled into the system, providing basic services, maintaining law and order, and, speaking in a very general sense, formulation and implementation of policies is of crucial importance in enabling the political regime to cope with the loads. At the level of policy formulation, it should be noted, impinge conflicting points of views, interests, demands and expectations. Further, raising of people's expectations and giving out of the hope that the satisfaction of the various needs of the people would constitute the sheet-anchor of government's policy have prompted the people to press the government to attend to their particularistic as well as non-particularistic demands. One factor that has exacerbated the channelling of excessive demands into the political system pertains to the lack of a tradition of self-help and self-reliance in the people who look to the government for succour.

Yet another fact that complicates expeditious formulation of policies relates to the democratic institutional framework which values dissent and free expression of opposite and at times incompatible views more than efficiency. This makes it necessary for the ruling elites to make a reference to the popular will for determining which objectives are to be pursued. But where majority rule is itself not widely given

allegiance to and "rules of the game" are very tenuously adhered to, policy formulation is likely to become an exasperating process.

Once policies have been formulated, and lines of action agreed upon, all depends on how efficiently they are given effect to. Even the most ambitious and socially beneficial policies and programmes, if they remain unimplemented or badly mutilated while being implemented, will not succeed in keeping people favourably oriented towards political order. The effective implementation of policies and programmes—the responsibility of the administrative system—cannot be insured if bureaucracy itself does not display qualities necessary for efficient job performance, or it is held in low esteem by the public, or excessive demands for unreasonable and improper gratification make the operation of legal-rational criteria of bureaucracy difficult.

We identified two critical structures which have considerable significance for the capability of the political order to handle the loads. These structures—administrative and leadership—are strategically located and functionally suited to perform the functions that mobilize support for the political regime act as communication channel between various strata of the society and those who exercise authority and claim legitimacy for this exercise, decide systemic goals and work for their realization.

However, there is important difference between the two structures. Leadership structure is concerned primarily with the task of determining the social objectives that represent the interests of, at least, a majority of the people in the society, and for this task provision of the opportunity for all conflicting viewpoints to be heard is of crucial importance. In other words, what matters in this process of determination of societal objectives is not the consideration of efficiency but of consensus, that is, reconciliation of opposed viewpoints and their aggregation in societal objectives. The administrative structure, on the other hand, deals with the achievement of given social objectives and emphasizes the discovery of the efficient, not the popular, means for doing so.

This division of functions clearly demarcates the jurisdiction of leaders and administrators and if both of them strictly adhere to this division there is no possibility that systemic goal gratification will suffer. However, such demarcations are never free of ambiguity, nor do the actors themselves possess a clear understanding of such a demarcation, nor are they free from the tendency towards aggrandizement.

Encroachment by one over the jurisdiction of the other is frequent and is, therefore, likely to subvert the basis of political organization.

Given the fact that administrators and political leaders constitute two very crucial sectors of political order and the nature of their interaction carries greater significance for the capability of the political order to realize societal objectives, it is of profound interest to explore the relationship that obtains between administrators and political leaders. As has already been pointed out, we identified four components that impinge in very crucial respects on such a relationship. The first relates to the awareness and understanding of the nature of division of functions on the part of the actors in both the interacting units. The second relates to the *conditioning* of the actions of the two groups of actors. We considered in this connection both the normative referents and role perceptions of the actors in both the groups. The third relates to the reciprocal application of evaluative standards and we selected perception of reciprocal image as the best indicator of this. The fourth concerns the dimensions of interaction between administrators and political leaders in practice and discussed the kinds of demands political leaders bring to administrators, the pressures they apply in support of their demands and the way administrators respond and are seen by political leaders to respond to these pressures.

Our discussion emphatically indicates that the conventional notion of a clear-cut and clean division of functions between administrators and political leaders does not operate in practice. According to the conventional notion, leaders are exclusively responsible for determining policies whereas administrators should concern themselves with the implementation of policies once they have been finally formulated. In practice, however, as our respondents testify, administrators claim responsibility in formulation of policies while leaders would not like to be excluded from influencing the course of administration. This is indicated by the fact that 45.3 per cent of administrators say that the responsibility for the formulation of broad policies should rest with both the leaders and the administrators. Similarly, 38.6 per cent of political leaders claim to have a say in the distribution of loans, grants and subsidies which is legitimately within the jurisdiction of administrators.

It is interesting to note that this encroachment is not perceived

either by administrators or by political leaders to be violating the boundary between policy formulation and administration. This is evident from the fact that there is a fair amount of interposition consensus in favour of sharing responsibility even in regard to exclusive jurisdiction of either the political leader or the administrator. Note, for example, that in regard to the formulation of broad policies 45.3 per cent of administrators and 45.6 per cent of political leaders agree that this responsibility should be shared by both. Also 41.5 per cent of administrators and 38.6 per cent of political leaders indicate their preference in favour of sharing responsibility in the matter of distributing loans, grants and subsidies.

That a division of labour between political leaders and administrators does not strictly follow the lines of demarcation between policy formulation and policy implementation is indicated by our data. It is only in respect of policy decisions relating to day-to-day working of the government and implementation of programmes that both administrators and political leaders indicate agreement about the desirability of leaving these matters in the hands of administrators. Otherwise, in rest of the fields excepting allocation of licences, quotas and permits, in which politicians would like to have a say, both administrators and political leaders prefer joint responsibility. This indicates the prevailing ambiguity in the allocation of responsibilities.

Inasmuch as both the interacting units prefer to work jointly in several important decision areas, it is incumbent upon them to be in frequent interaction, to engage in discussions, and arrive at decisions on the basis of mutual understanding and consensus. If such an interaction fails to develop, each of the interacting units will tend to stick to its own notion of what constitutes right action. Failing to persuade the counterpart of the propriety of its recommended action, it will try to reinforce its position by attempting to improve its power prospects. If this is the dominant pattern of relationship between administrators and political leaders, one can well imagine the consequences for the system flowing from such a relationship.

That the relationship between administrators and political leaders does to a very great extent reflect this pattern is indicated by several factors. In the first place, it will be recalled that the importance of contact between administrators and political leaders is perceived largely by the latter. Only 31.6 per cent of political leaders in comparison to 56.6

per cent of administrators recognize that mutual contact is not important. In the second place, our data show that administrators are not willing to assign more than a passive role to political leaders. It will be recalled that only 17.0 per cent of administrators are willing to consult local political leaders and get their advice in carrying out their duties, and only 20.0 per cent in favour of getting political leaders' active cooperation in discharging their duties. Note also that a large number of political leaders claim to have a more active role *vis-a-vis* administrators.

These two factors should make us alert to the possibility that, in spite of the contention of administrators to the effect that they are willing enough to share responsibilities with political leaders, they are much more concerned with the safeguarding of their power position and keep the politicians at a distance. Moreover, a tendency towards self-aggrandizement is also discernible inasmuch as they advance claim over decision areas which legitimately belong to political leaders. It is true that this tendency is also evident in the case of political leaders. However, success in any attempt at self-aggrandizement is consequent upon a feeling of self-confidence or potency which, as we will see shortly, political leaders lack. Further, administrators have more or less entrenched themselves, by virtue of a long tradition of domination buttressed by their crucial position in the political organization and competence, in power and are, therefore, not likely to yield to any attempt of encroachment by political leaders.

It is true that political leaders do bring to administrators unreasonable and improper demands and apply pressures on them to get their demands fulfilled. Administrators would be failing in their duty if they went on acquiescing to what political leaders unreasonably expect from them. Guided by primarily the legal-rational standards of bureaucratic actions, administrators will certainly evaluate political leaders' demands on the touchstone of legality and rationality and turn those down which fail this test. No doubt, they are within their rights to refuse to comply with unreasonable demands of political leaders; however, as Peter M. Blau points out, "To administer a social organization according to technical criteria of rationality is irrational, because it ignores the non-rational aspects of social aspects of social conduct."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Peter M. Blau, *Bureaucracy in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 58.

The point at issue is, however, not what an administrator does when he encounters political leaders making unreasonable demands on him. The relationship between administrators and political leaders must be examined in the context of (1) the intended expansion of representative politics at the local level and (2) the developmental activities that the government has either undertaken or sponsored in order to transform national society from a traditional to a modern one. It has been widely recognized that for lending stability to democratic form of government, local communities must be given more powers to meaningfully participate in decision-making processes as well as to determine their own destiny within the national frame of reference. The emphasis on delegation of more powers of decision-making to representative bodies at the local level implies a changed orientation on the part of administrators who have for long been accustomed to ruling the masses. They are now required to be responsive to the wishes of the people as well as their representatives and are expected to carry out decisions of representative bodies.

Similarly, the emphasis on developmental activities also requires administrators to be oriented more to performance than to what French are wont to call *la paperasserie*. What is now emphasized as requisite attributes in administrators are dynamism, pragmatism and commitment to work rather than to procedures.

What we want to emphasize is the fact that the extension of representative politics and the launching of developmental programmes have drastically changed the external conditions making it necessary for the bureaucracy to change its thoughtways and workways.

It is widely recognized that bureaucracy must display in its orientations and attitudes support for and willingness to realize systemic goals. But it should also be emphasized that such a disposition is needed not only on the part of administrators but also on the part of political leaders who as managers of public affairs are most concerned with the realization of systemic goals.

Our data show that there is a strong awareness on the part of administrators that inasmuch as rules and regulations are framed at higher levels, they do not take into account local problems and local situations. This realization on their part suggests the inadequacy of the existing rules and regulations in providing guidelines to administrators in handling varying and complex local situations. What complicates

the matter still further is the fact that these same rules and regulations are perceived to be rigid involving a lot of paper work to the detriment of doing concrete work. This is an emphatic indication of the fact that administrators themselves realize that the existing administrative rules and regulations are dysfunctional to the task of development programmes inasmuch as their emphasis on paper work, their rigidity, and their generality do not allow administrators to either handle specific situations or speedily dispose of their business. In other words, administrators tend to evaluate bureaucratic rules and regulations unfavourably.

Yet, the fact remains that, in spite of their unfavourable evaluation of rules and regulations, administrators find it incumbent upon themselves to give primacy to strictly following them. The strength of their commitment to this norm can be measured by the fact that as much as 43.4 per cent of administrators would rather favour delays in implementation of programmes than violate administrative procedures. It is true that a majority of administrators express themselves in favour of using their better judgment of meeting the demands of a particular situation or ignoring some rules for facilitating the solution of certain problems. However, administrators would really go to the extent of ignoring established rules and regulations seems very doubtful.

This is indicated by the prevalence among administrators of a very strong sense of upward deference. That is to say, administrators show a greater propensity to conform their behaviour to the expectations of their superior officers. Note, for example, that 60.0 per cent of administrators admit that concern of an administrator should be to see that his superiors are satisfied and 41.5 per cent recognize that whatever the situation, the administrator should be guided only by the instructions received from his superiors. If we add to it 39.6 per cent of administrators falling in the 'partly agree' category, administrators' commitment to this norm seems to be quite strong. Our data, then, bring out two very revealing manifestations of administrators' commitment to bureaucratic norms—their propensity to give primary importance to adherence to rules and regulations and their what seems to be an obsessive concern with following superiors' instructions and keeping super-ordinate authorities satisfied.

In contradistinction to administrators' strong articulation of bureaucratic norms, their orientation towards representative politics

and what it implies seems to be characterized by a low regard for an insufficient appreciation of the role of representative politics and political leaders. This is indicated by the fact that only 7.5 per cent of administrators admit that the primary responsibility of an administrator is to give effect to the wishes, proposals and recommendations of local leaders. Also, only 35.8 per cent of administrators feel the necessity of seeking the advice of local leaders in dealing with local problems.

Further evidence of administrators' low esteem for representative politics and political leaders is forthcoming from their responses to items in their role perception instrument. As we indicated earlier, only 50.9 per cent of administrators feel the obligation of carrying out the decisions made by elected bodies, while none of our administrator respondents is convinced of the obligation of modifying a policy decision on the advice of political leaders. Even when faced with insistent popular demands, only 41.5 per cent of administrators would be willing to modify a policy decision.

Another indication of administrators' disinclination to come to terms with the changed external conditions pertains to their refusal to recognize the importance of the role of special interests in democratic politics. It is a well-known fact that the vigour of democratic form of government lies in proliferation of associations which grow to protect and promote particular interests and attempt to influence government policies. The insensitivity of the bureaucracy to such a phenomenon is evident from the fact that only 18.9 per cent of administrators feel obliged to give some consideration to feelings of local groups in undertaking new programmes and only 9.4 per cent would go to the extent of occasionally compromising with local pressure groups.

This is enough to show that Indian administrative system retains even today much of the attributes that distinguished the Indian Civil Service of yesterday. The penchant for strictly adhering to rules and regulations, the obsequious dependence on superior's instructions, and the ostrich-like attitude to changing external conditions—these are the attributes that, as our data show, characterize administrative system at the district level. We do not, however, intend to suggest that changes in its environment have no impact on the administrative system. Administrators seem to be aware of the necessity of reorienting themselves to the new forces that have emerged and are operative since independence.

They also realize the necessity of establishing a new relationship with their environment and of responding to the emergent and emerging pressures released by the expansion of representative politics. But our data leave behind a strong impression that such an awareness is still very weak and not adequately embedded to prompt administrators to express it in their behaviour.

If administrators do not seem to have completely freed themselves from the influence of the yesterday's "steel-frame" bureaucracy, what about political leaders? Do they possess those attributes which are conducive to systemic goal gratification, in general, and, a functional relationship with administrators, in particular? Our data show that in spite of their profession of being committed to democratic principles, and well disposed towards an amicable relationship with administrators, there is not much supportive evidence to suggest that political leaders do in fact subscribe to these values.

It will be recalled that political leaders, in general, emphatically express themselves in favour of accepting democratic principles as guides of their action. In fact, they (84.2 per cent) insist that violation of democratic principles should not be tolerated even if it is recommended with the express intent to facilitating development of the country. On the face of it, then, political leaders are highly democratic in their orientation. However, it is not so is proved by the fact that in their actual behaviour they are much more influenced by what we have called "exigential values". To the extent that political leaders' behaviour is influenced by exigential values, which are not necessarily democratic values, their commitment to the latter is weakened.

Another indication of their weak commitment to democratic values is their conception of the role of the representative. As we have already seen, political leaders show their preference for autonomous-active conception of the representative's role. According to this conception, political leaders would not only resist any constraint on the freedom of their action but also go to the extent of applying pressures on people in order to bring them round to their own conception of what should be the best course of action. This conception of the representative's role is at odds with the established notion of the extent to which a representative can ignore popular wishes.

Similarly, in regard to the perception of their role *vis-a-vis* administrators, political leaders recognize the necessity of supplying relevant

informations to administrators for policy formulation, cooperating with them in programme implementation and protecting administrators from unreasonable criticisms. However, political leaders feel a strong sense of obligation to keep a strict watch on administrative performance and to bring to public notice instances of malfunctioning of administration or administrative abuses. It is of interest to note that political leaders do not experience any hesitation in taking recourse to extreme measures for rectifying administrative errors. For example, a large majority of our respondents, more than 77.0 per cent of political leaders, would take recourse to public agitation and seeking intervention by high level public officials and political leaders. All this points to the fact that, even though political leaders see the necessity of establishing functional relationship with administrators, they exhibit intolerance to what they think are administrative lapses and seem highly susceptible to extreme reactions.

Our discussion of certain aspects of behavioural dimension of the interaction between administrators and political leaders suggests that political leaders are concerned more with the advancement of parochial and narrow interests than with that of the broader entity, the district in our case. Further, we also noticed that political leaders frequently make improper demands on administrators and exert various kinds of pressures in order to make administrators concede to their demands. When frustrated in their attempt to get these demands fulfilled, political leaders tend to react in terms of taking retaliatory measures against them.

Our data, then, provide ample evidence to permit the inference that the interaction between administrators and political leaders is likely to be characterized by tensions and conflicts not only because of differential normative commitments but also because of position-specific bias in role conceptions. Each of the interacting groups tends to assign much more importance to its own role and evaluate the relevance of the counterposition in terms of the requirements of its specific position. As a consequence, application of two incompatible—or, at least, heterogenous—evaluative standards to the same phenomenon prevents administrators and political leaders from developing conventions which may allow their relationships to stabilize and take definite and mutually acceptable forms. Such a situation is not at all conducive to the forging of a relationship based on reciprocal understanding and

appreciation and cooperatively complementary role perception. The position-specific bias in role perception coupled with a meagre understanding of the role of the counterpart is bound to create disaffection between the interacting groups and incline one to unfavourably evaluate the other.

That reciprocal image perception of both administrators and political leaders reflects disaffection and unfavourable evaluation is supported by our analysis of their reciprocal image perception. There is, generally speaking, a great amount of agreement among political leaders that administrators are corrupt, rigid in their attitude, inefficient and interested mainly in their own career prospects. Political leaders further believe that there is little substance in the popular belief that administrators are impartial and mete out fair treatment. A large number of political leaders is of the opinion that administrators work in the interest of ruling groups. In addition, it is also believed by a majority of political leaders that administrators are interested not in doing any solid work but only in expanding departments and increasing procedures.

Apart from the poor image that political leaders have of administrators in terms of their personal and professional attributes, the feeling that administrators are not receptive and responsive to the needs, problems and difficulties of those they are supposed to serve is also very strong in political leaders. As political leaders see them, administrators not only keep themselves aloof from the people, they are also indifferent to their difficulties and unhelpful in redressing their problems. Even to political leaders, who are supposed to be the politically conscious stratum of the society, administrators do not seem to be paying due attention. Political leaders have a strong feeling that administrators do not appreciate their viewpoints as well as difficulties, distrust them, and ignore their proposals and demands.

It is not that only political leaders view administrators in an unfavourable light; administrators also have a very low image of political leaders. For instance, administrators believe that political leaders give much more preference to the furtherance of narrow, parochial interests, that they are incapable, for various reasons, of managing public affairs, and that they are distrustful of administrators, create trouble for the administration and do not appreciate the difficulties of administrators. In spite of this low image that administrators

have of political leaders, the useful function that the latter serve for administration is generally appreciated by administrators. However, administrators also recognize that political leaders are ignorant of and do not respect administrative rules, regulations and procedures.

It is clear, then, that both administrators and political leaders evaluate each other adversely. It is true that much of what one feels about the other stems from insufficient understanding and appreciation of the functions and role constraints of a person evaluated. Yet, the intensity with which adverse evaluations are made cannot be disregarded. Nor can it be claimed that such evaluations have no meaning or relevance for the interaction between administrators and political leaders. For one thing, the nature of image perception determines the affective orientations the actor is likely to evince towards the object. For another, it adds a predictive dimension to the interaction between two groups; the actor can and does anticipate the ways in which the object is likely to react and respond to the actors' suggestions, proposals and demands. Whether such anticipations are ill or well-founded does not concern us here. What is significant is the fact that anticipation of possible reactions from the object prompts the actor to reinforce his position with the help of certain manoeuvres intended to produce acquiescence on the part of the object.

When each of the interacting units holds the other in a very low esteem, it can be expected that behavioural consequences of such an adverse evaluation will not be conducive to the establishment and maintenance of a functional relationship between administrators and political leaders. Given the narrow identification of the political leader, verging almost on the parochial, it is not surprising that he will seldom approach administrators for the realization of systemic goals. The administrator will, however, tend to examine the proposals, demands and recommendations of the political leaders not in the light of their relevance for systemic goal gratification or legitimacy of the political order but bureaucratic considerations. That is, whether or not such proposals, demands and recommendations are in keeping with established rules, regulations and procedures. Finding them inconsistent with bureaucratic requirements the administrator will not hesitate to refuse to comply with them. His image of the political leaders as incompetent managers of public affairs, their ignorance of administrative rules and procedures, their identification with

parochial and narrow concerns and their tendency to create trouble for the administration—all these factors will tend to prejudice him against the leaders' proposals and demands and reinforce his decision to refuse to concede to them.

The political leader, when confronted with the administrators' hesitation to consider his demands and proposals favourably, will take no time in divining the reasons for the administrators' hesitation. He will ascribe this hesitation to the administrators' lack of commitment to work, his indifference to people's needs and difficulties, and his unsympathetic attitude to political leaders in general. He will, therefore, exert various kinds of pressures on the administrator to make him concede to his demands. If such pressures fail to produce the desired results, the political leader will not hesitate in dramatizing the issue by organizing public agitations.

It will, therefore, be seen that the interaction between the administrator and the political leader is overly characterized by 'position-centric' considerations, that is, an insistence on the part both of administrators and political leaders to give precedence and importance to the requirements of their own role performance. This prevents them from evolving certain conventions which will allow them to found their relationship on functional considerations and permit them to collaborate in nation-building and system maintaining activities. The result is that self-aggrandizing tendencies characterize their interaction and give rise to tension and conflict.

It can be noted that interaction between administrators and political leaders takes its character from the changed environment in which both find themselves. It is clear that the concept of development administration has the effect of drastically changing the power position of administrators. Functioning for a long time as the guardian of the political system and unincumbered by any constraints of representative politics, they are now required to be responsible to the political rulers and responsive to the wishes and opinions of the people. Moreover, they are now faced with increasing challenge from political leaders who aspire to deciding basic questions confronting the polity and assigning only an instrumental role to administrators. This is essentially a struggle for power.

The administrator responds to this challenge in two ways. In the first place, he seeks the support of powerful local leaders for

protecting his own position. In the second place, he treats administrative rules, regulations and procedures as protective devices and tries to protect himself by greater adherence to them. This latter course, however, threatens to lead to the process of what is called *displacement of goals*. As Robert K. Merton observes:

Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself; there occurs the familiar process of *displacement of goals* whereby 'an instrumental value becomes a terminal value'. Discipline readily interpreted as conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of bureaucrat<sup>5</sup>.

This phenomenon gives rise to several administrative ills, such as 'passing the buck', procrastination in decision-making, etc.

However, as our data indicate, in this struggle for domination and power, political leaders at the local level seem to be in a disadvantageous position. As we indicated earlier, they have a pretty low image of themselves; they are themselves convinced of their incapability of managing public affairs. Also, they feel powerless in influencing the course of administration. This is indicated by the fact that as much as 77.2 per cent of political leaders feel that administrators enjoy powerful protection, therefore, hardly, anything can be done to influence the behaviour of administrators. This helplessness inexorably leads them to take extreme measures which violate, or, at least, go against the grain of democratic principles of conflict resolution.

Our analysis, then, underlines several factors pertaining to the relationship between administrators and political leaders which have serious repercussions on the realization of systemic goals and on the capacity of the political order to handle the loads. In the first place, the gap between public authority as manifested in district bureaucracy and political leaders as representatives of the common mass still persists. In the second place, both administrators and political leaders show a very low degree of awareness of systemic goals. In the third place, each of them is moved more by the considerations of his own role requirements. The overall impact of all these factors is that realization of systemic goals suffers. It should also be pointed out both administrators

<sup>5</sup> Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Illinois : Free Press, 1949), pp. 154-55.

and political leaders that show insufficient realization and appreciation of the changed situation; there is not enough support in their attitudes for the necessity of reorienting their relationship that may promote and enhance systemic capacity for performance.

## APPENDIX I

# QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ADMINISTRATORS

### SECTION I

1.1 First of all we would like to know how long have you been posted in this district?

Years..... Months.....

2.1 Starting from the beginning of your career what posts have you held so far, for how long and where? (PROBE FOR CHANGE IN PLACE EVEN IF THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN POSITION)

<i>Position</i>	<i>Period or length of incumbency</i>	<i>Place of postings</i>
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2.2 Out of all the postings you have had so far, which one did you like most? (RECORD VERBATIM)

.....

2.3 Why did you like it most?

### SECTION II

3.1 Taking the district as a whole what in your opinion are the three most important problems that must be solved for the good of the district?

1.

2.

3.

3.2 Do other officials with whom you have to deal with also think these problems as important?

1. Yes            2. No            3. Any other response  
(Record verbatim)

.....  
.....

3.3 What about the political leaders you come into contact with, do they also think these problems as important?

1. Yes            2. No            3. Any other response  
(Record verbatim)

.....  
.....

3.4 Regarding the solution of (REPEAT FIRST PROBLEM MENTIONED) would you say the political leaders in the district generally agree or generally disagree with your views on how to solve it?

1. Generally agree            2. Generally disagree

(IF DISAGREE IN Q. 3.4 ASK)

3.5 In general, what are the main points of disagreement?

3.6 Regarding the solution of (REPEAT THE SECOND PROBLEM MENTIONED) would you say the political leaders in the district generally agree or generally disagree with your views on how to solve it?

1. Generally agree            2. Generally disagree

(IF DISAGREE IN Q. 3.6 ASK)

3.7 In general, what are the main points of disagreement?

3.8 Regarding the solution of (REPEAT THE THIRD PROBLEM MENTIONED) would you say the political leaders in the district

generally agree or generally disagree with your views on how to solve it?

3.9 In general, what are the main points of disagreement?

(IF 'R' SAYS POLITICIANS DIFFER IN Qs. 3.4, 3.6, 3.8 ASK)

4.1 To what extent does this difference of opinion pose problems for you in discharging your duties?

1. Great extent      2. Somewhat      3. Not at all

(IF 1 OR 2 IN Q. 4.1 ASK)

## 4.2 In what way?

### SECTION III

5.1 Would you say that it is very important, somewhat important or not important to consult politicians in discharging your responsibilities as an administrator?

1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. Not important

6.1 How often do the political leaders from this district come to seek your help?

7.1 Generally speaking do the leaders who contact you usually speak for themselves, or for their area, or for the whole district?

1. Mainly themselves
2. Mainly for some group in their area
3. For the district as a whole
4. Any other response (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_

8.0 Other administrators we have talked to have mentioned many kinds of problems which politicians bring to them for redressal or advice. Here is a list of problems generally mentioned. How frequently do politicians bring these problems to you?

*Frequently   Sometimes   Rarely   Never*

8.1	Guidance on administrative procedures and rules	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
8.2	Law and order problems	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
8.3	Economic problems of the people	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
8.4	Problems of administrative delays	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
8.5	Problems concerning implementation of government plans	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
8.6	Problems arising from conflict between groups (social, economic, political, etc.)	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
9.1	Can you think of any others?					

*Problems Q. 9.1*

*Frequency Q. 9.2*

9.2 How frequently do you come across this problem? (READ OUT EACH PROBLEM MENTIONED IN Q. 9.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

10.0 Generally speaking on whose problems do political leaders usually seek your help? I mean how frequently each of the following problems is brought before you?

*Frequently   Sometimes   Rarely   Never*

10.1	Problems concerning politicians' personal benefit	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
10.2	Problems concerning the interests of their relatives and family members	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )

		<i>Frequently</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Never</i>
10.3	Problems concerning the interests of their friends and close supporters	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.4	Problems concerning interests of certain caste or religious groups in the community	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.5	Problems concerning interests of particular political parties	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.6	Problems concerning interests of certain political factions or groups	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.7	Problems concerning welfare of the people of their own area	( )	( )	( )	( )
10.8	Problems concerning welfare of the whole district	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.1	Problems concerning any others? (SPECIFY)				

*Problems (Q. 11.1)**Frequency (Q. 11.2)*

11.2 How frequently is this problem brought before you? (READ OUT EACH PROBLEM MENTIONED IN Q. 11.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

12.1 Speaking from your experience, how frequent is it that politicians make unreasonable demands upon you?

1. Very frequently
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

13.0 How do you feel when you cannot meet the demands of politicians?  
For instance:

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
13.1	Do you feel that he will understand your difficulties?	( ) ( )
13.2	Do you feel that he will cease to co-operate with you?	( ) ( )

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
13.3 Do you feel that he will try to spoil your service record?	(      )	(      )
13.4 Do you feel that he will try to tarnish your reputation?	(      )	(      )
13.5 Do you feel that he will disturb your service conditions such as transfer, complain above, etc?	(      )	(      )
13.6 Do you feel that he can hardly do any harm?	(      )	(      )
14.0 Speaking from your experience what kinds of pressures do politicians actually apply on administration for getting done what they want. Here is a list of possible pressures. How often is it that these pressures are applied by politicians?		

*Frequently      Sometimes      Rarely      Never*

14.1 Try to spoil service records	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.2 Disturb service conditions by transfer, complain to higher level, etc.	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.3 Promise to take responsibility of consequences on himself	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.4 Attempt at persuasion through other political leaders of the district	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.5 Approach administrative officers at higher levels	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.6 Promise of better career opportunities	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.7 Making intervention from political leaders at higher level (MLA, MP and Minister)	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.8 Offer monetary incentives or other such rewards	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.9 Attempt at persuasion through important citizens	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )

	<i>Frequently</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Never</i>
14.10 Persuasion through your friends or relatives	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
14.11 Making a public issue by organizing agitation, procession, etc.	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
15.1 Any other kind of pressures? (SPECIFY)				

*Pressures (Q. 15.1)**Frequency (Q. 15.2)*

15.2 How often is this pressure applied by politicians? (READ OUT EACH PROBLEM MENTIONED IN Q. 15.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

16.0 When faced with pressures from political leaders to do something you do not consider proper, what courses are you most likely to follow? Here is a list of possible courses of action. Would you kindly tell which of these you would mostly follow, sometimes follow, rarely follow or never follow?

	<i>Mostly</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Never</i>
16.1 Explain limitations due to rules, regulations and directives	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.2 Appeal to their reason and good sense	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.3 Seek help of other local leaders and prominent citizens	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.4 Seek support from another competing political group	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.5 Create public opinion through formal or informal channels	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.6 Try to deal with the situation yourself but by seeking the support of higher levels of administration	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.7 Postpone decision till favourable situation arises	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )

Mostly   Sometimes   Rarely   Never

16.8 Seek transfer to some other place (   ) (   ) (   ) (   )

16.9 Try to deal with the situation yourself but by seeking support of higher level political leaders (MLA, MP & Ministers) (   ) (   ) (   ) (   )

16.10 Refer the matter to higher authorities (   ) (   ) (   ) (   )

17.1 Any other course of action you may take? (SPECIFY)

*Course of action in Q. 17.1*

*Frequency in Q. 17.2*

17.2 Would you follow it mostly or sometimes? (READ OUT EACH COURSE OF ACTION IN Q. 17.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

18.0 Here are five statements sometimes made by people about the relationship between an administrator and a politician. I would like you to choose one which fits most closely with what you think should be an ideal relationship between the two:  
 (MARK ONE BELOW)

18.1 In discharging his duties an administrator should not have anything to do with political leaders (   )

18.2 The administrator's responsibility should cease once he has explained government policies, and rules/directives to political leaders (   )

18.3 The administrator should consult local political leaders and get their advice in carrying out his duties (   )

18.4 The administrator should not be satisfied merely with consulting local political leaders but get their active cooperation while discharging his duties (   )

18.5 The administrator should be mainly guided by the advice of political leaders in discharging his duties (   )

## SECTION IV

19.0 Following are listed some statements concerning administrative rules and regulations and functions of administration. Will you please examine each of them carefully and tell me whether you agree, partly agree or disagree with each?

*Agree      Partly      Disagree*  
*agree*

19.1 Observance of all rules and regulations only amounts to a lot of paper work and less of concrete work	(      ) (      ) (      )
19.2 Administrative procedures are so rigid that the administrator has little scope for employing his experience and better judgment in improving implementation of programme	(      ) (      ) (      )
19.3 If by ignoring some rules and regulations, solving of certain problems in the district is facilitated, the administrator should not hesitate to do that	(      ) (      ) (      )
19.4 Adherence to rules and regulations helps the administrator to protect the administration from unreasonable demands and influence	(      ) (      ) (      )
19.5 Even if it delays implementation of programmes, one should insist on strict observance of administrative procedures	(      ) (      ) (      )
19.6 When the instructions received from his superiors do not apply in certain special local situations, the administrator should not be bound by them	(      ) (      ) (      )
19.7 Administrator should use his better judgment to meet the demands of particular situations instead of following rules literally	(      ) (      ) (      )
19.8 The primary concern of the administrator is to see that rules and regulations are strictly followed	(      ) (      ) (      )

Agree Partly Disagree  
Agree

19.9 Rules are framed at higher levels, they do not take into account local problems and local situations ( ) ( ) ( )

19.10 The concern of an administrator should be to see that his superiors are satisfied with his work ( ) ( ) ( )

19.11 When faced with different instructions from higher level administrators and from elected leaders an administrator should usually follow instructions of elected leaders ( ) ( ) ( )

19.12 The primary concern of an administrator should be to see that people's needs and requirements are presented to the higher authorities before decisions are made ( ) ( ) ( )

19.13 An administrator can be effective only if he accommodates people's wishes on every issue ( ) ( ) ( )

19.14 An administrator should refrain from taking decisions which may displease local leaders ( ) ( ) ( )

19.15 The primary responsibility of an administrator is to give effect to the wishes, proposals and recommendations of local leaders ( ) ( ) ( )

19.16 Whatever the situation, the administrator should be guided only by the instructions received from his superiors ( ) ( ) ( )

19.17 An administrator is discharging his duty well if he seeks the advice of political leaders in dealing with local problems ( ) ( ) ( )

#### SECTION V

20.0 Following is a list of certain matters on which decisions are frequently made. We are interested in finding out who in your opinion should be primarily responsible for taking decision on each of the following

matters? That is to say, should it be the responsibility primarily of the administrator, or of elected leaders, or both or none?

	<i>Primarily administrator</i>	<i>Primarily leader</i>	<i>Both</i>	<i>None</i>
20.1 Formulation of broad policies	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.2 Fixing of priorities in programme implementation	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.3 Policy decisions relating to day-to-day working of government	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.4 Implementation of programmes	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.5 Distribution of loans, grants and subsidies	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.6 Allocation of licences, quotas and permits	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.8 Selection of sites for programmes	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.9 Disposal of public grievances	( )	( )	( )	( )
20.10 Dealing with emergency situations such as drought, floods, etc.	( )	( )	( )	( )
21.1 Are there any other important matters on which decisions are frequently made (SPECIFY)				

*Decisional matters (Q. 21.1)*

*Responsibility (Q. 21.2)*

21.2 Who in your opinion should be primarily responsible for this decision? (READ OUT EACH OF THE MATTERS MENTIONED IN Q. 21.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

22.0 An administrator has to keep in view many goals and considerations while taking a decision. We have listed a few of them here. Which

of the following in your opinion are always important, sometimes important or never important?

	<i>Always important</i>	<i>Sometimes important</i>	<i>Rarely important</i>	<i>Never important</i>
22.1 Opinion of local political leaders	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.2 Prestige of administration	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.3 Interests of majority in the community	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.4 Advice of technical experts	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.5 Removal of inequality	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.6 Suggestions of subordinates	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.7 Prestige of elected leaders	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.8 Maintenance of harmony in the community	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.9 Interests of minority groups	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.10 Adapting rules and regulations to new situations	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.11 Upliftment of scheduled castes and backward class people	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.12 Directives from above	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.13 Involving more and more people in government decision-making	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.14 Changing old attitudes and habits of people	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.15 Administrative efficiency	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.16 Needs and requirements of people	( )	( )	( )	( )
22.17 Conformity to existing rules and regulations	( )	( )	( )	( )

23.1 Are there any other goals and considerations which an administrator has to keep in view? (SPECIFY)

*Goals and considerations (Q. 23.1)*      *Frequency (Q. 23.2)*

23.2 While taking decision do you consider this to be always important, or sometimes important? (READ OUT EACH GOAL OR CONSIDERATION MENTIONED IN Q. 23.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

24.0 There are different opinions as to who has benefited from the current development programmes. In your opinion, to what extent has each of the following groups or classes of people derived benefit from these programmes? Does each one of them benefits most, benefits somewhat, or does not benefit at all from the current development programmes:

	<i>Benefits most</i>	<i>Benefits somewhat</i>	<i>Does not benefit</i>
24.1 Political leaders	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.2 Certain political parties	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.3 Supporters of certain political parties	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.4 Friends and close supporters of politicians	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.5 Relatives and family members of politicians	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.6 Certain caste and religious groups	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.7 Scheduled castes and backward class people	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.8 Big landowners	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.9 Higher caste people	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.10 Businessmen and industrialists	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.11 Educated people	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.12 Common man	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.13 Workers	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.14 Small cultivators and landless labourers	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.15 District as a whole	(      )	(      )	(      )

## 25.1 Any other groups or classes of people? (SPECIFY)

*Groups or Classes (Q. 25.1)*      *Extent of Benefits (Q. 25.2)*

25.2 Does this group or class of people benefit most, somewhat benefits or does not benefit? (READ OUT EACH GROUP OR CLASS MENTIONED IN Q. 25.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

26.0 Different people talk of different things which government officers must or must not do. Out of the following items which ones you think you must do, may or may not do, or must not do?

*Must do    May or may not do    Must not do*

26.1 Carryout decisions made by elected bodies such as Zila Parishad/Kshetra Samiti, etc.	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.2 Carryout decisions made by elected bodies which in your own opinion may be unsound	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.3 Take action against a subordinate official on the insistence of political leaders	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.4 Modify a policy decision on the advice of political leaders	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.5 Give consideration to feelings of local groups, such as caste and religious groups in undertaking new programmes	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.6 Protect subordinates from interference by local groups or politicians in discharging their duties	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.7 Give a helping hand in the elections of those leaders who usually help government official in solving day-to-day problems	(      )	(      )	(      )

	Must do	May or may not do	Must not do
26.8 Take definite stand against any unreasonable demand which may come from local leaders	( )	( )	( )
26.9 Maintain good relations with those local leaders, who have backing of the people	( )	( )	( )
26.10 Keep a powerful faction of local leaders satisfied if this helps implementation of government programmes	( )	( )	( )
26.11 Occasionally compromise with local pressure groups	( )	( )	( )
26.12 Consider favourably proposals of leaders enjoying public support even if such proposals are not sound	( )	( )	( )
26.13 Turn down a demand of political leaders when it is against government policy even if it is in the interest of the district	( )	( )	( )
26.14 Modify policy in the face of insistent popular demand	( )	( )	( )
26.15 Convey wishes and demands of local political leaders to higher level officials	( )	( )	( )
26.16 Explain government programmes and policies to local political leaders	( )	( )	( )

## SECTION VI

27.0 Following are some statements sometimes made by people about politicians and administrators. We would like to know your own impressions about politicians and administrators as a class or group, which you may have formed in the course of your association with public life. What we are interested in is not your evaluations of

particular individuals but your impressions of politicians and administrators in general. Let us take politicians first. How far do you agree with each of the views listed below:

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
27.1 Politicians help the administrator in getting popular support for government policies	( )	( )
27.2 Politicians bring to the notice of the administrators people's grievances and opinions	( )	( )
27.3 Politicians do not know how to manage public affairs	( )	( )
27.4 Politicians are an important link between government and people	( )	( )
27.5 Politicians are a check on administrative lapses	( )	( )
27.6 Politicians are not aware of administrative procedures, rules and regulations	( )	( )
27.7 Politicians work only in their self-interest	( )	( )
27.8 Politicians do nothing but create trouble for the administration	( )	( )
27.9 Politicians are hostile to administration	( )	( )
27.10 Politicians are so much involved in power struggle that they have little time to attend to actual problems	( )	( )
27.11 Politicians have no regard for administrative procedures, rules and regulations	( )	( )
27.12 Politicians help in making government policies realistic	( )	( )
27.13 Politicians are generally cooperative with administrators	( )	( )
27.14 Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressures on them	( )	( )
27.15 Politicians do not trust administrators	( )	( )
27.16 Politicians create more and more dissension in the community	( )	( )
27.17 Politicians are not sufficiently educated for running the government	( )	( )

	Agree	Disagree
27.18 Politicians do not appreciate the difficulties of administrators	( )	( )
27.19 Politicians are concerned only with furthering the interests of their own relatives and castemen	( )	( )
27.20 Politicians care for people's welfare	( )	( )
28.0 Let us now take administrators. How far do you agree with each of the views about administrators mentioned below:		
	Agree	Disagree
28.1 Administrators distrust politicians	( )	( )
28.2 Administrators guarantee fair and just treatment to all	( )	( )
28.3 Administrators are corrupt	( )	( )
28.4 Administrators are concerned mainly with improving their own prospects	( )	( )
28.5 Administrators do not appreciate viewpoints of political leaders	( )	( )
28.6 Administrators encourage local initiative	( )	( )
28.7 Administrators have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems	( )	( )
28.8 Administrators work in the interest of ruling groups	( )	( )
28.9 Administrators are responsive to new ideas and practices	( )	( )
28.10 Administrators do not listen to the advice of others, they do whatever they like	( )	( )
28.11 Administrators do not pay any heed to proposals and demands of political leaders	( )	( )
28.12 Administrators are very rigid in their attitude	( )	( )
28.13 Administrators have no knowledge of local problems	( )	( )
28.14 Administrators take part in local politics	( )	( )
28.15 Administrators are inefficient	( )	( )
28.16 Administrators are helpful to people in redressing their problems	( )	( )

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
28.17 Administrators are partial to particular groups and classes in the district	( )	( )
28.18 Coming from urban areas, the administrators do not care for village folks	( )	( )
28.19 Administrators keep themselves aloof from the people	( )	( )
28.20 Administrators do not appreciate the difficulties of politicians	( )	( )
28.21 Administrators are sticklers for rules	( )	( )
28.22 Administrators are indifferent to people's difficulties	( )	( )
28.23 Administrators are better educated and therefore capable of running the government better	( )	( )
28.24 Administrators are more concerned with putting up a show than doing concrete work	( )	( )

### SECTION VII

29.1 In general, how would you describe the attitude of politicians in the district towards you? I mean would you say that they are generally helpful or not?

1. Helpful      2. Indifferent      3. Unhelpful

30.1 Do the administrators in the district receive respect from the people one can expect for?

1. Yes      2. No

31.1 Who would you consider are the five most *respected* politicians in the district?

S. No.	Name	Position	Party if any
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

32.1 What qualities would you like to see in a politician you come into contact with (RECORD VERBATIM)

.....

.....

.....

## SECTION VIII

*Office Interview**Code No.*

33.1 What's your age? .....

33.2 Where have you spent most of your life? Village..... Dist.....

33.3 What are your educational qualifications? Town/City .....

33.4 What is your caste? .....

33.5 What is your religion? .....

33.6 What is your father's occupation?  
(IF FATHER DEAD OR RETIRED ASK)  
(Q. No. 33.7) .....

33.7 What was your father's occupation most of his life? .....

33.8 What is/was his total income? .....

33.9 As a citizen which political party do you feel closest to? .....

33.10 Given a choice between politics and government service, what would you advise your son to choose? Government Service.....  
Politics.....

33.11 What is your total monthly income? .....

33.12 Is any relative of yours active in politics? (SPECIFY RELATIONSHIP AND NOT NAMES)  
1. ....  
2. ....  
3. ....

33.13 Is any relative of yours in government service? (SPECIFY RELATIONSHIP AND NOT NAMES)  
1. ....  
2. ....  
3. ....

<i>Relation</i>	<i>Position</i>
-----------------	-----------------

1.

2.

3.

<i>Relation</i>	<i>Position</i>
-----------------	-----------------

1.

2.

3.

## 33.14 (Interview identify R's sex by sight)

34.1 Thank you very much for your cooperation. We have tried to cover as much ground as possible in this questionnaire. However, there may be certain things which might have escaped our notice. Would you kindly tell us from your own experience about any other aspects of relationship between politicians and administrators which you consider to be important?

**TO BE ENTERED BY INTERVIEWER IMMEDIATELY  
AFTER INTERVIEW**

*Not to be Asked:*

**SEX OF RESPONDENT:**

	1. Male	(	)
	2. Female	(	)

No. of Sessions	Date	Time began	Time ended	Place*	Interview completed/ not completed	Remarks
1st						
2nd						
3rd						
4th						

\*Code categories for the place of interview.

1. R's home
2. R's place of work
3. Public place
4. Other (specify)

*Was anyone else present?*

1. No one present (or only children under 16 present).
2. Others present but they took no part.
3. Others took part.

*Was permission needed from anyone other than 'R' to conduct the interview?*

1. Yes, permission obtained from members of R's family.
2. Yes, permission obtained from R's employer.
3. Yes, permission obtained from some local elite.
4. Yes, other permission obtained (specify).
5. No permission obtained.

Was the respondent cooperative?

1. Very cooperative (R seemed actively interested in helping).
2. Cooperative (R answered cooperatively but did not seem actively interested).
3. Uncooperative.

Describe briefly the style and condition of respondent's dress

.....  
.....  
.....

Additional comments by interviewer on the interview is there anything that would be useful to the research team in understanding the interview question—anything about the respondent, the setting or anything else.

## APPENDIX II

# QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POLITICIANS

## SECTION I

1.1 First of all we would like to know how long have you been active in public life?

(Years)..... (Months).....

2.1 What public offices have you held so far—how long, in which organizations and where?

*Organization      Position with level      Place      Duration*

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.

### 3.1 Are you a member of any political party?

### 3.A1 Which party?

3.B1 As a citizen, which party you feel closest to?

3.A2 Since how long have you been a member of this party?

3.B2 Was there ever a time when you felt closest to another party or parties?

3.A3 Was there ever a time when you were a member of any other party?

3.B3 (If yes) Which one(s)?

1. Yes 2. No

3.A4 (If yes) Which party?

## SECTION II

4.8 Regarding the solution of (REPEAT THE THIRD PROBLEM MENTIONED) would you say that the administrators in the district generally agree or generally disagree with your views on how to solve it?

(IF DISAGREE IN Q. 4.8)

4.9 In general, what are the main points of disagreement?

.....  
.....  
.....

(IF 'R' SAYS ADMINISTRATOR DIFFERS IN Q. 4.4, 4.6, or 4.8)

5.1 To what extent does this difference of opinion pose problems in discharging your duties?

1. Great extent      2. Somewhat      3. Not at all

(IF NO, SKIP TO NEXT SECTION)

(IF 1 OR 2 IN Q, 5,1)

## 5.2 In what way?

6.1 Would you say that it is very important, somewhat important or not important for political leaders to approach administrators in the district in getting various things done?

1. Very important 2. Somewhat important 3. Not important

7.1 How often is it that you contact administrators in the district to get their help?

8.1 Generally speaking on whose behalf do you approach the administrator? I mean is it mainly on your own behalf, or for your area, or for the whole district?

1. Mainly themselves      2. Mainly for their area  
3. For the district as a whole      4. Any other response

9.0 Other political leaders we have talked to have mentioned many kinds of problems which they take to administrators for redressal. Here is a list of problems generally mentioned. How frequently do you approach administrators with each of these problems?

	<i>Frequently</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Never</i>
9.1 Guidance on administrative procedures and rules	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
9.2 Law and order problems	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
9.3 Economic problems of the people	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
9.4 Problems of administrative delays	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
9.5 Problems concerning implementation of government plans	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
9.6 Problems arising from conflict between groups (social, economic, political, etc.)	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
10.1 Can you think of any other?				

*Problems Q. 10.1*

*Frequency Q. 10.2*

10.2 How frequently do you approach administrators with the problems (READ OUT PROBLEM MENTIONED IN Q. 10.1 AND RECORD ABOVE.)

11.0 Often politicians have to approach administrators for getting certain things done for different groups and individuals in the district. Generally speaking whose problems do politicians in your opinion, usually bring to the notice of administrator and how often?

	<i>Frequently</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Never</i>
11.1 Problems concerning politicians' personal benefit	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
11.2 Problems concerning the interests of their friends and close supporters	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )

	<i>Frequently</i>	<i>Sometimes</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Never</i>
11.3 Problems concerning the interests of their relatives and family members	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.4 Problems concerning interests of certain castes or religious groups in the community	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.5 Problems concerning interests of particular political parties	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.6 Problems concerning welfare of the people of their own area	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.7 Problems concerning welfare of the whole district	( )	( )	( )	( )
11.8 Problems concerning interests of certain political factions or groups	( )	( )	( )	( )
12.1 Problems concerning any others? (SPECIFY)				

*Problems Q. (12.1)**Frequency Q. (12.2)*

12.2 How frequently is this problem brought before you? (READ OUT EACH PROBLEM MENTIONED IN Q. 13.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

13.1 Do administrators, in your experience, approach political leaders for asking certain favours?

1. Yes

2. No

13.2 What kinds of favours do administrators usually ask of political leaders?

*Favours**Frequency*

13.3 How often does each happen? Does this happen very frequently, sometimes, or rarely (READ OUT EACH FAVOUR MENTIONED IN Q. 13.2 AND RECORD ABOVE)

13.4 Now let us take political leaders. Do they in your opinion go to administrators with improper demands?

1. Yes
2. No

13.5 How frequently, would you say, politicians make unreasonable demands on administrators?

1. Very frequently
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

14.0 How do you feel when an administrator refuses to meet your demands or proposals? For instance:

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
14.1 Do you feel that the administrator is justified in refusing to comply with your demands or proposals?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.2 Do you feel that the administrator declines to comply with your demands without giving a careful consideration?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.3 Do you feel that the administrator declines most of the time because he does not want to do real work?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.4 Do you feel that he is prejudiced, therefore he does not listen to your demands?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.5 Do you feel that he is inept, therefore action should be taken against him?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.6 Do you feel that his behaviour should be exposed to public?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.7 Do you feel that the administrator enjoys powerful protection, so hardly anything can be done about it?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14.8 Do you feel that he is helpless due to procedural and administrative difficulties?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15.1 Do you have any other things to add in this regard?		
	1. Yes	2. No
(IF YES IN Q. 15.1)		
15.2 Kindly elaborate?		

1. Yes  
(IF YES IN Q. 15.1)

16.0 It is the experience of many political leaders that for getting certain things done it becomes necessary to bring pressures on administrators. Following is a list of possible actions that politicians may have to take to induce administrators to favourably respond. How often in your opinion, politicians in general apply each of the following pressures?

*Frequently   Sometimes   Rarely   Never*

16.1	Attempt at persuasion through important citizens	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.2	Making it public issue by organizing agitation, procession, etc.	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.3	Persuasion through his friends and relatives	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.4	Attempt at persuasion through other political leaders of the district	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.5	Bringing pressures from higher levels of administration	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.6	Bringing pressures from political leaders at higher levels (such as MLA, MP, Ministers)	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.7	Promise of better career opportunities	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.8	Promise of taking responsibility of consequences	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.9	Affecting service record	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.10	Affecting service conditions by transfer, complain to higher level, etc.	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
16.11	Offer monetary incentives or other such rewards	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )

## 17.1 Any other kind of pressures? (SPECIFY)

*Pressures Q. 17.1**Frequency Q. 17.2*

(IF YES IN Q. 17.1)

17.2 How often is this pressure used by politicians? (READ OUT EACH PRESSURE MENTIONED IN Q. 17.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

17.3 Of the above actions which ones in your experience usually prove most effective? (Note Number of the items only)

.....  
 .....  
 .....

18.0 Generally speaking, what course of action do administrators usually follow when political leaders bring pressures on them for getting their demands fulfilled? Here is a list of courses of actions said to be followed by them. In your opinion which of these are mostly followed, sometimes followed or never followed by administrators?

*Mostly      Sometimes      Rarely      Never*

18.1 They explain limitations due to rules, regulations and directives	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
18.2 They appeal to the reason and good sense of the politicians	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
18.3 They seek help of other local leaders and prominent citizens	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
18.4 They seek support from another competing political group	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
18.5 They try to create public opinion through formal or informal channels	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )

*Mostly   Sometimes   Rarely   Never*

18.6 They try to deal with the situation themselves but by seeking the support of higher levels of administration ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

18.7 They try to postpone decision till favourable situation arises ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

18.8 They try to seek transfer to some other place ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

18.9 They try to deal with the situation themselves but by seeking support of higher level political leaders such as MLA, MP and Minister ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

18.10 They refer the matter to higher authorities ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

19.1 Any other course of action they may take? (SPECIFY)

*Course of action Q. 19.1*

*Frequency Q. 19.2*

### SECTION III

20.0 Here are five statements sometimes made by people about the relationship between politician and administrator. I would like you to choose one which fits most closely with what you think should be an ideal relationship between the two.

20.1 In discharging his duties an administrator should not have anything to do with political leaders. ( )

20.2 The administrator's responsibility should cease once he has explained government policies, and rules/directives to political leaders. ( )

20.3 The administrator should consult local political leaders. ( )

20.4 The administrator should not be satisfied merely with consulting local political leaders but get their active cooperation while discharging his duties. ( )

20.5 The administrator should be mainly guided by the advice of political leaders in discharging his duties. ( )

21.0 Following are listed some statements concerning administrative rules and regulations and functions of administration. Will you please examine each of them carefully and tell me whether you agree, partly agree or disagree?

Agree Partly Agree Disagree

21.1 When elected to the public office a political leader must stand by the government in the face of even strong public demands ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

21.2 It is permissible for a political leader to act sometimes in an unauthorised manner if he is convinced that his action is ultimately for the good of the people ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

21.3 A political leader should only implement the demands and expectations of the people and not act independently ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

21.4 A political leader should always support his partymen even if their actions are at times unjustified ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

21.5 Under certain compelling conditions a politician is justified in acting undemocratically ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

21.6 If the leader is himself convinced of what is the best action he must try to implement even though he has to use some pressure on the people ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

21.7 You cannot act according to the principles of democracy with those who themselves do not believe in democracy ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

*Agree*   *Partly Agree*   *Disagree*

21.8 The most important thing for a leader is to follow his convictions even if they are different from what the constituency expects from him ( ) ( ) ( )

21.9 Use of unscrupulous means by a politician may sometimes be forgiven if they lead to the strengthening of his party ( ) ( ) ( )

21.10 After being elected to a public office, a political leader is not obligated to carry out decisions made by his predecessors ( ) ( ) ( )

21.11 A political leader should refrain from making proposals that may cause division in the party even if these proposals are important for the community ( ) ( ) ( )

21.12 Even if it delays development of the country, strict adherence to democratic methods should be insisted on ( ) ( ) ( )

21.13 Any decisions that threaten to alienate a sector or group in the community should be given up ( ) ( ) ( )

21.14 Politics being what it is one has often to compromise with principles ( ) ( ) ( )

21.15 A leader is obligated to follow the wishes of the community even if he thinks the people are mistaken ( ) ( ) ( )

21.16 If some misguided section of the people do not listen to persuasion they should be suppressed in the interest of the country ( ) ( ) ( )

21.17 What matters is quick and tangible results no matter by what methods they are achieved ( ) ( ) ( )

## SECTION V

22.0 Following is a list of certain matters on which decisions are frequently made. We are interested in finding out who in your opinion should be primarily responsible for taking decision on each of the following matters? That is to say, should it be the responsibility primarily of the administrator, or of elected leaders, or both or none?

	<i>Primarily administrator</i>	<i>Primarily leader</i>	<i>Both</i>	<i>None</i>
22.1 Formulation of broad policies	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.2 Fixing of priorities in programme implementation	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.3 Policy decisions relating to day-to-day working of government	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.4 Implementation of programmes	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.5 Distribution of loans, grants and subsidies	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.6 Allocation of licences, quotas and permits	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.7 Selection of sites for programmes	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.8 Management and control of public/government funds	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.9 Disposal of public grievances	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
22.10 Dealing with emergency situations such as drought, floods, etc.	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
23.1 Are there any others on which decisions are frequently made? (SPECIFY)				

*Decisional matters (Q. 23.1)*

*Responsibility (Q. 23.1)*

23.2 Who in your opinion should be primarily responsible for this decision?  
(READ OUT EACH OF THE MATTERS MENTIONED IN Q. 23.1 AND RECORD)

24.0 An administrator has to keep in view many goals and considerations while taking a decision. We have listed a few of them here. Which of the following in your opinion are important, sometimes important or never important?

	<i>Always important</i>	<i>Sometimes important</i>	<i>Rarely important</i>	<i>Never important</i>
24.1 Directives from above	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.2 Views of superior officers	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.3 Opinion of politicians in power	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.4 Opinion of other local politicians	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.5 Prestige of administration	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.6 Interests of the majority community	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.7 Advice of technical experts	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.8 Suggestions of subordinates	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.9 Prestige of elected leaders	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.10 Maintenance of harmony in the community	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.11 Interests of minority groups	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.12 Upliftment of scheduled castes and backward class people	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.13 Removal of inequality	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.14 Involving more and more people in government decision-making	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.15 Changing old attitudes and habits of people	( )	( )	( )	( )
24.16 Adapting rules and regulations to new situations	( )	( )	( )	( )

	<i>Always important</i>	<i>Sometimes important</i>	<i>Rarely important</i>	<i>Never important</i>
24.17 Administrative efficiency	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.18 Needs and requirements of people	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
24.19 Conformity to existing rules and regulations	(      )	(      )	(      )	(      )
25.1 Are there any other goals and considerations which an administrator has to keep in view?				

*Goals and considerations Q. (25.1)**Frequency Q. (25.2)*

25.2 While taking decision do you consider this to be always important, or sometimes important? (READ OUT EACH GOAL OR CONSIDERATION MENTIONED IN Q. 25.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

26.0 There are different opinions as to who has benefited most from the current development programmes. In your opinion to what extent has each of the following groups or classes of people derived benefit from these programmes:

	<i>Benefits most</i>	<i>Benefits somewhat</i>	<i>Does not benefit</i>
26.1 Political leaders	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.2 Certain political parties	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.3 Supporters of certain political parties	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.4 Friends and close supporters of politi- cians	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.5 Relatives and family members of politicians	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.6 Scheduled castes and backward class people	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.7 Big landowners	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.8 Higher caste people	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.9 Businessmen and industrialists	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.10 Educated people	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.11 Common man	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.12 Workers	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.13 Small cultivators and landless labourers	(      )	(      )	(      )
26.14 Community (District as a whole)	(      )	(      )	(      )

## 27.1 Any other groups or classes of people? (SPECIFY)

*Groups or Class (Q. 27.1)**Extent of Benefit (Q. 27.2)*

27.2 Does this group or class of people benefit most, somewhat benefits or does not benefit? (READ OUT EACH GROUP OR CLASS MENTIONED IN Q. 27.1 AND RECORD ABOVE)

28.0 Different people talk of different things which politicians must or must not do. Out of the following items which ones do you think you must do, may or may not do or must not do:

	<i>Must do</i>	<i>May or may not do</i>	<i>Must not do</i>
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28.1 Convey wishes and opinion of the people to administration	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.2 Keep a strict watch on administrative performance	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.3 Bring to public notice faults or flaws of administration	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.4 Strictly pursue at 'hands off' policy <i>vis-a-vis</i> administration	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.5 Advise administrators about the best course of action	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.6 Cooperate with administrators in carrying out government programmes	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.7 Provide administrators with relevant informations for making decisions	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.8 To support agitation against unjust government action	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.9 Cooperate with those administrators who agree with your viewpoint	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.10 To prevent administrators from taking improper action by agitation, etc.	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.11 Utilize administration for party building activities	(      )	(      )	(      )
28.12 Intervene when administrators ignore people's demands	(      )	(      )	(      )

	<i>Must do</i>	<i>May or may not do</i>	<i>Must not do</i>
28.13 Insist that administrators be guided in their action by advice given by politicians	( )	( )	( )
28.14 Seek intervention by political leaders at higher levels for correcting administrative ills at the district	( )	( )	( )
28.15 Request administrators to help in carrying out constructive party programmes	( )	( )	( )
28.16 Accept judgment of administrators in matters of policy implementation	( )	( )	( )
28.17 Protect administrators from public demands and unreasonable criticism	( )	( )	( )
29.0 Following are some statements sometimes made by people about administrators and politicians. We would like to know your own impressions about administrators and politicians as a class or group, which you may have formed in the course of your association with public life. What we are interested in is not your evaluations of particular individuals but your impressions of administrators and politicians in general. Let us take administrators first. How far do you agree with each of the views listed below.			

	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
29.1 Administrators distrust politicians	( )	( )
29.2 Administrators guarantee fair and just treatment to all	( )	( )
29.3 Administrators are corrupt	( )	( )
29.4 Administrators are concerned mainly with improving their own prospects	( )	( )
29.5 Administrators do not appreciate viewpoints of political leaders	( )	( )
29.6 Administrators encourage local initiative	( )	( )
29.7 Administrators have a tendency to expand the departments and increase procedures instead of solving concrete problems	( )	( )
29.8 Administrators work in the interest of ruling groups	( )	( )

Agree Disagree

29.9 Administrators are responsive to new ideas and practices ( ) ( )

29.10 Administrators do not listen to the advice of others, they do whatever they like ( ) ( )

29.11 Administrators do not pay any heed to proposals and demands of political leaders ( ) ( )

29.12 Administrators are very rigid in their attitude ( ) ( )

29.13 Administrators have no knowledge of local problems ( ) ( )

29.14 Administrators take part in local politics ( ) ( )

29.15 Administrators are inefficient ( ) ( )

29.16 Administrators are helpful to people in redressing their problems ( ) ( )

29.17 Administrators are partial to particular groups and classes in the district ( ) ( )

29.18 Coming from urban areas, the administrators do not care for village folks ( ) ( )

29.19 Administrators keep themselves aloof from the people ( ) ( )

29.20 Administrators do not appreciate the difficulties of politicians ( ) ( )

29.21 Administrators are sticklers for rules ( ) ( )

29.22 Administrators are indifferent to people's difficulties ( ) ( )

29.23 Administrators are better educated and so capable of running the government better ( ) ( )

29.24 Administrators are more concerned with putting up a show than doing concrete work ( ) ( )

30.0 Let us now take politicians. How far do you agree with each of the views about politicians mentioned below.

Agree Disagree

30.1 Politicians help the administrators in getting popular support for government policies ( ) ( )

30.2 Politicians bring to the notice of the administrators people's grievances and opinions ( ) ( )

	Agree	Disagree
30.3 Politicians do not know how to manage public affairs	( )	( )
30.4 Politicians are an important link between governments and people	( )	( )
30.5 Politicians are a check on administrative lapses	( )	( )
30.6 Politicians are not well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	( )	( )
30.7 Politicians work only in their self-interest	( )	( )
30.8 Politicians do nothing but create trouble for the administration	( )	( )
30.9 Politicians are hostile to administration	( )	( )
30.10 Politicians are so much involved in power struggle that they have little time to attend to actual problems	( )	( )
30.11 Politicians have no regard for administrative procedures, rules and regulations	( )	( )
30.12 Politicians help in making government policies realistic	( )	( )
30.13 Politicians are generally cooperative with administrators	( )	( )
30.14 Politicians cannot act in a decisive manner because of various conflicting pressures on them	( )	( )
30.15 Politicians do not trust administrators	( )	( )
30.16 Politicians create more and more dissension in the community	( )	( )
30.17 Politicians are not sufficiently educated for running the government	( )	( )
30.18 Politicians do not appreciate the difficulties of administrators	( )	( )
30.19 Politicians are concerned only with furthering the interest of their own relatives and castemen	( )	( )
30.20 Politicians care for people's welfare	( )	( )

## SECTION VII

31.1 In general, how would you describe the attitude of administrators in this district towards you? I mean would you say that they are generally helpful or not?

1. Helpful      2. Indifferent      3. Unhelpful

32.1 Do the political leaders in the district receive respect from the people one can expect for?

1. Yes      2. No

33.1 Who would you say are the five most *respected* administrators in the district?

*Sl. No.*      *Name*      *Position*      *Party if any*

1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.

34.1 What qualities would you like to see in the administrator you come in contact with ? (RECORD VERBATIM)

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

## SECTION VIII

Office Interview No.

Code No.

35.1 What is your age? .....

35.2 Where have you spent most of your life?      Village ..... District .....

.....  
.....

35.3 What are your educational qualifications? .....

.....  
.....

35.4 What is your caste? .....

35.5 What is your religion? .....

35.6 What is your father's occupation? .....

(If father dead or retired)

35.7 What was your father's occupation most of his life? .....

35.8 What is/was his total income? .....

35.9 Given a choice between politics and government service, what would you advise your son to choose? Politics.....  
Government service .....

35.10 What is your total monthly income? .....

35.11 Is any relative of yours active in politics? (Specify relationship and not names) *Relation* *Position*  
 1.  
 2.  
 3.

35.12 Is any relative of yours in government service? (Specify relationship and not names) *Relation* *Position*  
 1.  
 2.  
 3.

36.1 Thank you very much for your cooperation. We have tried to cover as much ground as possible in this questionnaire. However, there may be certain things which might have escaped our notice. Would you kindly tell us from your experience about any other aspects of relationship between politicians and administrators which you consider to be important?

TO BE ENTERED BY INTERVIEWER IMMEDIATELY  
AFTER INTERVIEW*Not to be asked:*

## SEX OF RESPONDENT:

1. Male ( )  
2. Female ( )

No. of sessions	Date	Time began	Time ended	Place*	Interview completed/ not completed	Remarks
1st						
2nd						
3rd						
4th						

\*Code categories for the place of interview.

1. R's home  
2. R's place of work  
3. Public place  
4. Other (specify)

Was anyone else present?

1. No one present (or only children under 16 present).  
2. Others present but they took no part.  
3. Others took part.

Was permission needed from anyone other than 'R' to conduct interview?

1. Yes, permission obtained from members of R's family.  
2. Yes, permission obtained from R's employer.  
3. Yes, permission obtained from some local elite.  
4. Yes, other permission obtained (specify).  
5. No permission obtained.

Was the respondent cooperative?

1. Very cooperative (R seemed actively interested in helping).  
2. Co-operative (R answered cooperatively but did not seem actively interested).  
3. Uncooperative.

Describe briefly the style and condition of respondent's dress

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Additional comments by interviewer on the interview: Is there anything that would be useful to the research team in understanding the interview question—anything about the respondent, the setting or anything else.